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Chapter One   Introduction 
The long twentieth century is,                                                 
agency. Children are not simply seen to be, but seen, heard and felt to do. Children are not 
simply beings, they are more significantly doings. They are actors, authors, authorities and 
agents. They make a difference to the world we live in. Over the period from the late 
nineteenth century to now in the early twenty-                                            
intensified and the areas in which they are able to do has proliferated. Children have been 
seen and felt to do in the life of family, the life of society, the life of politics and the life of 
economy. 
It is not simply that the child in the singular has become a focus of huge emotional, 
social, cultural, technological and economic investment, rather it is that over the course of 
the last hundred years or so children as a class or group or collective of people have become 
more vocal, more visible and more demonstrable in ways that resonate across our 
contemporary world. Across this period of time it is not only the presence of children as 
                                                                                         -social 
or pre-social actors that has intrigued investigators, provoked debate, and led, among other 
things, to research, surveying, institutionalisation, building, support, sanctions and 
             A                                                                      
because somehow children over this period of time have gained a voice which was before 
hidden or that they had a strength and political power that has until now not been revealed. 
N                                                                                          
natural and technological contexts has been dependent on their being networked, 
assembled  or infrastructured with other persons and things in such ways as to endow them 
with powers, which they alone could neither hold nor use.  5 
 
To put this crudely, over much of the twentieth century we have seen the 
emergence, development and embedding of children as being seen to have a stake in the 
institutions and processes which govern their lives and others. Children are increasingly 
seen and related to as democratic subjects. Nobody is saying, nor have they said, that this is 
straightforward nor even that it has been achieved (whatever that might mean), but across 
the major social institutions of family, school, criminal justice, health and medicine, 
consumer culture and work, and political structures proper it is impossible now when talking 
about children not also to talk about their stake in the decision-making process and their 
role in shaping the institutions and organisations that shape them. What power do children 
and young people have in modern families? Should children have a say over the school 
curriculum? Does it make sense to talk about infants and babies as having political rights? 
Alongside the democratisation of our relations with children, we see a huge investment in 
children as consumers. Either directly as consumers of toys, television programmes and 
computer games or as influencing the purchasing decisions in the household, children are 
addressed as significant economic agents. As many commentators have shown, the 
relationship between children as democratic subjects and children as consumers 
demonstrates often intertwined histories (Cook, 2004; Oswell, 2002). The growth of the 
modern mass media of novel, magazine, film, radio and television address children as 
distinct and separate audiences and often narrate their lives in ways that endow them with 
power over their lives, their environment and the lives of others. Different again, our 
                                                                                             
street or in the ghetto or with children as the vehicles of crime through generations across 
time. The sins of the fathers and mothers are seen by some as most visibly present in the 
infant, whose nakedness is often seen to conceal the wickedness of a changeling. And the 6 
 
health of populations is now often seen to reside in either the neglect or well-being of 
children. Panaceas, for example, directed to the psychiatric disorders of young children 
playing in the nurseries repeat a longstanding hope that the agency of children will, like a 
pharmakon (both cure and poison), bring about a new Jerusalem. 
Of course, the narration of children setting off on adventures and becoming kings 
and queens in strange lands in worlds of fiction is a long way from children sitting in a 
council chamber making decisions which affect how we live our lives. The buying of a 
computer game is similarly very different from being able to determine with whom one lives 
during the process of family divorce. And the transformative power of an educated child is 
different from that of a genetic disorder. To suggest otherwise would be ridiculous, but 
across the different modalities of power and expression, the different apparatuses, 
institutions and organisations, the different materialities and relations, and the different 
histories, temporalities and geographies, sociologists of children have provided research and 
ideas that demonstrate how the capacity for children to determine theirs and others lives 
has emerged and grown, certainly over the long twentieth century, but also slowly and 
incrementally over the last two to three hundred years. 
In sociology, but also anthropology, psychology, literary theory, art history, media 
analysis, history and various other disciplines, groups of pioneering scholars began to 
provide empirical and theoretical understanding for the emerging, developing and 
extending agency of children. My concern in this book, though, is not to attempt the huge 
task of surveying and synthesising an interdisciplinary field of childhood studies (as it is now 
often termed), but the more modest, but equally huge, task of building on the significant 
research in the sociology of children, which has grown significantly since the late 1980s and 
                                                                      T              7 
 
contribution to the growing field of childhood studies, but only so from a particular 
perspective and trajectory. In that sense, this book emerges out of a particular disciplinary 
formation and it is framed in the context of questions and debates that come from that field 
of study and research. But more than that, it is a book that hopes to introduce newcomers 
to the field in a manner that acknowledges the huge debt of much original and significant 
research from the sociology of children. I should note here that, although there is some 
discussi                                  I                                                    
                               
For many people studying and researching children, there are four central questions: 
what is a child, in what ways is childhood differentiated from adulthood, how do we 
understand the growth of a child, and what freedoms or controls are appropriate to be 
placed on the child? For many people, these questions are intimately related. We know 
what a child is in the context of how that child is different from an adult and how they might 
be seen to progress from one stage of being to another and according to that age certain 
conduct is permitted or prohibited. Even those who would baulk at the thought of such 
thinking are, by and large, caught by the attraction of trying to understand children through 
the divisions and walls that separate them from adults. We can refer to this as the 
identity/difference thesis, namely that children (or childhood) have a distinct identity, 
whether this identity is considered in social or biological terms. Moreover, this identity is 
understood only inasmuch as it constitutes a difference from adults (or adulthood). Thus, 
we know children and childhood only by virtue of their difference from adults and 
adulthood. Equally though there are many people for whom such natures and divisions have 
a lesser importance and for whom living with or as children is a matter of the singularities or 
particularities of that particular being, doing and becoming. There is a need, we argue, to tilt 8 
 
                                                                                       
lives and experiences. We argue that the various ways of being children are such that they 
                                                                     nce has a persistent 
qualitativeness. Children are measured and standardised through a variety of different 
scales. The arrangement of children according to one set of measures is populated by adults 
and their organisation is messier than a sharp-edged ruler. In many cases there is no relation 
across the different scales, in some the relation is far from clear and precise. No difference 
is well-executed. In that respect the book hopefully touches on the sympathies that have 
grown in this relatively young field of knowledge, not to police the line of difference, but 
simply to observe, to investigate, and to describe. 
T                                                                            
inasmuch as agency might be paired with social structure (although that certainly is a focus 
of chapter three                                                                      
                                                                                           
inasmuch as it allows us to think through the different ways in which children and young 
people have been and are actively involved in emergent, innovative, experimental and 
substantive forms of solidarity and co-existence. But also it allows us to think through how 
children and young people are, whether in whole or part, the focus of innovation and 
investment in the shaping and reshaping of social existence. My concern in this book is to 
                                                                                        
novel investigations and pathways, rather than a restrictive and limiting notion. For what we 
see across the broad and growing field of research in childhood studies is, for sure, the 
repetition of a normative model of social science which endlessly returns to the dichotomy 
or duality of structure and agency, but we also see a huge array of innovative studies which 9 
 
                                                                                          
engagement with their everyday lives and with the enduring patterns of social and historical 
presence. Over the course of this book, my intention is to survey some of this work in a way 
that offers a series of sketches of the different, complex and multiscalar articulations of 
                   In that sense, the book is intended to provide a series of meta-
observations on this growing field in order to make visible an array of descriptions of agency 
in the lives of children. 
The design of the book is quite simple. It is shaped by an intention to review some of 
the existing literature in the field and peripheral fields. It is intended as an exploration of 
                                                          a self-present consciousness or 
reflexive subjectivity of the unitary child, but considers agency in all its mobilisation, 
                                I              gency is not centred on a point of origin, 
                                                                                             
Agency is not, then, performed in the manner of He-M       M             U          I      
            I                  W                                                         
supported through human and non-human arrangements and infrastructures. Moreover, 
agency, as it is not seen to be centred on human reflexivity, is distributed across human and 
non-human arrangements and infrastructures, but it also rests as much on parts of children 
as on whole children. Rarely is there concern about children or the child in a holistic sense, 
                                                                                       viral 
                                                         
The book considers these issues through a series of key problem-spaces, which have 
attracted concern and investment from a range of different actors, including academics, 
experts, governmental authorities, children, teachers, parents and various others. These 10 
 
spaces   concerning the family, schooling, crime, health, play and consumer culture, 
                                          can be seen to comprise some of the main 
concentrations of research in the field of childhood studies. The areas are defined in part by 
                                                                                             
market, namely to those concentrations of government and economy with respect to their 
lives as children. By and large the book reflects the limitations of the field of childhood 
studies inasmuch as it is shaped within the histories, social contexts, economies and 
governmentalities of Europe and North America. The more recent research that has become 
visible in the field from Latin America, India, China and Africa raises serious questions and 
points of discussion and dialogue with much of what I say. But also there are many bridges 
and continuities across the different national and regional contexts. I have included some of 
that emerging material, but too little. 
T                                                                                
attempts to provide, not any                                                                 
with what Fouc                                  D           ‘               In that sense, its 
intentions are limited to making more visible a rich analytical and descriptive language 








Chapter Two   Agency after Ariès: Sentiments, Natures and Spaces 
In this chapter I return to a seminal work in the sociology of childhood, written by 
the historian Philippe Ariès over fifty years ago. The book, Centuries of Childhood (1962) was 
originally titled in French as L E      et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime (1960). It 
offered a history of childhood, but also perhaps more importantly it provided a way of 
                                                                                            
even childhood as an image, but children whose very distinctiveness as children is a 
consequence of their history. What Ariès gives us is a sense of children as imbued with a 
historicity. Children are seen as having a historical particularity, as constituting not only a 
social or psychological, but an historical subjectivity. F                      A           H   
did we come from that ignorance of childhood to the centring of the family around the child 
                                                                                           
(despite what Ariès insists), but one which changes our relationality with and as children. It 
is only with the work of Ariès and others in the 1960s that that particularity is able to be 
understood qua historical particularity: namely, as an aspect of historical self-reflection and 
reflexivity. But also this sense that children have a historical existence implies that the 
experiences and agencies of children are disclosed within a horizon of historical reflection.  
Nevertheless, the sociology of childhood has really only been concerned with three 
           A                                                                                   
thus a social institution (not a biological given), and that childhood constitutes a form of 
division and segregation between children and adults. In the proceeding sections I follow 
Ariès obliquely in order to provide brief genealogies of three main thematics which 
undergird much of this book. In doing so, I am sympathetic to, but also highly critical of (a 
                                  A      argument inasmuch as, I argue that, children are not 12 
 
reducible to categorical forms of conceptualisation, children as a collectivity are not 
reducible to a social invention, and children as modern collective subjects are not reducible 
to their enclosure wi                    -              T                       I             
                                                                                             
of childhood.  
 
Sentiments and Descriptions 
A pivotal idea in the sociology of childhood is that childhood is a social construction. 
Those beings which we perceive as children are perceived and understood as separate 
entities with definable attributes and qualities only by virtue of their being socially 
             T                                                                            
mind inasmuch as their agency is conditioned in some sense by their being defined as 
children, inasmuch as they are constrained by the institutions which reproduce this category 
of childhood, and inasmuch as their agency is directed to either reproducing or contesting 
this structurally reproduced category of childhood.  
 
Iconographies and the Accumulation of Description 
The sociological argument about childhood as a social construction or a social 
institution is an argument that, as I have mentioned above, sociologists trace back to Ariès: 
namely that childhood is a social and historical invention and that, although children (as 
those in a state of biological immaturity) have existed for all time, childhood as a 
              Archard, 1993                        has had a finite and specific period of 
existence. Ariès boldly states that: 13 
 
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to 
suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of 
childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds 
to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular 
nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. 
In medieval society this awareness was lacking. (Ariès, 1962: 128) 
M       A                                                                               
centrality of the school in shaping modern ideas of childhood and the school as constituting 
                         A    , 1962: 397). But in the context of his discussion of the family, 
                                                                                        
but also of the centrality of the child and an image of childhood within that family (Ariès, 
1962: 340-41). For Ariès, the idea of childhood is an expression of a more general idea of the 
family. But what is significant is his presentation of an argument about the idea of childhood 
in terms of the emergence and growth of a particular iconography. For Ariès, an awareness 
of the existence of children as different and as particular in their own right is made visible, 
in part, through representational practices and visualising technologies. Thus, he argues: 
Medieval art until about the twelfth century did not know childhood or did 
not attempt to portray it. It is hard to believe that this neglect was due to 
incompetence or incapacity; it seems more probable that there was no 
place for childhood in the medieval world. (Ariès, 1962, 31) 
And he continues: 
It was in the seventeenth century that portraits of children on their own 
became numerous and commonplace. It was in the seventeenth century, 
too, that the family portrait, a much older genre, tended to plan itself 14 
 
                  I                                                     
the child a place of honour, with countless childhood scenes of a 
                        N                                                
thirteenth century, and its progress can be traced in the history of art in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But the evidence of its development 
became more plentiful and significant from the end of the sixteenth 
century and throughout the seventeenth. (Ariès, 1962, 44-5) 
Childhood is made visible literally through a series of descriptions and the development of 
new iconographies. These iconographies have aesthetic form, but they also have material 
and cultural durability inasmuch as their effect is able to accumulate over time and 
inasmuch as a clear concept is able to be seen only as a consequence of such accumulation. 
W                              A                        hildhood is not seen to 
emerge in a momentous instance, a single creative event, but through the longue durée 
across historical, social, geographical and economic time. It is the consequence of a number 
of contingencies that only in their accumulation become visible as a single phenomenon 
(Bloch, 2006; Braudel, 1980). This sense of the historical duration of the becoming of 
children as definable beings is something which has been sometimes overlooked by 
sociologists of childhood, who often focus on social constructions as accomplishments in 
                                                                          y, in conditions of 
co-presence). Where Ariès is concerned with agencies which come together over the long 
temporalities of tens and hundreds of years, sociologists have tended to be micro-




Concept, Conception or Sentiment? 
T               D     A                 A                                             
                                             C                                            
childhood and yet different societies at different moments in history might have different 
conceptions of childhood. Whereas the former identifies an object or being which is as yet 
undefined or which lacks concrete attributes, the latter refers to the actual definitions or 
attributes of childhood (Archard, 1993: 21-24). Adrian Wilson had stated earlier that 
                                  our                                                         
                                W                -3). Archard and Wilson before refer to 
                               W                                                           
perspective of the present. There is, of course, a secondary aspect to this discussion 
concerning whether an awareness of childhood refers to an awareness of children in the 
singular (i.e. to my child, or to this particular child in front of me) or to children with some 
sense of collective presence (i.e. children as a collectively understood body of people). 
Many historians since Ariès have subsequently uncovered a wealth of evidence 
regarding how past societies imagined and acted in relation to children. But in many ways it 
    A                                                                   A                    
descriptive devices and forms of description through which children could become 
intelligible to themselves and others. The focus on portraiture is highly significant in this 
sense. Children become visible by virtue of the descriptive devices which shape them as 
beings in the world and beings in relation to others. Although sociologists now talk of 
descriptive assemblages (Savage, 2009) or inscription devices (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), 
A                                                                          T                
inscription device is that it is seen to have a direct relationship to that which is recorded, but 16 
 
also that through inscription (i.e. writing and recording) a social order is materially made 
(Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 51 and 245). In this sense the observations of children by 
various artists helps to establish children within a particular form of social order (i.e. with 
regard to social class and status, a relation to the household and countryside, a relation to 
adults and family, and a relation to forms of dress and comportment). But the notion of 
                                                                                            
something more evocative of the senses, and something less cognitively framed or 
experienced. And yet Ariès frames the pivotal point of his argument through a limited sense 
of what that sentiment might be, namely a sense dominated by the visual and the image. 
T            E                      A                                                         
                                                               ame a history of childhood in the 
context both of a history of visual culture, but also a history of the relationship between 
image, concept and ideology (see Mitchell, 1986).  
Notwithstanding the visual, we should not forget nor disavow the breadth of 
sentiments, sensations and materialities through which relations are constructed in the 
world. If we assume such a leading position for the concept or category or image as 
cognitively defined, then we might justly                                               or 
                                                                                           
collective being. How have children been assembled through those sentiments, sensations 
and affective relations? Anecdotally, we might note how adults talk, for example, about the 
smell of a young baby as an index of affection, more so maybe than how a baby looks. 
Moreover, the smelling of new baby by a parent is often followed by a closer embrace or 
       T                  I                  I                  combination of senses that 
facilitates any feeling of intimacy or distance for the child and any sense of what the child is. 17 
 
A number of historians writing in the 1960s and 1970s   over and above Ariès comments 
                                    - supported a thesis, generally stated, that over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there developed a greater intimacy 
between parent and child (de Mause, 1974; Shorter, 1975; Stone, 1977). Much of this 
historical research has now been either seriously amended or outright dismissed. But much 
of the criticism has focused on the historical accuracy of the findings or corrections 
inasmuch as intimate relations between parents and children have been discovered, for 
example, in the medieval period and in the ancient world. But what has been forgotten by 
and large is the notion that children might owe their existence as children not solely by 
virtue of their conceptualisation, but through a whole series of different kinds of affective 
and sensory relati                                                                        
(namely, devices through which feelings are able to be recorded, offered support and given 
durability).  
 
Collective Subjectivity and Categorical Thinking 
There has been a predominant focus on childhood as conceptualised and classified 
as a discrete identity, such that we might divide up human beings of all ages into either 
those who belong to childhood or those who belong to adulthood and we can list attributes 
that are similarly distributed between the two categories. Often books on childhood divide 
up work and play, school and work, innocence and knowledge, and so on between the two 
camps. In this way, sociologists then tend to talk about discourses or ideologies of childhood 
as if childhood constituted a particular idea or category or a way of labelling, identifying and 
defining social structure. This is of course correct in some sense. For example, two leading 
figures in the field, Allison James and Adrian James, definitively state t                     18 
 
the structural                                           collectivity. And it is within this 
                                                                                           
that any individual                                                      J         J      
2004: 14). But this is in many ways to provide a cognitivist framing of children in such a way 
that the capturing of the group nature of children as empirical collectively defined subjects 
implies reducing such collectivity to a concept or category, which then stands in for, but also 
                                                                                           
multitude of people and things within its remit and moreover includes as its support a form 
of social structure. Such a reduction to the category of childhood often forgets the 
accumulation of sentiment, iconographies and description. We caution against an 
overemphasis on categorical thinking. 
The problems are six fold. Firstly, understandings of childhood as a category (or as a 
categorical identity) often fixate on the category as having power and agency and less on 
the assemblage of agencies and processes that do the work of classifying. In this sense, 
categorical thinking has a tendency to focus on the outcome and not the process. Secondly, 
categorical thinking often assumes a logic of identification, such that those subsumed within 
categories are put there as if by a magic which resolutely glues like with like, with no 
messiness or difficulty or agency. Thirdly, categorical definitions of childhood assume that 
the category either acts like or names a container or a box. The box has a structure, it has a 
name and rules of membership (i.e. childhood as a category) and only some individuals are 
able to be contained within this category. Often though, children fail to be boxed in to the 
category of childhood, not because the boxes do not fit, but because the multitude of 
experiences which we might talk about as to do with children fails to be explained through a 
single identity. The singularity of children as a collectivity is such that it is enormously 19 
 
experientially rich, textured and detailed. Fourthly, understandings of childhood as 
categorical often presume that those who fill the container are individual children, either 
children constituted as individual subjects through the power of discourse or ideology or 
children whose agency is demonstrated only by virtue of their individuality, consciousness, 
reflexivity, will or intentionality. The sociology of childhood often repeats and reframes such 
a notion of individual agency whether in terms of the individual child contesting or affirming 
ideologies or categories of childhood or whether in terms of the interpersonal discursive or 
conversational relations between two or more individuals. T                       -as-
           a sacred object of the sociology of childhood, seems unwittingly to have all the 
hallmarks of a social universal. It is an assumption held prior to any empirical investigation, a 
stock belief of this relatively new social science. All children are constructed through the 
figure of the sociological child; such a child is always agentic or has the capacity for agency, 
a capacity across all historical and social particularity. Fifthly, classifying children within the 
                                                                                        
propositional structure or as cognitive schema to the detriment of a diversity of media, 
material artefacts, technologies, affective relations, sentiments and cultural forms through 
which children come together. Moreover, the means, media and points of connection 
through which children come together have grown and proliferated over the last two to 
three hundred years. Finally, it is not then                                                   
but that it is not a rule-defined container for individual agents with respect to social 
           T                                        a priori a set of people who belong to it; 
rather it constitutes a point of reference, mobilisation and contestation and it is only 
mobilised in particular social situations.  20 
 
Paradoxically, despite the constant reference to childhood as a form of social 
structure, sociologists of childhood are conscious of not seeing children and childhood 
                                             T                                                
                                            W                              T       ue that 
just as there is no general and totalising conception of nature, so too is there no general and 
                                  T                                                    
                                                                 cular constructions constructed 
by particular sets of social agents. For the sociologists of childhood it has been important to 
disclose                                                    childhood  as constructed by adults 
alone (James and Prout, 1990). It is important to recognise the agency of both children and 
adults in the construction of childhood, but it is equally important to recognise that the 
accumulation of descriptions and sentiments problematises that construction as occurring 
in a sociological present and that the positions from which descriptions are produced and 
valued are themselves problematised as a consequence of such accumulation. For us, to ask 
                                                                                            
grasp  the complex processes, patterning, stability and consistency, yet also contingency and 
particularity, sometimes over short periods, sometimes glacial, sometimes local, and 
sometimes global. The issue, for us, is to locate agency throughout what others might term 
structure and not to bifurcate the two in terms of a totalising or individualising polarity; but 
to understand the extension of agency along different temporalities and spatialities, not 






Ariès starts his work on the family by dismissing two stock beliefs at the time of his 
writing, namely that modern industrialisation has led to a weakening of the family and that, 
since the eighteenth century, core family values have been under attack from liberal 
individualism. On the contrary, Ariès argues, over this period the family has had a much 
                                                                                           
Importantly, h                                                                          
                                                                                             
                  A                T                                      A              it brings 
about the emergence of the modern family around a moralistic set of ideas about 
immodesty and it brings into play an idea of the centrality of childhood innocence. For Ariès, 
the disclosure of childhood as an idea is similarly a freeing of children from biology; 
historical analysis provides the means through which the biological can be shed and the idea 
freed, able to take on value and affect, and able to be communicated outside its natural 
habitat. It is interesting to note that for Ariès an understanding of the family and of 
                                                                                 O      
contrary, for Ariès, the emergence of the modern family implies a separation of the private 
from a public, social world.  
In my discussion I try to hold a line which does not assume, but questions, any 
simple division or determinacy of the biological or the social. Moreover, any discussion of 
the nature of children cannot assume that our knowledge of that nature is one written 
sole                                                 A                                    
informed by the sociology of childhood) must also seek to find a way of thinking (evidence 
permitting) of that agency as an influence. 22 
 
 
Either Society or Biology? 
The sociology of childhood most often draws from Ariès the idea that childhood is a 
social and historical construction. It is precisely this understanding of childhood and the 
family as historical that is read in terms of the determining influence of society, rather than 
biology. It is seen to constitute a bifurcation, or a splitting, of children into an idea, or social 
construction, on the one hand, and a biological and natural entity, on the other, in such a 
way that the latter is discarded, but also such that the agency of children might be disclosed 
as a purely social (and hence not biological) agency. Allison James and Alan Prout, in their 
                                                         , claim                            
children is a biological fact of life but the ways in which this immaturity is understood and 
                                       J         P                I                  
sociological study of children needs to understand that over and above any natural growth 
and change (that is ontologically existent, but epistemologically indeterminate), the social 
shaping, construction and constitution of childhood as an identity and differentiated state of 
being is one formed through social institutions, discourses and agencies. On the one hand, 
t                                                      discounted in order to study what is 
knowable and visible to the social scientist, namely social being; but, on the other, in 
                                                                                        
territories ripe for exploitation in order to reveal their underlying social constructedness.  
But there have been a number of historians critical of the basic assumptions of social 
constructionism. The criticisms have largely been on the grounds that childhood is 
predicated on child development, that the latter is seen as fundamentally biological, and 23 
 
that childcare is predicated on an equally biologically determined relation between parent 
and offspring. Thus, the medieval historian Shulamith Shahar has stated that: 
[T]he central thesis... is that a concept of childhood existed in the Central 
and late Middle Ages, that scholarly acknowledgement of the existence of 
several stages of childhood was not merely theoretical, and that parents 
invested both material and emotional resources in their offspring... 
although it cannot be valid to discuss childraising and parent-child 
relations purely in terms of instinct and natural conduct, there are 
certainly immutable factors involved. A considerable part of the 
developmental process is biologically determined. (Shahar, 1990: 1) 
Similarly, Linda Pollock has argued, on the basis of parental diaries, that the eighteenth 
century does not bring about a sea change in the relations between parents and children 
inasmuch as parents might be seen to begin to demonstrate an affection and intimacy 
toward their offspring. For her, there was no incremental increase in emotional investment 
by parents to their children from the thirteenth to sixteenth century. On the contrary, she 
argues that children have always been seen as special and that parents have always shown 
affection to them. She argues that: 
Many historians have subscribed to the mistaken belief that, if a past 
society did not possess the contemporary Western concept of childhood, 
then the society had no such concept. This is a totally indefensible point of 
view   why should past societies have regarded children in the same way 
as Western society today? Moreover, even if children were regarded 
differently in the past, this does not mean that they were not regarded as 
children. (Pollock, 1983: 263) 24 
 
For many historians, then, the argument about social construction is one that is confirmed 
or refuted in the context of historical time. The arguments for a social constructionism and 
the criticisms against can be understood in the context of a zero sum game: either a concept 
of childhood has always been present throughout history and it has been so because 
childhood is fundamentally biological and a universal feature of human society or childhood 
is fundamentally social in origin and has been absent for much of human history and only 
emerges at a particular moment in space and time.  
There are two issues to consider. Firstly, there is often an assumption that whilst 
biology endures through historical time, the sociality is only revealed through the 
differentiation between historical periods or is marked by its fleeting particularity. But it is 
A                                       Annales School of history, that historical change is 
geological. C                                                               longue durée, 
                                                                            B              
31). Childhood is seen as social structure, a form of stability and security over history and 
across generations. The shedding of the biological, as it were, is not at the expense of an 
understanding of an enduring quality of childhood. Childhood is understood as a 
particularity, but not one                                                                 
(Braudel, 1980: 27). Some have criticised Ariès for his indefiniteness with regard to the 
actual date for the invention of childhood. When is the birth of the concept of childhood? Is 
it at the end of the eighteenth century or in the Renaissance or the Middle Ages? (Flanderin, 
1964: Becchi and Julia, 1998a). But such criticism ignores the nature of Ariès            
whatever its faults and inaccuracies.  For Ariès the particularity of childhood is not 
understood in the context of the historical moment, but across the long movement of 
historical time.  Of course, on this point, it is also important to note that some sociologists of 25 
 
childhood, in a somewhat contradictory manner, have stressed the particularities of social 
constructions of childhood (i.e. with respect to the primacy of the social as against the 
biological), but also have reproduced the idea of childhood as a universal (i.e. across all 
history and geography), this time through as a social structural, not biological universal. In 
this sense, there is an element of the sociology of childhood which, whilst criticising 
naturalistic accounts of children and childhood, simply repeats the form of that 
construction. 
Secondly, many historical studies since Ariès show how different periods of history 
                                                                                           B   
these studies do not make the simple argument that their studies thus show that childhood 
is either social or biological. There is caution about any simple social or biological 
reductionism. French medieval historians have argued and demonstrated how concern for 
the child was clearly evident in Europe from the fifth to the early sixteenth centuries 
(Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999; Fossier, 1997; Riché and Alexandre-Bidon 1994; see also 
Orme, 2001). Children are documented in their everyday lives in the context of the church, 
in places of education and learning, in the family, at work, in the castle and on the streets 
(Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999; Riché and Alexandre-Bidon 1994). There is no doubt that 
there were understandings in the medieval period of what a child was and how to care for 
    T              tollere, to take up) of the child by the father in order to hold-off the threat 
of abandonment was more than a literal act at the birth of an infant, it was also a metaphor 
for the growth of the child (Boswell, 1988). Even further back in time, historians of the 
ancient Greeks and Romans have similarly shown how a conceptualisation of the child is not 
peculiar to the modern period (Dixon, 2001; Becchi and Julia, 1998a and 1998b). 
Throughout recorded history it is clearly evident that there has existed some understanding 26 
 
of the child as different in nature to the adult commenting and that there has also existed a 
demonstrable concern and affection for the child as addressed in those writings and other 
representations. Children have long been seen as objects of affect and affection. Even if we 
take the cases of child abandonment (Boswell, 1988) or the sending of babies for wet-
nursing (Shahar, 1990), there is no evidence to suggest that this constitutes a lack of 
affection or care. On the contrary, over and above the difficulties of historically accounting 
                                                                                           
moments and across social class, but also different conceptions and social organisations of 
             Hendrick, 1997). That the infant and the child were the object of experience, 
attention and adult discourse is not at issue. It is also worth noting that historical evidence 
of children often points to them being addressed by and large (although not exclusively) in 
the singular (i.e. as a son or daughter, or as a child learning). Children   horizontal affections 
or experiences with other children are not by and large the focus of attention (i.e. children 
may have reciprocal affections toward adult teachers or parents, but not other children). In 
this earlier period, these accounts are written and documented by adults and children are 
not by and large subjects of the accounts provided, whether as authors or as actors. 
 
Biopower and Writing on the Life of the Child  
In a twist to the standard reading, we should understand Ariès                  
regarding the diaries of the physician Héroard of the infant dauphin Louis XIII not (as Ariès 
has been understood by sociologists as saying) in the context that poses a social 
constructionist argument against a biologistic one, but in the context of an emerging focus 
on the body of the child, such that that focus is provided by a circulation of signs and 
interests. For Ariès, H         writings indicate a complete lack of modesty toward the 27 
 
infant Louis XIII. He states that                                                          -
                                                                                       
(Ariès, 1962: 98). On the contrary though, such a document indicates a significant piece of 
evidence for the argument that the child is a fundamentally bio-political entity. H         
diaries constitute a natural history of the child. Héroard documents the life of Louis XIII in 
astonishing detail. He follows him everywhere. He asks him about all aspects of his life. All 
areas from sexual activity to defecation to eating to social behaviour are documented. In 
this sense, contra Ariès, the sexualisation of the young dauphin as recounted by this 
physician does not point to an exemplary difference between seventeenth century and 
present day conceptions of childhood (i.e. with regard to sexual innocence) but rather that 
H         account is a vivid demonstration of the relationship of the sovereign palace 
household to the body of the young, naked and bare child. H       s account marks the 
beginning of a relationship to the child, one that describes and catalogues and visualises 
their body along a scale from sexualised fantasies to medical definition (Foucault, 1979). 
Before that time there were certainly child prostitutes and adults that preyed on young 
                          G                                                              
                                                                     A        -Bidon and 
Lett, 1999). B   H                          te a relation between biography and medical 
case history. They demonstrate a relation between writing, observation, and the life of the 
child. As one historian has noted: 
I                                       L                                          
manipulated and controlled by the doctor, to the extent of his powers, from the 
                        H                                                             28 
 
and output of his infant charge, intervening continually and disruptively. (Marvick, 
1993: 289) 
There is a definite continuity with the present inasmuch as the child constitutes a privileged 
focus for the proliferation of writing and concerns about sexuality, but also a privileged 
focus with regard to a correlation between child observation, descriptive devices, 
biographical existence, biosocial history and governmental intervention. 
Cultural historians, such as Ludmilla Jordanova, have talked about the growth of the 
natural and moral sciences and also about the popularisation of medicine in the eighteenth 
                                                                                        
discourse, but demonstrates how that body in all its complexity is articulated and re-
articulated (Jordanova, 1989 and 1999). Jordanova argues that, in the eighteenth century, 
                                            J                       T                      
revolved around, not only the emerging natural, but also the emerging social, sciences and 
was concerned with the habits, sensibilities and relationships between men and women and 
                      J                 I  J                                                 
relationships were integral to understandings of the natural. She argues that: 
In the late eighteenth century, life was commonly associated with activity 
and plasticity, with the adaptive powers of organisms to respond to the 
environment, and with organization, that is, the structural complexity of a 
living being, a concept used to explain the special properties of animals 
and plants. Life was a notion of synthesis, system and fusion... A rigid 
demarcation between mind and body thus made no sense, since the 
organism was one integrated whole. Hence, clearly, the moral and the 29 
 
social emerged out of the natural organization of living matter. Life, then, 
was a fertile concept. (Jordanova, 1999: 175) 
Moreover, the particular descriptions of children were mapped out in terms of their 
similarities, closeness, differences and distance from the natural world. Thus, children were 
talked about in relation to their animality or their plant-like nature or in terms of their 
instinctual or bestial conduct (Jordanova, 1989). The enduring nature of these descriptions 
is still hugely resonant now. 
In a different vein, Carolyn Steedman argues that our modern understandings of 
childhood find their history in the natural sciences, such as physiology and medicine. 
Understandings from these expert knowledges were disseminated (for example, through 
child care manuals) across the body politic, and especially to parents and those who had a 
                                                                                
phenomenon and a name for the phenomenon, of eliding growth and childhood and 
                                 F   “                                henomenon that helps 
                                                                                              
                                                                                          
the problem they represented: they become the question of interiority  (1994: 76). 
“                                                                                           
central to our understanding of children as a collective experiential subject, but also to a 
more general sense of experience as growth. A notion of growth as interior to the body of 
the child is to be distinguished from earlier ecclesiastical writings on original sin and infancy 
(i.e. what has wrongly been seen as a problem of innocence and experience) and natural 
philosophical work on predetermination (i.e. the problem of the homunculus). For example, 
in relation to the former, recent work on St Augustine (whose writings initiate the medieval 30 
 
discussion of original sin) show how he constructs the infant not as one who commits actual 
s                                                            -                                  
informed by the sin of Eve) whose baptism brings the infant into the community of the 
Christian church (Stortz, 2001; Traina, 2001). It is only as the infant develops speech that the 
child becomes accountable for their actions and is thus capable of actual sin. And in relation 
to the latter, preformationism holds that the embryo is not a moment of creativity and 
growth, but a point of sameness with the soul of parent. The embryo and later the infant 
and child are merely larger versions of the same soul that is enclosed in the soul of the 
forbearers and their forbearers and so on. 
In contrast then, the growing child (the generationality of interiorised life) becomes a 
condition of the experiential relations of children in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth 
century physiological writings on development and interiority fold growth into the body of 
the child. Moreover, as others have argued, in the problematic of growth and interiority (i.e. 
                                                        a privileged place in offering its body 
(as a supposed site of universality) for the narration of the story of life. The temporality of 
the growth of the child (as a linear development) is one that is seen to mirror the 
development of the human species. Hence the development of any individual child is seen 
to re-                                                                                    
(Castañeda, 2002). Thus, for ex                                       C       D             
               “                          C       F                                             
                                                                                             
population or species and does so in a way that figures the temporarily of both as a linear 
progression. In contrast to any suggestion that the child is either social or biological, recent 
historical and social research would argue that the child is disclosed as a phenomenon 31 
 
within a field of problematisation concerning the bio-political and bio-political production 
(i.e. about the politics and labour of life) (Foucault, 1979 and 2004). 
 
The Lives of Children and Literary Culture 
It is easy with talk of science (whether natural or social) to exclude children, by 
default almost, from having any role, subjectivity or agency. But what is clear is that the 
making of science from the eighteenth century onward also rests on the mobilisation of 
children and the enlisting of their agency. A key factor in this was the development of a 
literary culture for children. Thus, the discussions of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
                                                                                             
only philosophical treatises on education and the child, but texts which reveal particular 
notions of middle-class civilisation and particular artefacts and tools for becoming civilised. 
The use, for example, of ABC books to images of nature was not generalised at the time of 
their writing. These tools for reading and writing and for learning about the world were not 
widely distributed; they were rarefied technologies. These were tools that were only later 
generalised through the standardisation of education from the late nineteenth century 
onward. T                                                                              
publishing and the growth of a literary culture for children. In the late eighteenth century, 
                                                                                          
collections for children emerged as new cultural forms. In 1770 Francis Newbery published 
The Natural History of Birds by T. Teltruth, which contained appropriated passages from 
T      B         Description of Three Hundred Animals (1730). The Good Childs Cabinet of 
Natural History (published in 1801 by John Wallis, London) contains chapters on Beast, 
Birds, Fishes, Insects and Flowers and within each chapter a series of images and 32 
 
                                    D                                                              
England, tells us that natural histories for children would bear the generic traces of a wide 
                                                                                             
                 T                                                             F                
but it also demonstrates an understanding of children in the context of scientific enquiry 
and construes children as subjects of scientific experiment and investigation. The child is 
constituted with the authority of the scientific gaze. They are able to bear witness to nature. 
They are authorised to give testimony to the empirical before them and to have credibility 
conferred to their experience. But equally this is a science of the marvellous real, both fact 
and spectacle. A                                                                           
its nomenclature an                                        -             I                   
sense is mythic and popular. It is a marvellous natural history. 
The deployment of literary signification for the child provides a medium that both 
marks a transition from infancy to childhood (i.e. in terms of literacy as an acquisition), but 
also as a necessary perversion of the primary experiential relation between infant and world 
(i.e. inasmuch as the relation between child and world is now seen to be mediated through 
                    I                    ‘            L                                    
words (Rose, 1984: 46). Jacqueline Rose in her work on chil                         
importance of Locke in the innovation in pedagogic publishing for children; she refers to the 
publication in 1756 of A Little Lottery Book for Children, containing a new method for playing 
them into a knowledge of the letters as a                  L                         
          B                   L                                                       
                                                                                             
written language, and a desire to hold the written word as closely as possible to the 33 
 
                                ‘                We might add that Locke, in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, talks about an immediacy not simply to the image, but also 
to the thing and to play (Locke,        ‘                       ‘          Emile               
being asked not only to retrieve a lost state of nature, but also to take language back to its 
pure and uncontaminated source in the objects of the immediate world... [T]he constant 
stress throughout [is] on the purity of the visual sign...Whether it is a case of physical 
gesture and expression, or of pointing out objects in the real world, what matters is that 
signs should immediately speak   ‘             -8). For Locke, infants are experiential 
subjects (i.e. they have the capacity for experience and to be experienced) and it is only by 
                                                                 F   L                   
Rousseau, our relation to the empirical is necessarily mediated by the condition of maturity. 
Although Montaigne may have posed experience in the context of maturity and death, it is 
Rousseau and Locke who frame experience in the context of infancy and signification. 
The early nineteenth century witnessed an increase in the rates of literacy in the 
British population and an increase in religious revivalism. In the 1830s three-quarters of 
working-class homes possessed books, mainly religious. In 1801 less than fifteen percent of 
all working-class children between five and fifteen attended Sunday schools, but by 1851 
the figure was over seventy-five          A                                                   
                                                          D        1988: 31), it                
taste for debased, sensat                 was identified as a social pathology (Donald, 1992: 
53). Such concerns only intensified as the century progressed and the new one began. As 
James Donald has argued                                                                    
which the standard language and the national literature were taught in the elementary 
                     F         E         A             D                  T   34 
 
governmentalisation of education (i.e. the bringing of education within the authorities of 
the state) and the standardisation of pedagogy were firmly established by the early 
twentieth century (Hendrick, 1997: 63). From now on, all children within particular national 
territories were brought within the purview of a universal set of measures. Compulsory 
schooling for sections of the population between particular ages constructed childhood as a 
national standardised entity (Sommerville, 1982), but also extended the domain of the 
social across that particular national territorialized body of people and forms of conduct 
 ‘            I                                          -exist children and childhood; it is not 
seen to be that into which children are socialised. On the contrary, the social is, adjectively, 
that which describes a set of processes through which a population is disclosed, through the 
emergence of particular problems (e.g. literacy, poverty, and so on) and through the 
development of particular technologies (e.g. schooling). Society is a consequence of, in part, 
the institutionalisation and gov                                          “                  
one site in which this process can be seen to have occurred. But equally, we could consider 
the emergence of standardised forms of health and measurement for children or the 
standardisation of welfare generally. Accordingly, in this context too, the social is defined 
within the purview of the national. 
‘                                                how it is spoken both by and to the 
child   is subject to strictures, and characterised by differences, which need first to be 
located inside the institution where language is systematically taught. This is an issue which 
                                                                                          the 
fact that language has an institutional history which determines how it is written, spoken, 
                 ‘                M                                                         
dominant literacy or the shaping of an English literature, but with the configuration of a 35 
 
medium (literary cu                                                              
                                                                C                        
important, but so were other institutions of welfarist state policy (Sommerville, 1982; 
Hendrick, 1997). In this sense, through the historic capacities and capabilities of the nation-
state (Sassen, 2006), a collective experiential subjectivity for children was able to be formed. 
Moreover, it was precisely through the development of those capacities that children have 
been able to contribute to their own description and to the knowledge of their own nature 
in a manner certainly novel and innovative.  
 
Spaces 
Much of the argument about spaces has been made in the preceding sections, so I will 
not labour the point. In the closing chapter of Centuries of Childhood, Ariès quotes a passage 
from The Little Prince by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry: 
He was free, infinitely free, so free that he was no longer conscious of 
pressing on the ground. He was free of that weight of human relationships 
which impedes movement, those tears, those farewells, those reproaches, 
those joys, all that a man caresses or tears every time he sketches out a 
gesture, those countless bonds which tie him to others and make him 
heavy. (Quoted in Ariès, 1962: 395) 
For Ariès the history of childhood and its place within the development of the school is a 
history of imprisonment. He states that: 
The school shut up a childhood which had hitherto been free within an 
increasingly severe disciplinary system, which culminated in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the total claustration of the 36 
 
boarding-school. The solicitude of family, Church, moralists and 
administrators deprived the child of the freedom he had hitherto enjoyed 
among adults. It inflicted on him the birch, the prison cell   in a word, the 
punishments usually reserved for convicts from the lowest strata of 
society. (Ariès, 1962: 397) 
T                                                                                      
                                                                                         
          A                  I             M      F                                       
governmentality (which we will discuss in chapter six) rests on this earlier analysis, but what 
i                    A                                                                        
which is institutionalised and which, in doing so, curtails the agency of the child; secondly, a 
history of the transition from the medieval period to the modern period in terms of a history 
of the reduction and curtailment of that freedom; and, finally, an analysis of that transition 
in terms of the passage from heterodox to homogenous, purified and enclosed space. 
This story of the tabulation of knowledge, of confinement and of modern civilisation is 
one that certainly finds its grounding in that earlier period. For example, in the late 
eighteenth century, there were stories of a strange creature, boy-like, but also animal-like, 
running across the fields and hills of southern France and scavenging for food in the local 
          T                                                                             
finally brought to heel in January 1800. Abbé Pierre-Joseph Bonnaterre, Professor of Natural 
History at the Central School for Aveyron, was able to make some initial observations of the 
savage before the boy was taken to Paris. There was an intention to make the child a 
property of the new French republic, under the supervision of the Society of Observers of 
Man. By July that year, after some irritation, the savage boy was finally taken to Paris, to the 37 
 
Institute for Deaf Mutes in the care of Jean-Marc Itard and his housekeeper, Madame 
Guérin. The boy, now renamed as Victor, was of great interest to the newly emerging moral 
sciences. T            V                                                          B    t was not 
     “                                                                                    
society that carried the connotations of noble association. It was a society synonymous with 
civilisation. In contrast to Ariès, the becoming social of the child was not in opposition to its 
education. Nevertheless, society was a rare phenomenon, too precious to be distributed 
evenly across the whole population. In I                              he talks of places of 
social gathering, such as particular houses, a village, and the city and he talks of particular 
manners, tastes and forms of conduct (i.e. certain senses, sensibility, gentlemanliness, 
gesture, and posture). V                                             P                  
society, into a particular European                 M         it was through learning how to 
speak, how to listen and how to write that Victor, it was hoped, would be introduced into 
French middle-class society. Victor learned to adopt some of the manners and modes of 
conduct of French society, but in a highly idiosyncratic way. For all their collective efforts 
(Victor, Itard and Madame Guérin), the boy, although he enjoyed the warmth of affection, 
the heat of a good bath, and could use letters to request a glass of milk at restaurants in 
Paris, could never speak and he never fully progressed out of his wild nature. Toward the 
end of the period that Foucault hails as the Great Confinement and the beginning of the 
Classical Age the wild boy of Aveyron was figured as a life unconfined, on the edge of 
           It is particularly apposite then that the discovery and education of Victor at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century should be marked by such an ambivalence concerning 
his nature and socialisation, his wildness and learning, his discipline and freedom. The 
agency of Victor is of a person forever in exile from   on the cusp of belonging to   38 
 
civilisation and society, the French Republic, and the birth of a new nation. The attempts to 
normalise Victor constitute an exemplary moment in the formation of modern power, but 
also in the history of modern childhood (Foucault, 2004).  
But Ariès sees things slightly differently. For him, childhood is the result of a process 
of quarantining children, keeping them separate until sufficiently mature to live with adults. 
The school (as initially a means of guardianship of the soul and then a site of training) and 
the family (as a blanketing of children within the comforts of a private life separated from 
                                                                                         
alongside a geometric division of space. Thus, for example, in the closing page of his book, 
Ariès argues that: 
The old society concentrated the maximum number of ways of life into the minimum 
of space and accepted, if it did not impose, the bizarre juxtaposition of the most 
widely different classes. The new society, on the contrary, provided each way of life 
with a confined space in which it was understood that the dominant features should 
be respected, and that each person had to resemble a conventional model, an ideal 
type, and never depart from it under pain of excommunication. (Ariès, 1962: 399) 
The heterodoxy of the Middle Ages   a diversity and mixing of classes and ages   is 
contrasted with the modern clean spatial and conceptual division between generations.  
B                                                                                      
to hold and yet generational distribution seems equally obvious. The question for us then is 
                                                              A                            
(their capacity to act and be acted upon) is less geometrically and more topologically 
dispersed, but also less captured by a single perspective and more constituted through 
multiple planes and multiple scales. It is interesting in this respect that Ariès does not take 39 
 
the lesson from de Saint-Exupéry that children and adults are both drawers of worlds and 
themselves drawn into those worlds. The Little Prince is nothing if not drawn and described 
by an artist and aviator, whose work is misrecognised by the grown-ups and hence, as a 
consequence aligns him more with children than adults, and whose work carries him into 
other worlds, fantastic and mysterious. It would be foolish to think that a return to an 
equally drafted world of the medieval period, a world with less modesty, would somehow 
deliver a world of greater freedom and less discipline. Of course, all worlds are heavy in 
their connections. But then we are never free from the equipment and devices, forms and 
descriptions which make us who we are. 
  The cultural analyst Mieke Bal, in an introduction to narratology, talks about the 
relation between modes of description and types of novelistic form. She says: 
W       C              -                                              
there   for seeing an army in a cloud of dust produced by a herd of sheep   
and Zola and Co boasted the referential existence of their described 
objects, modernism, with its dual philosophy of subjectivity and chance, is 
well placed to demonstrate an altogether different status for description. 
(Bal, 2009: 40) 
Modernist forms of writing play with the framing of description and place the frame as an 
                                                  “             A                           
clean spaces of modernity, then, owe a debt to naturalistic forms of writing and thinking 
about space as external to the act and process of inscription, but also to Euclidean ideas 
about geometric space (Law and Benschop, 1997).  
Ariès positions himself outside of those spaces of confinement in such a way that he 
can survey those spaces, document their existence, and account for their emergence. Of 40 
 
course, the luxury of that position, that is the position of the professional academic 
historian, is dependent on the passage through the education system so described. But also 
A                                                                to include or ignores those 
others who people, build, support, organise, discipline, punish, and care for those children 
aggregated in the schools or families. Are those who build and manage the boundaries 
inside or outside those spaces of confinement? If those people, for example parents and 
                                                                           A                  
                                                        I      A                               
                                                            A                           
might we understand the social relations (friendships, habits, play, love, teaching and so on) 
                       I                                                                   
children are also those spaces around which we find a huge aggregation of adults, as if the 
confinement of children involved not a removal of adults, but on the contrary their 
concentration. Equally, what we find is that, as a consequence of that intensity of 
attachment and investment, new forms of social relationality are incubated and distributed 
outside those nests. The classroom is less a space in which children are locked, than a 
shaper of teacherly relations, pupil interactions, cognitive measures and pedagogic 
technologies. On their way to any local school now, children walk with friends or parents or 
guardians or grandparents or older or young siblings or parents of friends; some may take 
the bus, others a train, yet others drive. Along the way they mix with conductors, drivers, 
commuters and other children. Some children may even board at school and wake to 
matrons and prefects and housemasters, and breakfast in the school canteen peopled by 
cooks and other staff. When lessons begin another entourage of people and things are 
assembled. Moreover, the lessons learned in the classroom may form the basis of learning 41 
 
at home with a parent; but equally a pedagogic style might find its way on a television 
programme or a computer game. What seems clear, as demonstrated in the body of the 
                                                                                         
might further be defined and detailed have been dispersed across the social. And in doing 
                                                                                           
terms of a clean differentiation and positioning of adulthood and childhood. What is 
important, then, is not to look at the division of labour between children and adults, but 
rather to investigate the labour of division (Law and Benschop, 1997). 
 
Conclusion 
  It will have been clear that my argument with and against Ariès has been based on a 
sociological fiction. The Ariès I have interpreted, argued against and talked alongside has 
been a mythical figure, one that resonates across and often implicit within much of the 
sociology of childhood. My intention, then, in this chapter, has been to talk through that 
mythical construction in the context of the rich and detailed sociological and historical 
research on children, which presents a genealogy of modern children in a different vein. 
Instead of repeating the three reductions of concept, society and space, we presented a 
sense of the historical disclosure of children as experiential and collective subjects in terms 
of the accumulation of descriptive and sentiment devices, in terms of the complex 
entangled histories of the social and the natural, and in terms of an understanding of the 
institutional stamp of modernity not simply in terms of the enclosure of children within the 
sanctified spaces of discipline and care, but rather their aggregation alongside and their 
necessary mingling with adults in spaces certainly more heterodox and topological than 42 
 
many seem to want to acknowledge. Important in that history is the need to reveal where 
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In this section I look at theories of children and childhood initially in the context of 
modern or classical social and sociological theories and then in terms of, what some may 
term as, postmodern social and cultural theories.  
In the first chapter I review debates on the social structure and agency. These 
debates have been central to the recent development of the sociology of childhood from 
the late 1980s onward. In part the sociology of childhood has provided analytical and 
empirical descriptions of childhood as a social structural phenomenon, in the sense that all 
societies both past and present might be said to encode a division between adulthood and 
childhood, that such a division also implies inequalities regarding power and the distribution 
of capital (of one form or another) and that a relationship of learning or socialisation is 
needed for the transition of people from one category of personhood to the other. On the 
other hand, a wealth of empirical studies have considered children as agentic beings, 
namely as social beings who make a difference to the social worlds around them, whether in 
terms of their capacity to interpret and make meaning or in terms of their capacity to 
materially manipulate their environment. But also, research in the sociology of childhood 
has sought to understand structure and agency, not as mutually exclusive devices for 
understanding and describing the experiences of children. Instead, these researchers have 
sought to see structure and agency as two sides of the same coin. 
Nevertheless, structure and agency are sociological abstractions and emerging out of 
this central problematic has been a body of different kinds of research and analysis guided 
more by attempts to understand children and their social worlds as more partial and 
negotiated. This diverse body of research broadly conceived has endeavoured to 
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          I                                                                        otiated and 
interstitial agency in the second chapter of this section. 
In the third chapter of this section I look at post-structural and post-social 
understandings of the social. Some of this work comes from cultural studies or associated 
disciplines, some from science and technology studies and some from material cultural 
studies. In this chapter I talk about the importance of language in problematising any notion 
of agency which is simply centred on an individual and unitary subject. Language, and the 
dialogic textual nature of it, forces us to think of agency as dispersed and fragmented. 
C                                                                                     
characters or actors are orchestrated through plot, voice and staging. But, of course, such a 
                                                                                                
this point that I turn to studies of agency which see it as distributed across human and non-
human, social and technological, and culture and nature. In this material turn, various ideas 
concerning the arrangement of different elements are considered. We review work on the 
assemblage, network, apparatus and infrastructure. In doing so, we try to get a sense of the 
complex arrangements through which chi                                                 
part-objects, the variety of scale, but also without losing sense of children as people. 
My intention in framing this section in this way is to return to some of the debates 
within post-structuralism which emerged in the 1980s in a concerted way across the social 
and cultural sciences, but which were largely dismissed by the reimagining of the sociology 
of childhood in the late 1980s. In doing so, I want to hold onto some of the strengths which 
were initially                                                                          
within a series of discussions and ideas which problematise a rather prosaic and 
individualised understanding of structure and agency which is normalised in the work of 46 
 
Anthony Gidde                                                                        
                          I                                                      -network 
theory and assemblage theory does so with that post-structural terrain as its horizon. In 
doing so, hopefully a material semiotics emerges (admittedly in very partial form) which 





















Chapter Three   Modern Social Theories: Agency and Structure 
By and large sociologists of childhood have, whether explicitly or implicitly, held the 
focus of their study on children with speech and from school years and above. The questions 
of agency and power, culture and interpretation, politics and rights have largely, but not 
exclusively, been oriented to those children in their mid- to late- years, rather than to 
infants (in the literal sense of those with no speech). Many sociologists of childhood take 
D                                                                                           
(Durkheim, 1979: 149). And yet some sociologists, notably Priscilla Alderson, have argued 
that any sociology of childhood needs to include those younger children, infants and babies, 
as well as the older ones (2000). Indeed, the question of infancy has been at the heart of the 
issue and to circumscribe a priori what constitutes the domain of study would certainly 
seem to jump the gun. In many ways, there is an acceptance that children are individuals 
and have various abilities and competencies. But it is also accepted that such individuation 
is a facet of development and that prior to individuation is a state of pre-formed human 
being-ness inasmuch as individuation is social individuation. A central problem then for 
sociologists of children has been not simply the question of agency, but the problem of 
agency as both individuated and predicated on human growth inasmuch as growth is 
defined as the propensity to sociality. Much of the recent sociology of childhood, certainly 
since the late 1980s, has sought not only to construe children (often in some indeterminate 
sense) as having agency (as making some impact on the world), but also to reconfigure our 
understanding of social structure as more open to the dynamic interactions and influences 
of children as agentic beings. Whereas the presumption of the immaturity of infancy has 
                                                                                          
social world (i.e. as socialisation) or as an inherent schema through which a propensity to 48 
 
normality is defined (i.e. as normal development), the sociologists of childhood in their 
explorations of social agency often refuse at first base such fixity. The intention of the 
sociology of childhood in the late 1980s was in part to find a place for children without 
returning to such fixity. This chapter will provide a detailed account of some of the issues 
concerning structure and agency within the sociology of childhood, but it will also make 
evident some of the substantial problems with such a formulation. That said, it also needs to 
be said that much                                                                            
relation between agency and structure, which largely ignores the hugely wealth of writing 
                                             T                                            late 
1980s centred on the work of Anthony Giddens and to a large extent that focus has 
remained as part of the common sense of the field. In part, that focus might be seen to be 
motivated less by a concern to theorise children and childhood, than by a concern to frame 
                                T                                                                  
theory, than in politics. Its purpose was, in many ways, to rebalance the perceived 
inequalities of power or to find ways of researching children which did not reproduce the 
prejudices of power. 
In this chapter, then, I consider briefly the lineage of modern social theories of 
agency and structure with respect to children. I do so foregrounding the correlation of 
agency and individuation, the dominance of the social and the ascription of structure as a 
unitary totality. 
 
Social Being and Becoming 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century French sociologist Emile Durkheim 
understood childhood as essentially a problem of growth:                ich the individual, 49 
 
in both the physical and moral sense, does not yet exist, the period in which he is made, 
develops and is                    ). The growth of the child is not open and indeterminate, 
rather it has a clear teleology and objective. For Durkheim, childhood growth is understood 
only in the context of individuation. Moreover, the state of growth is typified by Durkheim 
                                                                                         
unstable and constantly changing equilibrium; he grows because he is incomplete, because 
he is weak, because there is stil                                 ). Adulthood is constituted as 
                                                F   D                         
incompleteness is understood                      150). Such becoming from weakness to 
                   D                                                                  
                                                                       T                     
generational and g                                                                            
                                150   “                                                     
                                             151). Physically, intellectually and morally the 
child is transformed from weak to strong. Body, mind and will are slowly formed and their 
                                                    T                             
understood by Durkheim in terms of an increasing regularisation. Instability is overcome 
                                  T                                      nd thoroughly 
                      I            D                                                          
                                                153). 
D          discussion of the becoming of the child is a way of imagining the wonder 
of growth, of generationality, and of the transformation of the child from a state of nature 
                   D                                                                     al 
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                                                    D                    A            
discussion of becoming is one that bears some similarities to those taking place in other 
disciplines of the social sciences, notably a little later in the developmental psychology of 
Jean Piaget. It was this understanding of childhood as development, as the transition from 
a-social to social individual that is common to much subsequent sociological thought. 
Sociological thought, though, in contrast to the psychology of Piaget and others, clearly 
places the outcome of childhood growth (i.e. the normative telos of adulthood) as a social 
institution, as a form of being defined by the collectivity (and not by the maturity of the 
mind   both cognition and emotion   alone). 
Many recent sociologists of childhood have been critical of any conceptualisation of 
childhood as a becoming from nature to society. Thus the British sociologist Chris Jenks 
comments on the problem of reading social definition from physical growth: 
The social transformation from child to adult does not follow directly from physical 
growth and the recognition of children by adults, and vice versa, is not singularly 
contingent upon physical difference. Childhood is to be understood as a social 
construct, it makes reference to a social status delineated by boundaries that vary 
through time and from society to society but which are incorporated within the 
social structure and thus manifested through and formative of certain typical forms 
of conduct. Childhood then always relates to a particular cultural setting. (Jenks, 
1996: 7) 
W                 J               can equally be applied to psychological and emotional, 
as much as physical, becoming. For Jenks, but also for other sociologists of childhood, 
notions of the child as progressing from stage to stage along a normatively defined line of 
development are understood as social constructions that are situated within particular 51 
 
social contexts, particular discourses and knowledges, and particular social institutions. In 
such developmental perspectives, children are viewed only inasmuch as they are moving 
toward a normatively defined notion of what is an adult and, in that sense, sociologists of 
childhood have been critical on the grounds that children are only ever known, assessed, 
measured, and normalised according to the criterion of adulthood. 
In contrast, sociologists of childhood from the late 1980s onward have argued that 
                                                                                A         
to the main protagonists of this perspective, the sociologists Chris Jenks and Alan Prout and 
the anthropologist Allison James, the notion of social being implies that:  
The child is conceived of as a person, a status, a course of action, a set of needs, 
rights or differences                                 T                         
understood in its own right. It does not have to be approached from an assumed 
                                                 T                                  
static, for it too is in time. Like all social actors, it populates history. (James, Jenks 
and Prout, 1998: 207) 
The notion of the child as a social being, then, orients our understanding of childhood as a 
terrain of analysis and knowledge in its own right (rather than in the context of its 
socialisation and development in the family, the school, and society) and in terms of the 
horizontal relations across peers and adults (rather than simply in hierarchical relations with 
adult institutions). 
There has been a clear shift from the late-1980s onward that foregrounds the study 
                                                                                              
projections. This argument construes children as people, ones valued in their own right, not 
as adjuncts to adults, family, or school, and not measured according to normative adult 52 
 
views and structures. The focus is in the first instance on children in the positive sense of 
their action and being in the world. Children are conceptualised as active in their own 
construction. Thus, it is not simply that childhood is a social, as opposed to biological, entity, 
but that its construction is a consequence of both adults                                      
                                                              J     and Prout, 1990: 7). 
P                                                                                           
                                       this possibility has been muted in sociological 
engagements with childhood for so long is testimony to how strongly adult-centric a 
                         P              . In this argument, children are not to be seen as 
                     M         Prout argues in the context of questions about the child 
                                                                                     
adults; entering into their world is thus an essential step in an adequate sociology of 
                   P       000: 2). 
There are questions though as to how we make sense of the proposition that 
children are agentic social beings. What do we mean by agency? Is it individual or collective? 
Is it only social or is their agency hybridly formed across social, psychological, and biological? 
Is it purely human or does it rely on non-human (i.e. technological and natural) resources? 
Do all children, across age differences, have agency? Do some have more agency than 
others? Does agency always rely on others to mediate and t                         I      
                                                                                                
different, as consequence of its actions? Does the child have proprietorial rights, as it were, 
over its own agency? Is the indi                                                    O          
agencies work through that site? These questions will be addressed in the ensuing pages, 
but one thing is clear is that children cannot simply be assumed to fit within a normative 53 
 
teleological structure and that any understanding of contemporary children must take 
seriously the fact that childhood is negotiated through competing generationally located 
agencies. And agency at some basic level refers to the capacity to do things. Thus, children 
are conceptualised as beings who have the capacity to do things in the world, where that 
                                                                                            
implies that children are                         s   I                      ciology of childhood 
is able to learn from earlier philosophies of childhood and psychologies of children that 
construe them as active. Nevertheless, the main focus of a sociology of childhood has been 
to consider agency in the context of a series of broader questions about power, structure, 
and culture.  
 
The Duality of Structure and Agency 
Contemporary sociologies of childhood have largely been concerned with the 
question of power and social order and much recent theoretical and empirical work in the 
fiel                                                                                     
Traditionally structure and agency have been seen in terms of two opposing traditions or 
approaches to the question of society and social association. Marx, Durkheim, functionalists 
such as Parsons and structural anthropologists such as Levi-Strauss might be taken as 
                                                            W                            
as Schutz, or ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel might be seen to prioritise agency or 
social action. On one side of the equation, the emphasis is seen to be on determining 
structures; on the other creative and interpretative action. Such a dichotomy is far from 
adequate to explain the lengthy discussions in sociology concerning the nature of social 
order and the question of agency. 54 
 
Parsons, Systems and Roles 
A significant voice in the argument concerning social structure is Talcott Parsons. His 
functionalist analysis of social systems has helped to shape a dominant strand of thinking 
about childhood socialisation, the internalisation of social order. He argued over fifty years 
ago that: 
The acquisition of the requisite orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role is a 
learning process, but it is not learning in general, but a particular part of learning. 
This process will be called the process of socialization, and the motivational 
processes by which it takes place, seen in terms of their functional significance to the 
interaction system, the mechanisms of socialization. These are the mechanisms 
                                                                         P        
1951: 205) 
For Parsons the social is understood in systemic terms. Society is a social system that 
functions organically and that can be understood according to the functional and 
dysfunctional, namely those personalities and those forms of conduct that can or cannot be 
successfully socialised. Children are socialised, Parsons believed, primarily through the 
institutions of schooling and the family. But, a              P                                 
from sociology and social psychology were conducting research and considering the 
influence of the mass med                               (e.g. Bandura et al, 1961). For 
P                                                                                             
and identification of the individual within and with a particular functionality within the 
system. The difficulties of socialisation into any particular role may derive from the 
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articulation of individual personality with the structure of the social system. Jenks notes 
that:  
P                                             P                                    
namely social actors, come to be constructed in terms of the features they display 
that are pertinent to their functioning in the wider context, not those relevant to 
their difference and individuality. (Jenks, 1996: 19) 
Jenks talks about the identification and isomorphism that is central to the elision of the 
growing child to the social system in the process of successful socialisation. This problematic 
is one that has concerned a number of social scientists in the 1960s and 1970s (Giddens, 
1979). For the sociology of childhood it presents a clear problem with regard to the 
reduction of children to an abstraction and to a theoretical model that fails to provide an 
understanding of the everyday lives of actual children (James, Jenks and Prout, 1998: 25). In 
contrast then the sociology of childhood has made an attempt to understand a more 
dialectical relation between social structure and social agency. The work of Anthony 
Giddens on structure and agency has been central to that attempt.  
 
The Turn to Giddens 
Although himself not working in the discipline of the sociology of childhood, it is the 
work of Giddens in particular that has helped to frame much contemporary debate in the 
      J         P                             G                                            
been criticized, some such view of how structure and agency complement each other seems 
to be an essential component in any sociology of childhood   J         P                 
The sociology of childhood as enunciated by James and Prout thus construes, on the one 
hand, children as social actors (interpreting and acting upon their world), and on the other, 56 
 
childhood as a social institution, objectivised as social structure. In their programmatic 
statement for a paradigmatic shift in the study of childhood, they quote Giddens: 
Every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of 
production, and as such may initiate change by altering the structure at the same 
time as it reproduces it. (Giddens, 1979: 69 quoted in James and Prout, 1990: 28) 
The understanding of structure, though, is one that is also understood through the work of 
the Norwegian sociologist of childhood Jens Qvo       Q                                   
has considered childhood as a structural constant across all human societies. He argues that 
within any given society (and here Qvortrup tends to conflate                          
                                                                                            
be compared to other structural collectives within that society (e.g. the elderly). For 
Q                                                                                           
structural forms                            Qvortrup et al, 1994: 6). The separation of children 
from adults is, it is argued, common to all societies, a structural universal. This basic tenet is 
taken up by many sociologists of childhood. Thus, William Corsaro states clearly that: 
For children themselves, childhood is a temporary period. For society, on the other 
hand, childhood is a permanent structural form or category that never disappears 
even though its members change continuously and its nature and conception vary 
historically. (2005: 3) 
All children, except fictional ones, grow up. They are all born and they are all born into 
structural relations not of their choosing. In that sense, the sociologists of childhood argue 
that children are necessarily born into the structural relations of childhood, into childhood 
as a structural form. The exact nature of that structural form, it is argued, may vary from 
society to society and across historical time, but the form itself is a constant. In that sense, 57 
 
such an argument would be at odds with any understanding of childhood as simply a social 
construction that was completely contingent and had no relation to social structure; it is 
also one that is at odds with a notion of childhood as a social and historical invention. 
Nevertheless, this idea of social structure is one which constitutes a structural totality that is 
not fixed because childhood is a fixed biological or psychological essence, but because it is a 
social universal. That said, as with adults, children, it is argued, have agency with regard to 
social structure. They are not simply and passively fitted into pre-existing social roles. Rather 
children are seen both to affect and be affected by social structure and by the constructions 
and institutions of childhood therein.  
Giddens talks about the dialectical relation between structure and agency in terms of 
                          H                                                                   
and structuration. He states that: 
Structure, as recursively organized sets of rules and resources, is out of time and 
space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces, and is marked 
                                T                                                   
implicated, on the contrary, comprise the situated activities of human agents, 
reproduced across time and space. Analyzing the structuration of social systems 
means studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable 
activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of 
action contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction. (Giddens, 1984: 25; see 
also Giddens, 1979: 66) 
I                                                                                               
two sides of the same coin. T                                                            
                                                         G                   G              58 
 
                                                                                             
interdependence of action                                                 E                 
                      as                                                                 
initiate changes in other component parts, and these changes, in turn, produce changes in 
                                                   E                       G              
73). This idea of system, as defined through its reciprocal and recursive relationality, is one 
that finds its recent history in cybernetic thought from the 1940s. 
The Giddensian notion of the duality of structure is not accepted uncritically by some 
          B     M                                                             ‘   B           
Margaret Archer, to make an argument that people and society are very different 
sociological entities and that they are not part of a single process. She provides an argument 
that questions the degree of creativity and agency that social actors have with regard to 
                      “                                                                     
         “                                                                                   
                                                                                           
(Mayall, 2002: 33). Social actors transform with the resources to hand; they do not create 
anew. In this sense, she argues that any understanding of structure and agency needs to 
take account of history and material continuity. Social structure pre-exists the individuals 
who make use of its resour                                                             B        
1979: 46 quoted in Mayall, 2002: 34). 
The issue is not that Giddens pays no account of history, but that he perhaps 
overemphasises the creative capacity of individual agents. Individual agents are not tasked 
with (re)producing the totality of social structure, rather other and different agencies 
produce environments, built and peopled at different moments, historically and 59 
 
geographically, which may then be occupied by others at other moments, in the creative 
process of occupation. The creative capacity of agents is certainly a significant issue with 
regard to the sociology of childhood: to what extent do children have agency? Is the agency 
of children to be understood in the same terms as the agency of adults? Does the notion of 
                                                                                          
everywhere? Is agency a social universal? Or is agency differentiated, between some 
children of different ages in some circumstances rather than other? Is agency accumulated? 
Is its power or extension dependent on the mobilisation of others (both human and non-
human)? 
For Giddens the question of agency is fundamentally about power. Agents have a 
capacity and capability to make things happen, to have an influence and to have some sort 
of control. He argues that agency is not simply about being able to act, but about being able 
to make a difference. He says: 
T                                                                         or to 
refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or 
state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, 
in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those 
                    A                                                               
                    -existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to 
                                                                       is, to exercise 
some sort of power. (Giddens, 1984: 14) 
I  G               , social actors have agency with respect to geographical space, the day-
to-day and the longue durée of institutions. The space and time of the locale, but also the 
historical struct                                                 In contrast, Giddens talks 60 
 
about the passage of a person through the life cycle in terms of                         he 
talks about the longue durée of institutions in terms of the repetition of the life cycle. The 
matter warrants little discussion from Giddens, but it is of considerable importance to 
sociologists of childhood. It matters because if the longue durée of institutions is reversible 
and if children are agentic social actors, then the institutionalisation of childhood as a 
structural form (and a significant categorisation of the life cycle) would itself be reversible 
and open to social and historical change. However, if the structural form of childhood is not 
reversible, then we would need an account of its irreversibility. Moreover, such an account 
may need to include                                                            need to have 
recourse to the ideas developed by Mayall. Research within the sociology of childhood has 
tended, by degree, to favour one or other position with respect to the reversibility or not of 
social structure and the capabilities of agency with regard to structure. 
Giddens lays great stress on an understanding of agency in terms of knowledge and 
reflexivity (i.e. the ability to know the world, but also to change the world as a result of that 
           H               every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of 
reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member                          
proposition that all social agents are knowledgeable about the social systems which they 
constitute and reproduce is a logically necessary feature of the conception of the duality of 
            G                  F   G                                                 oring 
or rationalisation of action. He talks about discursive and practical consciousness and he 
also talks about unconscious motivation. The question for any sociology of childhood is the 
extent to which these distinctions might be applied to the investig                            
A                                                                                             
                                                                                               W  61 
 
should note that when Giddens is talking about agency in this way he is referring to 
                                           T                                             
of the conditions of that action in the everyday is thus the privilege of those with the 
requisite competency. Giddens draws on the work Erik Erikson (but also Sigmund Freud) to 
                                                                                            
                                                                                       
intervene in a se                                                                   
emotional competency and trust and the recognition of  a distinct and generalised human 
agency (i.e. over and above the human agency of parental figures) (Giddens, 1984: 58). 
Certainly the research on very young children, for example by Alderson (2000) and Urwin 
(1984), would provide a significant contrast to any model of the development of agentic 
capacities and capabilities in the manner Giddens outlines. 
 
Elaborations on Giddens: Structural Dichotomies 
James, Jenks and Prout, in Theorizing Childhood, Polity (1998) and James and James 
in Constructing Childhood (2004) offer much food for thought in their elaboration and 
complexification of the structure and agency model. They provide a framework for the 
sociology of childhood that figures                                                 
            J      J         P                  the socially constructed child, the social 
structural child, the minority child and the tribal child. These discourses or positions are 
structured in relation to a vertical axis which bundles structure with identity and 
determinism against agency, voluntarism and difference. But also along a horizontal axis 
which bundles particularism, local and change against universalism, global, and continuity. 
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social research on children and childhood in such a way that takes into account the main 
sociological dynamics. These dynamics (e.g. between the particular and the universal, or 
structure and agency) are talked about in terms of key sociological dichotomies. The model, 
then, is intended to do more than simply map the sociological life of children; it is intended 
                                                                          generative 
sociological existence. As a hermeneutic model it has its virtues, but it tends to militate 63 
 
against the Giddensian focus on the duality of structure and agency in such a way that 
hypostatises the poles rather than seeing them as reflexively intertwined and that 
                                                              ty, socially constructed and social 
structural) in such a way that individualises children as sociological types. The danger, then, 
is that the model, instead of taking a Giddensian model forward, takes it back to a 
Parsonian-like model of system and social role. There is a question as to whether more 




In this chapter we have considered longstanding discussion in the sociology of 
childhood on struct                                                 G                    
a way of framing the main contours of debate. For sure, this framing device corsets some 
writers and some aspects of the debate and some writers thus corseted may not welcome 
the fact nor recognise such dressing. Nevertheless, the recourse to Giddens helps to typify 
debates within the sociology of childhood in terms of a fundamental social relation between 
an individuated agency and a structural totality, both of which are sociological abstractions. 
The overarching problem with the Giddensian model (and of those inspired by his writing) is 
                                                               the situated activities of 
human agents, reproduced across time and space   G                                      
in favour of either structure or agency in such ways that either totalise, globalise and 
universalise structure or individualise, localise, and particularise agency. A complex, 
recursive, multilayered, and topological sense of system, which may include different forms 
of materialities, cultural form and social technology, is often foregone in favour of agency in 64 
 
the form of the isolated human individual. The child as social agent is also the reflexive and 
originary centre of social action. As an atomistic origin of human action, agency itself is 
never explained. Moreover, the question of the circulation, investment and accumulation of 
capacity (or power) in the context of system (or infrastructural patterning) is equally 
                                                                         There are clearly 
                                                                                          as if 
the questions of its distribution, accumulation and unevenness were not central questions 
for empirical investigation, and as if agency simply fell on the shoulders of individuals and 
not children as collectively defined  I                     P                              
agency of children as actors is often glossed over, taken to be an essential, virtually 
                                                                             P            
65). Of course, the task is to begin to provide an analytics which is able to explain agency in 













Chapter Four   Partial and Situated Agency 
  In the context of this broad framing of structure and agency, sociologies of children 
and childhood have also looked to different ways of understanding agency in terms of social 
interaction. Social interaction is understood within empirical contexts and inasmuch as the 
features of that interaction emerge only within that empirical context. Social interaction is 
broadly conceived as situational. In this section I discuss four analytical models concerned 
with peer cultures, social competence, hegemonic negotiation, and tactical agency. All the 
writers we consider focus on social interaction; but social interaction is framed, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, within a broader more fixed                                      
position and relation to social structure. 
 
Peer Cultures 
‘                                                                                 
                                                                               s.  
Ethnography, but also conversation analysis, discourse analysis and other forms of 
qualitative method, it has been argued, allows                                         
                                                                                  on of 
                    James and Prout, 1990: 8-9). These spaces of association, these collective 
worlds of children (worlds produced by children, through their social agency) are, to use 
H                              lifeworlds        system . But they are also cultures 
inasmuch as these worlds are ways of life.  
The work of the sociologist of childhood William Corsaro is illuminating  C         
research in Italy and the United States on pre-                                               
group cultures. For Corsaro what is important is how children of particular age-groups 66 
 
interact with each other. These lifeworlds are distinct from those of adults. As an 
                                 C                                                         worlds 
                                                                                    
interactions of children. Corsaro, for example, considers the work involved in maintaining 
these cultural spaces: 
Establishing and maintaining peer interaction are challenging tasks for kids who are 
in the process of developing the linguistic and cognitive skills necessary for 
                                      K                                     
                                                       W          be the mother 
                    “                                                                 
                                                                 -          K    
work hard to get things going and then, just like that, someone always messes things 
up. (Corsaro, 2003: 40) 
F   C                                                         -       H                      
                                                                                   F            
children wanting to play with another group of children might walk around the group 
                                                         demands to be allowed to play (see 
C                   C                                                                         
participation. The cultural worlds that Corsaro investigates are mainly highly localised and 
face-to-face interaction, namely interaction within conditions of co-presence.  
C                                                                                
together on an everyd                                                                         
routines, artefacts, values, and concerns that children produce and share in interaction with 
                    P                                           A        C               say 67 
 
it explicitly, his understanding of peer group is one that is shaped also by a notion of 
generation                                                                               
         N                                                                xclusively of 
children. C                                                                                
media and toys. He says that: 
Families play a key role in the development of peer culture in interpretive 
reproduction. Children do not individually experience input from the adult world; 
rather, they participate in cultural routines in which information is first mediated by 
adults. However, once children begin to move outside the family, their activities with 
peers and their collective production of a series of peer cultures become just as 
important as their interactions with adults. (Corsaro, 2005: 131) 
Thus, although adults may be absent from some of the peer cultures of older children, for 
younger children parents, legal guardians, teachers and others play a significant role in 
arranging and structuring the symbolic and material resources for those younger children. 
C                                                                                           
                                                    W. E. B. du Bois. Corsaro talks about 
                                                                                           
                                                                                                 
            and these cultures are intric                   C            : 4). The question 
                                       C                                                       
according to a prior structural generational difference. T                      C            s 
him to foreground the collectivity and in some sense solidarity across children (or people 
within a generational cohort or peer-group). But, i                                       
extent mediated and shaped by adults and if children live across two different cultural 68 
 
spaces of adulthood and childhood, then we might wonder to what extent children have 
distinct cultures that can be inhabited by either children themselves or childhood 
ethnographers, such as Corsaro himself.  
 
Social Competence 
Ian Hutchby and Jo Moran-Ellis situate their research in the context of               
                                               H           M    -Ellis, 1998: 9). Their work 
stresses an understanding of competence not as an a priori of human subjectivity (whether 
adult or child), but as an accomplishment produced                            I should note 
                                                                                
              I                                           H           M    -Ellis argue 
that: 
[T]he social competence of children is to be seen as a practical achievement: that is, 
it is not something which is accorded to children by adults, like a right, and can thus 
be redefined or removed. Rather, social competence is seen as something children 
work at possessing in their own right, the display of which is an active, agentic 
achievement. (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998: 14) 
Aware of the need to move beyond any moral or political imperative to accord children 
social agency and competence (as evidenced in much research in the sociology of childhood 
from the late 1980s to the 1990s), Hutchby and Moran-Ellis frame the issue primarily in 
empirical terms: 
W                                                                                
relational parameters within which it is enabled or constrained, still need to be 
ascertained on an empirical level. What research at that empirical level shows is that 69 
 
                                                                              
which is stabilised, to greater or lesser degrees, in and through the interactions 
between human actors and the material and cultural resources which are available, 
and which can be recruited to play a part in the constitution of specific, situated 
activities. In short, empirical work needs not only to conceptualize children as 
competent but to establish the ways in which children display, can be required to 
display, and are policed in their displays of social competence. (Hutchby and Moran-
Ellis, 1978: 15) 
For Hutchby and Moran-Ellis social competence is not a unitary phenomenon nor is it 
something that can be simply possessed (although it might be something that is worked at). 
Competence can only be demonstrated in situ. They argue that social competence cannot 
            ply as a property of individuals            whether it is with other children or 
with adults, in everyday situations of peer group play or in more formal, adult-framed 
                                                                                        tories 
                                                                                               
                                                               H           M    -Ellis, 
1978: 16). Such situated ren                                      als a picture of childhood 
as a dynamic arena of social activity involving struggles for power, contested meanings and 
                           H           M    -Ellis, 1978: 16).  
Hutchby and Moran-Ellis argue against the idea that                       is a form 
                       -                        argue that the idea that             
equals non-                           H           M    -Ellis, 1978: 21). Again Hutchby 
and Moran-Ellis turn not to a priori models of power and competence, but to empirical 
investigation. Any differentiation and distribution of competence with regard to children 70 
 
and adults, they argue, can only be settled in particular situated arenas of action. But, if 
                    e is to be understood as situated and collective, then there are 
questions as to how we understand that collectivity. If competence is distributed across the 
arena of action, across material and cultural resources and across both adults and children, 
in what sense is the social competence about            social competence? If social 
                                                                                          
there are further questions as to how that collectivity might be understood? Does Hutchby 
and Moran-E                        cussing on competence as a situated interaction 
demonstrated empirically, rest on a prior conceptualisation of children as a category of 
person defined through social structure? 
 
Hegemonic Negotiation 
Research within cultural studies offers a different way of framing the negotiated 
collective settlement across adults and young people. Reference is made less to arenas of 
action, than to the institutions, discourses and technologies of power in such a way that 
                                                 onstructed in the context of adult 
hegemony. Whereas Hutchby and Moran-Ellis are concerned with conversational resources 
largely in contexts of interpersonal relations, a hegemonic approach has recourse to a larger 
array and larger scale of resources. Language, or discourse, is still a focus, but it is framed 
within a broader political context. James and James draw on this approach and argue that:  
The overarching reach of such institutional processes to define and separate children 
as a group apart emphasi                                                         
what is thought right and proper for children   exercise over children's experiences 
at any point in time. These processes are therefore also some of the cultural 71 
 
determinants that are central to a cultural politics of childhood, processes which 
largely work to oppose childhood to that more powerful and relational concept of 
              in other words, children are what adults are not. (James and James, 
2004: 21) 
In this sense, we might understand c                                                     
which cultural studies (e.g. Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Hebdige, 1979) has understood 
subcultures as structurally related to (and not disconnected from) the parents cultures of 
particular class formations. For example, it may be possible to talk of particular youth 
cultures, such as those based around music and style (e.g. classically in the work of 
subcultural theory of the 1970s, the mods, the punks, skinheads, and Rastafarians), not as 
essential generational cultural formations, but as shaped only in the context of cultural 
struggle. In some of this research, generational subculture is certainly understood in the 
double structuration of class and generation, such that cultural meaning is ideological and 
analysed as the structural expression of symbolic resistance (Hall and Jefferson, 1976). This 
work within neo-Gramscian cultural theory was caught between forms of structuralism and 
culturalism (Hall, 1980). It typified an approach and an engagement with the politics of 
youth that stretched beyond the analysis of subcultures per     P    W                  
Learning to Labour suggests that the peer group culture of the boys is both a product of the 
social structure of the school (and hence a product of oppositional power relations, not 
least between adult/child, but also middle-class education/ working-class manual labour), 
but also a negotiated space in which the boys (although stereotyped as thick and lazy) are 
                                                 W              O                          -
Gramscian) research, though, has understood youth subculture as itself constitutive of 
popular figurations of young people (Hebdige, 1979 and 1988). Much of the latter research 72 
 
(influenced by the reading of the Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci by Ernesto Laclau 
(1977), Stuart Hall (1981) and Tony Bennett (1986)) was much more constructivist. As 
Hebdige states: 
I  G                                                               -                         
I                                          T           G                 made and re-
made, actively articulated in the double sense, both spoken, uttered and linked with, 
combined. (It has to be at once positioned and brought into being.) (Hebdige, 1988: 
205) 
In this sense any cultural construction of children as a collective subjectivity is understood in 
anti-essentialist terms. There is no prior, fixed or essential being of children. Similarly, there 
                                                       . as defined, for example, by play or 
            ‘                                                                         
consequences and effects of institutional power, discourse and cultural negotiation and 
contestation. Instead of prioritising conditions of co-presence, this research has an 
understanding of the cultural formation of collectivities in the context of media and cultural 
technologies in late modernity. Any sociology of children needs to understand how 
                                     ediated not only through face-to-face encounters, but 
through a whole array of media and cultural technologies (Buckingham, 2000; Livingstone, 
2002). Research in media, communication and cultural studies has developed this 
understanding (not only, or always, with direct reference to neo-Gramscian theory) not only 
                                              K              A                                 
is also one of understanding the agency of young people in contesting the media texts and 
interpretati                                                                          
belonging (Bazalgette and Buckingham, 1995; Buckingham, 2000). 73 
 
[C]hildren may resist, or refuse to recognize themselves, in adult definitions   and in 
this respect, adult power is very far from absolute or uncontested. Nevertheless, 
their space for resistance is largely that of interpersonal relationships, amid the 
      -                                          F                                     
complicit in sustaining these defi                                    -                  
default: age differences, and the meanings that are attached to them, are a primary 
means through which power relationships are enacted, not only between adults and 
children, but also between children themselves. (Buckingham, 2000: 13) 
These cultures are not only for children, they are of children; they are made by both 
children and adults and the terms of participation are defined in the context of these 
cultural struggles, negotiations and structures of consent. Nevertheless, however much this 
                                                                                              
consequence of discursive negotiation, there is still on the receding horizon a structural 
form within which generational difference and positionality is marked. Certainly for some of 
the earlier cultural studies writers, this dichotomy comes from the Gramscian engagement 




  Alcinda Honwana in her research on young combatants of Mozambique draws 
attention to, what she refers to as,                    T                 , she observes, do 
not have access to the resources to construct and build space, to control the resources of 
                                                                                           
with the concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximize the 74 
 
                                                                  H                   
Honwana finds this notion of tactical agency in part from Michel de Certeau, who contrasts 
F                                                                    cally controlled and 
regulated, with the power of the weak, who occupy space only through their mobility and 
their ability to turn it through their movement. Where strategy and strength are conceived 
in spatial terms, tactics and weakness are seen as more temporal; the only space the weak 
occupy is the space of the other, from which they emerge and return. Although Honwana 
does not discuss this, the idea of resistance that comes from De Certeau also finds its 
genealogy in theorisations of urban guerrilla warfare from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
(Guevara, Marighella, Red Army Faction and others), as a form of struggle which is hidden, 
dissimulated, swift, draws on the resources of the powerful, urban and incisive. For De 
Certeau, space and strategy are Cartesian and geometric, such that space contains and 
encloses people and objects; in contrast tactics and time are topological inasmuch as they 
are defined in terms of vectors and trajectories (de Certeau, 1984). For de Certeau, strategy 
                        or the manipulation) of relations of force which becomes possible 
whenever a subject of will and power (a business enterprise, an army, a city, a scientific 
                                         I                                                      
place by vision and the power of knowing (typified by the ordering of legible spaces) (1984: 
5). In contrast, tactics concern the absence of a proper place, movement, non-totalising, 
blow-by-blow, poaching, and surprises. De Certeau talks about tactics in terms of memory. 
H                                D                           F                          
(1968): 
[M]emory does its work in a locus which is not its own. It receives its form and its 
implantation from external circumstances... Its mobilization is inseparable from 75 
 
alteration; indeed, memory draws its very capacity to intervene from its alterability   
mobile, adaptable, without a fixed locus. It has this permanent feature: it forms itself 
                       emerging from the other (from circumstance), which it now loses 
(this being no more than a memory): whence a twofold change, both in itself (since 
its modification is the condition of its own exercise) and of its object, retained only 
when it is lost. (De Certeau, 1984: 40) 
For de Certeau, strategy and tactics are two logics of action (1984: xx). But whereas strategy 
names action linked to power, tactics names action linked to its reversal, its alteration. For 
H                                                                  T             ncy which is 
not defined through a logic of identity, but through a logic of the hybrid, of the in-between. 
“                B                                                                           
                                      H                ).  
  Tactical interstitial agency, then, has a more creative, experimental relation to the 
structures and resources to hand. Children and young people, who so often are denied 
access to resources and to the means of accumulating resources, find strength through their 
creative bricolage, through their make-shift mash-ups, and their making do. Adults, in 
contrast, so often control the resources, the means of reproduction; they control the space; 
they make the environment; they build the schools, the homes, the television sets and 
computer networks; they people the police, the teachers, the parents, and the social 
workers. This is a schema which sites two camps, the strong and the weak, the structural 
form of the one is the inversion of the other. And yet, what are the consequences of this De 
Certeauan schema? A generational division is mapped onto a division between space and 
time, strategy and tactics, power and resistance, Foucault and De Certeau. Does not the 
schema itself replay a spatial geometric separation of generational difference? Is not, then, 76 
 
                                                           I                          
rather inasmuch as it makes a change that remains), does not the weak constitute an 
articulation of power? For de Certeau, the weak comes from the Other (as the condition of 
                            T                                                         
                         O          F                                                          
precisely at the level of enunciation. 
  But more than this, enunciation from the site of the other relies on resources to 
hand. As Voloshinov argued many years ago, there is no inner voice, pure and of itself. All 
enunciation is oriented to another. But more than that, all enunciation and all action relies 
on its externalisation through material resources in such a way that the force of the 
enunciation, or the action, is mediated by virtue of that externalisation, by virtue of those 
resources to hand. Tactical interstitial agency is thus, perhaps, lacking a place, a secure and 
permanent site from which to build a fortress. And yet, it finds itself some place. In the 
gathering of resources, some environment is built, however provisional. Of course, once we 
consider the process of externalisation and the accumulation of resources to hand, we 
necessarily involve others who have a stake in the use and utility of those resources. These 
others may be other people, but equally they may be simply the recalcitrance of objects 
themselves, or th                    L                                                         
place is not simply owned nor disowned by tactical agents. Moreover, the building of agency 
with others (both people, animals and things) relies not only on things which are fleeting, 
insecure and impermanent, but also on things which are more enduring, and yet other 
things which seem permanent, unmoveable, resilient. The demonstration of agency (to use 
the term which Andrew Barry has explored (2001)) is across various forms of duration and 
materiality. To act is to act in an environment which is not static, not a structure, but 77 
 
constituted through different and uneven securities and insecurities, permanence and 
impermanence, swiftness and sluggishness. The earth is not made up of a single substance 
and agency resonates through different substances and is demonstrated (or performed) 
through that variation. In addition we need to grasp that the things and people through 
which agency resonates are not all the same size; they are not all of the same scale. Some 
are large and some are small; some are buildings and some are teeth; some are states and 
some are clothes. Agency is interstitial, but it is also infrastructured. 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter we have considered analytical models which stress the partial, 
conditional, situated, empirical and collective disclosure of children within social settings. It 
                                                                                               
within the individual child as an originary point of origin. That said, although there is an 
emphasis on the contingent nature of agency as performed in particular empirical contexts, 
the setting for these localised negotiations has the stamp (however residual) of social 
structure. Moreover, whereas, on the one hand, micro-sociological work on conversational 
and linguistic  social interaction stresses conditions of co-presence, interpersonal 
relationality (if not intersubjectivity), and the delimitation of resources within the spatial 
and temporal present and, on the other hand, a cultural studies approach looks to 
institutions and discourses and the relation between subject and institution, there is in both 
                                                                                       ined 
through linguistic or discursive resources. Although there are different models of discourse 
deployed (from models of conversation to those of Foucauldian discursive formation), 
                                                                         ollective agency 78 
 
is demonstrated. Some sociologists of children have been critical of reducing agency to 
discursive agency and instead have turned to research on agency as material, 
heterogeneous and distributed across social, technological, and natural resources and 






















Chapter Five   Subjectivity, Experience and Post-Social Arrangements 
  The sociology of childhood in the early 1990s was often too quick to conflate 
                      with social agency and too quick to dismiss some contemporary 
theoretical approaches which seemed to deny children experiential authenticity and agency. 
B                                                                                        -
structuralist                                                                                    
fractured, or disarticulated. Post-structuralist approaches, broadly conceived, have been 
concerned with the unsettling and decentring of the subject (in terms of their originary 
cognitive individuality, experience, authenticity, and authority) by virtue of the fact of 
language as a symbolic system and of the unconscious. Through a focus on language, 
discourse and narrative any notion of agency as centred on the individual child is criticised 
on the basis of the fracturing of subjectivity and on its constructed and performative nature. 
A dramatic language of actor, staging, performance and mise-en-scene (stage setting) are 
often deployed in critical accounts to emphasise the constructed and decentred nature of 
subjectivity. But the post-structuralist turn has itself been criticised and problematised 
through a thoroughgoing anti-humanist set of approaches which intend to analyse social 
relations in terms of objects, material culture, technologies and devices. In this materialist 
turn there is a sense in which agency is now understood in terms of its being both human 
and non-human, both social and technological, and both cultural and natural. It is in the 
context of both these turns (post-structuralist and materialist) that a descriptive detailing is 
                                                                                         




Subjectivity and Experience 
For the sociology of childhood in the 1990s, the Foucauldian discourse analytic and 
post-structuralist approaches seemed to offer the child only from an adult perspective, 
seemed to deny any agency to children, and seemed to construct childr                     
as an effect of discourse and power. Some of these accusations are certainly correct. The 
largely historical and literary methodological focus considered mainly texts and documents 
written by adults about children. The focus on constructions seemed to take away precisely 
what the sociology of childhood seemed to offer, namely an agency for children. That said, it 
is nevertheless worthwhile returning to that earlier work that considers the child as a 
discursive construction and as instituted within fields of regulation in order to tease out an 
understanding of agency that is predicated on a notion of the subject as non-unitary and 
distributed across language and the unconscious, not least because it allows us to move 
beyond any simplistic analysis that assumes a fit between the individual, agency and 
experience.  
In writing on the social production of childhood, influenced by thinkers as diverse as 
the historian of ideas Michel Foucault, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and the 
ling     E     B                                                                        
                                                                                           
constructed only as a discursive position, or more broadly as a position within regimes of 
power and knowledge. Foucauldian accounts of the discursive positioning of the child 
subject (at least those ones developed within the context of the social sciences) have talked 
not just of discourse, but of the relations across discourses, practices and social institutions. 
The early work of the social psychologist Valerie Walkerdine is notable in this respect. 
W                                                                                        81 
 
primarily sociological in tone. Walkerdine in her work on primary school learning in the UK 
looks at the intersection of the discourse of developmental psychology, the practices of 
child-centred classroom teaching, and the institution of the primary school (1984). These 
practices intersect to produce and regulate the child as a developmental learning subject. 
Thus she argues: 
What I aim to demonstrate is that the very lynchpin of developmental psychology, 
                                                                                    
                                                                   W                 
154) 
T                                                                                              
                                                                                      mes of 
                       F                       W                  
Particular disciplines, regimes of truth, bodies of knowledge, make possible both 
what can be said and what can be done: both the object of science and the object of 
pedagogic practices. Pedagogic practices then are totally saturated with the notion 
of a normalized sequence of child development, so that those practices help produce 
children as the objects of their gaze. The apparatuses and mechanisms of schooling 
which do this range from the architecture of the school and the seating 
arrangements of the classroom to the curriculum materials and techniques of 
assessment. (Walkerdine, 1984: 155) 
She is not saying, however, that these apparatuses are uniform in their make up or their 
effects nor that they are the same wherever they are to be found (from one school to 
another), but that they constitute a form of diagram of power, knowledge and subjectivity. 82 
 
Such an account, although its use of a Foucauldian analysis of discourse and power 
allows a focus on discursive practice rather than social structure, does seem to present the 
child only as a construct of the agency of others. In order to deconstruct the allocation of 
                                                                   any capacities in the child. 
However, in her later work on media and culture Walkerdine draws equally on a post-
structural psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity to frame the complex tensions 
concerning the positioning of the child and the fantasy relations of children. Here there is 
talk of structure, not social structure as such, but the structure of the subject (unconscious 
and conscious) and the structure of desire with respect to language as the structure of the 
symbolic order. The relation between the structure of the subject (and the mechanism of 
identification) and particular discursive formations has been the focus of much discussion 
within poststructural theory. Walkerdine, nevertheless, writes: 
[S]tructures are activated in specific ways according to what happens to and the 
fantasies held by any particular person. This brings the theory much closer to one 
which allows any subject their own specific history and not a subjectivity determined 
by the content of media representations. (Walkerdine, 1997: 177) 
C          W                                                                        
discourse to position and regulate subjects, but also to recognise the investments that 
subjects have in particular fantasies (e.g. regarding control or seduction) and hence to 
understand the processes whereby subjects get hooked into certain discourses. However, 
for Walkerdine any interpellation of a subject by discourse is always mediated by the 
structures of fantasy that underpin the subject. Moreover, the structure of any particular 
fantasy cannot be seen to determine the positionality within that fantasy structure. The 
interpretation of dreams and the unconscious by Freud is instructive here (1991)  F       83 
 
analysis of one particular dream concerns a fantasy struc                              A 
                        F                                                          lity, rather 
there are many positionalities. The subject could identify with the child, with the one who 
beats, with the act of beating or with the mise-en-scene of the dream itself. At root in this 
analysis is the notion that agency cannot be located in a particular acting individual. Instead 
agency must be seen to be distributed across the unconscious, the conscious, and language. 
Agency must be seen, in this approach, across the discursive or narrative positionalities 
within the fantasy.  
The work of the French psychoanalyst Lacan is significant here inasmuch as he 
provides an account of the entry of the infant into language and the formation of the 
subject and he explicitly talks about agency in terms of the agency of the letter in the 
unconscious, namely as an agency that is dispersed throughout the symbolic. In an early 
essay, Lacan talks about the infant as a mass of drives, a form of being closely tied to the 
mother. In this state of being the infant knows no other. The infant and mother constitute a 
dyadic pair. The infant only becomes a subject as such   namely, as one who has a sense of 
self distinct from others   only with the entry into the symbolic order of language. The entry 
into language is seen by Lacan as a form of alienation from an imaginary wholeness with the 
mother. The unitary individual is seen as a myth of wholeness, an imaginary fixation. For 
Lacan, then, subjectivity is constituted in the complex of the alienation of desire, in the 
distribution of the self in language as a collective phenomenon, and in the division between 
conscious and unconscious. What is said and known by the subject can never be 
transparent, the basis of reflexive knowledge and the means of control. On the contrary, in 
this model, such knowledge is itself open to the disturbance of the unconscious and to the 
processes of language. In this sense, children in their entry into the symbolic, in their 84 
 
creation as subjects with language, are alienated from any control over their subjectivity 
and any transparent knowledge of self or world. Children have agency only inasmuch as 
they are alienated from that agency (which is dispersed through language and the 
unconscious). Children, as it were, are given the driving seat of a car with no controls, but 
with the illusion of a steering wheel that works, and a whole lot of baggage that keeps 
popping up from the back seat, distracting the driving. 
Whereas in the Giddensian account of agency the individual social actor has recourse 
to experience (or the reflexive relationality to time and space) as the condition of social 
action, for structural and post-structural accounts of subjectivity experience is decentred 
and held to account only inasmuch as it is constructed within language. As I said above, 
structural and post-structural understandings of the subject have been articulated through 
different writers from different traditions. G       A                I           H        A  
E            D              E                                                           
philosophical reasoning of experience, the subject and maturity running from the sixteenth 
to the twentieth century. He discusses the separation of experience and science in 
Montaigne and he focuses on how death is conceived as the limit of experience; experience 
is conceived in the context of the movement toward death, namely in the context of 
maturity. Then through a discussion from Descartes to Kant to Husserl and Heidegger on the 
relation between the transcendental and the empirical, he comes to the twentieth century 
concern with language and subjectivity. In Freud, Agamben sees a reversal of the 
relationship between experience and maturity, such that the limit of experience is now 
turned backward to infancy; a passage that Agamben also sees in grammatical terms as a 
turn from the first to the third person inasmuch as the primary site of experience is now 
seen as the unc          I  B                      A                             I     85 
 
                                                                                       
discourse as utterance. Agamben provocatively states that: 
The constitution of the subject in and through language is precisely the expropriation 
                                                                       A         
experience, far from being subjective, could then only be what in human beings 
comes before the subject   that is, before lang                                     
literal sense of the term, a human infancy, whose boundary would be marked by 
           A                    
There is no pure experience from which either voice or agency emerges. What we get from 
Agamben, but also many others, is that the splitting of the subject into conscious and 
                           I                                                                 
speaking the statement (the subject of the enunciation) places a big question mark over the 
authority of any statement and any subject. Cultural critic Homi Bhabha, for example, states 
that: 
The concept of cultural difference focuses on the problem of the ambivalence 
of cultural authority; the attempt to dominate in the name of a cultural 
supremacy which is itself produced only in the moment of differentiation. And 
it is the very authority of culture as a knowledge of referential truth which is at 
issue in the concept and moment of enunciation. The enunciative process 
introduces a split in the performative present, of cultural identification; a split 
between the traditional culturalist demand for a model, a tradition, a 
community, a stable system of reference - and the necessary negation of the 
certitude in the articulation of new cultural demands, meanings, strategies in 
the political present, as a practice of domination, or resistance. (Bhabha, 1988: 19) 86 
 
There is no simple certainty regarding such authority because there is no simple 
authorisation of meaning. In this argument, meaning and the identity of the subject (i.e. as if 
it were a discrete unitary individual) are only fixed as an imaginary relation, as a mythical or 
ideological certainty, or as cemented within a regime of knowledge and power. 
  The impact of this post-structural turn and the focus on subjectivity as both split and 
dispersed through the symbolic order of language is radical in terms of how we understand 
                   O                                                                   
simply collapse experience and agency into an individual child. But, on the other, more 
positively it means that: 
a)  we are able to investigate the dispersion of discourses on and about children and 
childhood; 
b)                                                                                         
within those discourses; 
c)  we are able, as with Walkerdine, to investigate how those discourses and 
positions are also correlated with relations of power; 
d)  we are also able not to assume that those who identify with those discourses on 
children and childhood are th                                                  
adults), but also that those discourses may in fact be, even in the first instance, 
primarily addressed not to children, but to others (e.g. adults); 
e)  we are able not only to differentiate between the spoken child (the subject of 
the statement, of the enounced), who is spoken about in discourses and the 
speaking child (the subject of enunciation), who is positioned through the act of 
speaking (or reading or receiving) 87 
 
f)  we are able, moreover, to understand that such a differentiation between 
speaking and spoken subject is not rooted in an unitary individual speaker, but is 
a relational (or textual) construction, such that we may see relations of speaking 
within relations of speaking (i.e. as a layering over layers, a palimpsest); 
g)  we are able to understand how the relations of speaking, of the voices and the 
genres through which voice is spoken, are dependent on a genealogical field of 
other voices, texts and speaking relations; 
h)  and finally we are able to understand that our capacity to speak as children with 
experience and with respect to our claims about those experiences does not 
imply that our utterances are able to secure those claims, to control their 
meaning or to authenticate them. 
In that sense, then, the impact of the post-structural turn on the social study of children has 
been to frame questions of agency as questions located within the domain of language and 
the symbolic inasmuch as that domain is a complex of voices, agency, speaking relations and 
forms of power. Neither child nor adult can speak in a manner which draws on their 
experience as a source of either power or truth. Any authorial or authoritative voice is 
always differentiated and dispersed through other voices and texts. Social relations in this 
sense are akin to a novelistic text, in which the author writing may adopt a particular 
position and voice as a narrator; in turn the narrator may tell a story in the context of other 
characters and plot, such that the characters have voices; but also such that in turn, those 
characters may narrate stories with characters and plot; and in turn this textuality of the 
novel problematises the notion of the author as him or herself standing outside the text as 
their position is similarly told within another text (or series of texts). Social relations, in this 
sense, are understood as dialogical and intertextual. 88 
 
That said, there are certainly problems with understanding the constitution of the 
subject in the context of language as if the experiential were primarily or only mediated 
through the symbolic. The writing of Karin Knorr-Cetina has helped to reframe Lacanian 
models of subjectivity in the context not only of a symbolic order, but of a post-social order 
that is littered with both words and things (2001). In late modernity, Knorr-Cetina argues, 
the subject recognises and misrecognises itself across material worlds. The subject has 
agency in a world of objects, but such that its agency is decentred and distributed across 
those objects. For Knorr-Cetina any understanding of the constitution of the subject must 
take account not only of the human, but of the non-human as well. Knorr-Cetina argues that 
 the self need not be seen as frozen into a lacking subjectivity for life at the mirror stage. It is 
at least as plausible to conceive of lacks in a more sociological idiom as permanently 
recreated by relevant institutional processes in a post-industrial society  (Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2002: 173). For Knorr-Cetina the attempt to recognise oneself in the mirror is no 
longer framed within the imaginary pre-oedipal stage of mother and infant dyad, but across 
the various media and forms of consumer culture. It is this sense of the distribution of 
subjectivity not only or primarily through language, but through a material post-social world 
(including images, media, languages and objects) which helps to frame our understanding of 
                                                                                         
cultures.  
 
Material, Heterogeneous and Distributed Agency  
There has been an interest in the research of Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and others 
associated with, what has been called, actor-network theory or the sociology of translation. 
This line of thought has been especially useful in helping scholars understand children as 89 
 
both natural and cultural; it is also significant in its providing intellectual resources for 
thinking about agency, not as located within the individual child faced against social 
structure, but as itself distributed across a network of agents or actors, both human and 
non-human. T        C          L                                                T         
term which derives from the structural semantics of A.J. Greimas in his analysis of the 
structural and generative elements of narrative. For Greimas, the notion of an actant 
defines a narrative device above and below the level of character, inasmuch as it defines a 
narrative function which may be adopted by a single character or by a group of characters, 
but equally a single character may embody more than one actantial function (Oswell, 2006). 
Thus, in the story of the Wizard of Oz, Glinda the good witch of the north constitutes a 
single actant (the helper, who helps Dorothy). But equally, that actantial function of helping 
may be seen to be distributed across other characters as well, such as the Scarecrow, the 
Tin man and the Lion. For actor-network theory though, the notion of actant is used to 
foreground the fact that the characters or agents of a network may be both human and 
non-human. 
Across sociology and cultural theory from the 1990s there has been a material turn 
which has sought to understand more concertedly the relations across human and non-
human. For example, the work of Donna Haraway has been centrally important in figuring 
                                                                                   H        
1991). Some of this work within the sociology of childhood has been explored in the context 
of the body (Prout, 2000) and some more generally in relation to social theories of 
childhood (Castañeda, 2002; Prout, 2005). For us here, these resources help to provide an 
understanding of and to initiate a discussion about association, materiality and the 
distribution of agency                                       ncy as assembled or 90 
 
infrastructured across human and non-human. Prout, drawing on this kind of approach, 
argues that: 
U                                                                             
collection of different, sometimes competing and sometimes conflicting, 
heterogeneous orderings. These can be fragile but they can also be stabilized, 
become widespread and, therefore, found on a large scale. (Prout, 2005: 71) 
He goes on to discuss how actor-network theory provides a way of avoiding any opposition 
between structure and agency by recognising, in the first instance, that actors are hybrid 
entities (both human and non-human, natural and social), but also that stabilised entities, 
                                                                        n of a network of 
actors. Structures, in this sense Prout argues, do not pre-exist their mobilisation as such. 
N                                         P                                               
when new sets of network connections, for example between children and technologies 
        TV                              H                                                   
                                                                     P              -2).  
W                                G           le theoretical project concerned the 
overcoming of the dualism of structure and agency and that his understanding of the duality 
of structuration is one that attempted to envisage structure as a contingent outcome of 
agency. Moreover, his understanding of system, as the practical domain of interaction, 
understood as it was through ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, appears very 
similar (albeit stripped of the human/non-human hybridity) to the notion of an actor-
network as described by Prout (and also to how Prout develops the ideas of actor-network 
theory in subsequent sections). The significant difference between the two concepts of 
system, as discussed by Giddens, and actor-network, as discussed by Callon and Latour, but 91 
 
also Prout, is that the former is often conceived as an organic totality that is able to 
reproduce itself, but also change according to systems of information and feedback, 
whereas the latter is one that is conceived in terms of the openness of the network with 
regard to the mobilisation of new actors. Whereas systems theory presupposes the 
givenness of the system prior to its instantiation and hence is able to analyse the 
development and change within any given system or systems, actor-network theory 
promises to only consider the actor-network as a consequence or outcome of mobilisation. 
Theoretically (although rarely in empirical investigation) it is also able to consider the falling 
apart of any actor-network. 
Actor-network theory talks about the mobilisation of different actors to form 
particular actor-networks, such that actors become spokespersons for other actors 
mobilised within the network (see Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981). Such an 
understanding might construe the process of representation in any network as itself a form 
                                                              “                           
certainly be useful for the sociology of childhood in terms of its offering the possibility of 
thinking about children as so frequently constructed in the representations and knowledges 
of adults. Actor-network theory is thoroughly anti-humanist. It offers a methodology which 
                                                                          We might imagine 
not children as whole individuals, but as part-objects. For example, ophthalmology 
                                                                                              
                                                                                            
        O                        not interested in the development of the whole child, but 
primarily with the teeth (or rather with the whole child only inasmuch as that entity might 
have an impact on the health of the mouth) and with the relationality of teeth and the 92 
 
mouth to decay, hygiene, and daily conduct (e.g. brushing of teeth). In this sense, actor-
network theory has opened the way to investigation of particular configurations of bodies of 
different kinds. 
Actor-network theory is fundamentally interested in thinking about the association 
between things and the organisation of those things, such that the association and 
organisation have no form or substance prior to their collective actualisation. It is as a result 
of that radical understanding of contingency that actor-network theory has in many ways 
also moved beyond any simple logic of representation. If, during a regular sight test, the 
                                                                                             
                     spoken over, as it were, by the ophthalmologist, but because the 
materiality of the eye (and its ability to see in certain ways rather than others) affords 
certain things that can be said about it and it does so in the context of the voice of the child 
in recounting what the eye sees on the wall chart. The expertise of the ophthalmologist 
needs these others in order to speak authoritatively. The expert does not speak alone, but 
only collectively with others. In that sense, there is a process of translation across these 
material entities and actor-network theory, as a sociology of translation, is able to 
investigate this translation as fundamentally about sociality as an association and a 
relationality between things, in media res (see Oswell, 2006). But although actor-network 
theory provides a model of thinking agency and networks as necessarily connected and 
              L                                                                          
cars, the analytical framing of actor-networks means that all actors become both reduced to 
atomistic entities and conceived with respect to a single scale or plane. The fact that Callon 
and Latour (as with systems theory) state that if one actor changes in the network, then all 93 
 
                                                                     s multiscalar. And 
that is perhaps a problem. 
 
Post-Social Arrangements and Collectivities 
Other writers have also considered the question of solidarity across different 
                             T     G      D           F     G                                 
as the abstract form of particular organisations of different materialities (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983) and they talk                     or arrangements as particular formations 
across materialities that have recourse to an ideal-typical generative and formative source, 
                                          D           G            8; see also, for a 
discussion regarding childhood, Lee, 2001 and 2005). But the use of the term assemblage or 
arrangement in this chapter owes as much to its use by those working within actor-network 
                                                                          L              
Assemblage is the translation of the French word agencement, which ordinarily would be 
translated as arrangement. The sense it is given here is that of the overriding primacy of the 
eventfulness of connections with and betw                                      A  
arrangement carries with it the connotations not only that of network, which may appear 
sometimes static and flat, but of an assemblage which is a composition of dynamic, 
generative and agentic parts, such that those parts have temporality, movement and 
capacity only by virtue of their being composed or arranged. In the following discussion, we 
get a sense also of how the notion of assemblage borrows from broader discussions about 




F          A         
In some ways, the notion of the assemblage is similar to Foucault   notion of the 
apparatus (dispositif)                              . But perhaps more so for Foucault, the 
organisation of materialities is intimately tied to the actualisation of power, inasmuch as 
power relations have no prior form and are only made visible in particular relations across 
institutions, practices, and discourses. H                                                     
                                                                                           
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions   in short, the said as much 
                                                                                            
                                                                                       
institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice 
                                                                                              
                                                                                               ce 
relations; fifthly, within these force relations the apparatus takes on a strategic function, for 
example, in the control of an unruly population and the socialisation of that population into 
a functioning economy; and sixthly, its formation is always premised on an experimentation 
and innovation, never a repetition of the same (Foucault, 1979: 92-3; 1980: 194-5; Deleuze, 
1992). The apparatus is not defined by something external to it; it is not made intelligible 
with reference to one particular logic or model; rather the organisation of the apparatus is 
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apparatus is not external to power; it is the shape and organisation of power; it is the 
singularity, or specificity, of power. 95 
 
We can certainly draw on a Foucauldian analysis of the dispositif to understand how 
a relation across particular discourses of childhood are mobilised across particular 
institutions and practices and in the context of particular populations. Nikolas Rose, for 
                                                                                         
                                                                                    
discursive figurations are mapped across institutional practices such as the school and the 
family, and at how knowledge of the child in these terms constitutes forms of normalisation 
and pathologisation (Rose, 1985 and 1989). The arrangement of power and knowledge is 
directed toward the child, but in doing so others (parents, teachers, and so on) are caught 
within its operations. In that sense, power is not understood in binary terms (i.e. there are 
those who do have it and those wh                                                            
M            ‘                                    F                                             
as Jacques Donzelot (1979), there is no simple contest of power between social structure 
and agency or between the state (as a unitary entity) and the individual. In this sense, power 
is not located as a possession in the hands of the adult, the parent, the expert, or the state. 
On the contrary, power is inventive, creative and contingent. Power is disaggregated across 
different forms of organisation. Power is relational with respect to resistance and freedom. 
Resistance is not the unitary domain that opposes power, but rather it is its support and is 
itself the emergent field of counter-powers (Foucault, 1979). Freedom again is not the limit 
of power; it is not that which power seeks to control and repress. Freedom, in the context of 
modern advanced liberal regimes of authority, is that which constitutes a pivotal relay in the 
extension of power. Power works, not against, but through freedom. The agencies of power 
are collective, decentred and disaggregated in particular contingent associations and 
dispositifs, but also that agency is itself the outcome of power. Such that what is seen as 96 
 
having agency within particular situations   from a dental surgery to an opticians to a school 
classroom or a family sitting room   is constituted as an effect of the particularities of the 
arrangement and the visibility of a particular problem or set of problems. A Foucauldian 
understanding of dispositif provides an understanding of the relationality across 
disaggregated complex materialities and of their relationality to relations of power. An 
understanding of the effectivity of the dispositif also allows us to investigate its capacity to 
endow capacity upon elements. Subjects are constructed with capacities inasmuch as those 
subjects are understood in the context of relations across individual, population and 
government.  
 
People as Infrastructure 
The analytical models of the network and the dispositif provide important resources 
for any sociology of childhood. They raise significant questions regarding power, agency, 
materiality and solidarity. They do so in a manner that questions the spatiality of 
organisation and the geography of power. And they do so in a manner that allows us to 
                        a circulated, contested image                                     
                                                 -                                     
have an effect on the regulation and lives of children, and children as a collectivity endowed 
with capacity  M                                                                          
that the necessary distributiveness of agency and power means that all those agents in the 
configuration of either alliances or networks are affected. Thus, experts, parents, schools, 
homes and so on are all affected in the particular agentic configurations through which the 
child or childhood or child-parts or children are the primary object of concern. In such a mix, 
it would be easy to lose sight of people, of children as people. Abdoumaliq Simone, in his 97 
 
ethnography of Johannesburg, provides an analytical tone which both holds the significance 
of an analysis of the material sociological assemblage without losing the fragility, 
resourcefulness, inventiveness, blood sweat, and toil of people. The term he uses is 
                                               
Infrastructure is commonly understood in physical terms, as reticulated systems of 
highways, pipes, wires, or cables. These modes of provisioning and articulation are 
viewed as making the city productive, reproducing it, and positioning its residents, 
territories, and resources in specific ensembles where the energies of individuals can 
be most efficiently deployed and accounted for. By contrast, I wish to extend the 
notion of i                                                           A                  
characterized by incessantly flexible, mobile, and provisional intersections of 
residents that operate without clearly delineated notions of how the city is to be 
inhabited and used. These intersections, particularly in the last two decades, have 
depended on the ability of residents to engage complex combinations of objects, 
spaces, persons, and practices. These conjunctions become an infrastructure a 
platform providing for and reproducing life in the city. Indeed, as I illustrate through 
a range of ethnographic materials on inner-city Johannesburg, an experience of 
regularity capable of anchoring the livelihoods of residents and their transactions 
with one another is consolidated                                              
reciprocal efforts are radically open, flexible, and provisional. In other words, a 
specific economy of perception and collaborative practice is constituted through the 
capacity of individual actors to circulate across and become familiar with a broad 
range of spatial, residential, economic, and transactional positions. Even when actors 
do different things with one another in different places, each carries traces of past 98 
 
collaboration and an implicit willingness to interact with one another in ways that 
draw on multiple social positions. (Simone, 2004: 407-8) 
Such an approach suggests that there is no prior structure or even structure as an ideal-type 
(i.e. as a consequence of the systemic patternings in time-space). It offers a way of thinking 
about the dynamic and complex topologies of organising. But importantly it does so without 
losing sight of people. For example, the HIV virus is passed on at birth, the antiretroviral 
drugs taken at regular intervals throughout the day, the silence and secrecy of the 
condition, the fear regarding school mates and the routine visits to the hospital: these 
constitute a collection of partial objects connected to other arrangements, but also 
connected to each other in the context of a very singular case of a sixteen year old girl living 
in North London. These are collectively shared experiences, dispersed across different 
arrangements. But where is the centre to this? And what holds them together? To talk of 
children as people does not imply that people are the glue which does the binding together; 
it is simply to stress that they are a significant part of this assemblage. 
 
Children as a Collectivity 
  But w                                                                             be 
re-considered in the context of the complex topologies of ideas, power, and materiality 
discussed above? Over and above any questions about the extent to which            
constitutes a class in-itself (as structure) or a class for-itself (collective self-consciousness), 
there is a major question as to whether it makes sense to construe children as a collectivity. 
Allison James and Adrian James make this problem very clear: 99 
 
[I]t is... the case that even within one generation of children, in any one society, each 
                                                                                       
of their social circumstances. (James and James, 2004: 22) 
Children are centrally constituted through differences of age, sexuality, gender, class, 
gender, disability, geographical location and various other particularities of upbringing. 
Children as a collectivity comprise a multitude of experiences and positionalities. 
If children are constituted as a collectivity, it is not because all children within that 
class of persons are the same. Such an understanding of class (i.e. in the sense of class and 
classification, and not simply social class) would be one that reduced a class of things to a 
single sign or measure and one that disavowed the possibility of difference within a single 
class and one that conceived of difference only in terms of identity (Deleuze, 1994). Already 
in the discussion above we have seen that contemporary thinking on the matter of 
collective agency conceptualises collectivity as a multiplicity, such that each singular item 
within a class is not reducible to any single measure. Not all classes, as with milk, have to be 
homogenised. The notion of multiplicity means that we can think of a singularity, such as 
children, as plural. Moreover, it might also be the case that plurality and difference (not 
reducible to identity) enriches the collectivity, deepens its collectivity, through intensifying 
the questions of what it is, its singularity. Let us return to the example of paediatric 
ophthalmology  A                                                                          
within particular infrastructured settings. But across the infrastructures at different 
moments children are constituted as collective subjects. In order to ascertain appropriate 
measures and protocols for treating children in eye clinics, surgeries, at home or in school, 
tests need to be completed, children divided and assessed. Children with no knowledge of 
each other, with no shared experiences, are brought into experimental settings and 100 
 
aggregated. Moreover, as a consequence of these tests particular eye defects are identified 
and procedures, exercises and technologies developed for their rectification. At another 
moment children are sitting, waiting for a regular eye examination (a Snellen test) in their 
eye clinic, in the meantime other children are being examined, for others the prescription 
written, and yet other children are being fitted with spectacles. The capacity to see is 
enhanced through the spectacles; their capacity to act in the world is enhanced through the 
facilitatory technology of lens and metal frame. Of course, less than a hundred years ago, 
having the correct prescription glasses meant the difference between being labelled 
educationally dull and being normal. At another moment in the school playground, a small 
boy is being teased about his spectacles by some older children; two older girls, also 
wearing glasses, step in and threaten to wallop anyone who issues another insult; the small 
boy and bigger girls exchange smiles. 
If children   collectivity does take the form of a multiplicity, then it is one that is 
arguably in some instances and perhaps increasingly trans-national and global. Although 
there is significant evidence   historical, sociological, psychological and anthropological   to 
suggest that there are connections (albeit complex and non-unitary) to be made across 
children of similar and different age groups in many individual nation-states and across 
geographical locales that are connected through historic migration and family ties, 
exchanges of social and public policy, connections through international media and 
communications, and so on, there is a risk that our understanding of such complex and 
uneven networks across the global might be flattened and made static. Some might argue 
that across such complex topologies we understand children as a multiplicity in terms of a 
latent humanism, such that underpinning the collective connections of children is that they 
share the same universal biological determinations. But as we have already seen, there are 101 
 
many who have investigated the interface between the social and the natural and 
discovered that certainly biology (in its crudest sense) plays a significant role in our 
understanding of children. However, the biological cannot be simply seen in opposition to 
the social or the cultural, but rather that both are hybridly constituted within a rapidly 
developing sphere of bio-social and bio-political production. If the collective subjectivity of 
                                                         -political humanity is on the horizon 
of complex hybridly formed connections across the social, technological and natural. In that 
sense, children   as a multiplicity and as a collection of singularities   are, as we all are, 
constantly on life-support on interconnected machines. No body lives nor acts alone. That 
said, the intention is not to reduce these substantive hybridities to a flattened ontology. 
What we get from Simone is that people are the locus of a knotted and knotting 
                                                                                            
economic, social, technological, biological and cultural), they cannot be cut from the 
arrangement without destroying the umbilical knot. 
 
A Return to Generation  
B                  I                                                              
defined through generational difference. For whatever reason, what has distinguished 
children for certainly the last century and before is that they represent growth. The Finnish 
sociologist Leena Alanen has argued that instead of providing a sociology of childhood, we 
should be thinking of a sociology of generation or generationing. Her discussion draws upon, 
but is different from, the discussion of childhood as a structural phenomenon and 
generation in the work of Qvortrup (1994). In a move similar to the argument against 
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of generation. Mannheim argued that members of a single cohort (defined by age) undergo 
similar historical and social experiences, they develop certain commonalities across their 
                     I  M             lysis the notion of generation provides a link 
between the linear process of a group of people getting older and the longer process of 
history as a linear movement. Alanen discusses this in the context of an analysis of class 
formation and of the relationa                                        I                           
                   F   A                                                                
                                                                                              
a rela                                                                             
                                                                                         
             A                  T                                                         gency 
in contesting ones positioning within such a relational process of generationing. It is 
significant that Mayall who also talks of this process of generationing also talks of the role of 
children as agents in contesting the positioning by adults and of the different context in 
which such interaction might occur (Mayall, 2002). 
This is not the place to review research in generation, cohort or life stage (see 
Närvänen and Näsman, 2004). But let us consider the idea that generating constitutes as it 
were a dividing practice through which children as a collectivity are differentiated from and 
subordinated to adults. In the context of schooling and the forming of cohorts individuals 
are aligned under a single measure; they are constituted as a class of individuals of the same 
age (where age is a measure or unit of unification). Certainly the making of classes, for 103 
 
example, in schools helps to constitute shared experiences based on similar ages (where 
similarity is understood within the measure of an age-range between set dates, such as 1
st 
September to 31
st August over the period of a year), a common history inasmuch as those 
shared experiences are predicated on shared habits within a common institution and a 
common identity insofar as the class is constituted as a definite bounded group of 
individuals. But outside of that institution, whether after the end of the school day or in the 
school holidays or after leaving school, ones constitution within a generational cohort is 
dependent on other factors. At home one has a generational relation to other family 
members; on the football pitch ones generational cohort may change dependent on ones 
skill and on the organisation of the teams under twelves, under fifteens, under eighteens, 
but not according to the school class cohort; on leaving school and taking up employment 
ones relation to a generational cohort will also depend on ones identification with school 
                                                                                                
etc). All of these are contingencies and need empirical investigation. They cannot be 
assumed a priori. The relationality across the school, family and football pitch is uneven and 
constituted in terms of different measures and scales. But also what about the teachers, the 
classroom assistants, helpers and others, all of whom are consistent features of a year 
group? The stability of the year group is defined in terms of those aspects which are seen to 
                               T                                     ed against those 
elements (such as whiteboards, physical classrooms, but also teachers) which are seen as 
                                   T                                                          
                                 T                      tudy of assemblages, networks, 
apparatuses and infrastructures discussed in the previous sections lead us to different ways 
of understanding generational difference and they might stress that: 104 
 
a)  it is important to investigate particular assemblages with respect to the question 
                                                                              
                                                                a priori with 
                                                                                    
                     
b)  similarly, temporality or becoming or progression, cannot be assigned a priori to 
some actors rather than others; 
c)  generational progression needs to be investigated in terms of its foregrounding 
within particular assemblages, through, for example, particular measurement 
and standardisation devices (such as progression from one level to the next on 
the basis of examination or age at a particular point in the annual calendar); 
d)  instead of seeing generation in terms of children pushed through a pipe 
(Qvortrup) or as a performative dividing practice (Alanen), it is important to 
investigate children as productive beings within an assemblage, such that their 
agency is relative to other agencies within the assemblage, but also such that 
those other agencies are themselves generative; 
e)  and, although elements within an assemblage may have productive and 
generational  capacity, there are unequal relations with regard to the capacity to 
accumulate value as a consequence of productive agency (or labour). 
Children have historically been unable to accumulate capital of different forms. Their love 
for their parents or those that look after them may be traded for shelter and protection and 
education, but they are not able to profit from their emotional labour. Their work at school 
is returned in the form of certificates and diplomas, but not in terms of control within the 
institution of schooling itself. Their consumption of popular culture and their exchange of 105 
 
artefacts and communications has historically little value except as trinkets and memories. 
Children have historically lacked the means, not of forming and belonging to networks, but 
of maintaining them, building them up over time, and providing the material means of their 
support and of their reproduction. In that sense, children are often thought to have the 
means of association, but no means of institutionalisation. They can certainly be creative, 
but they are thought fundamentally to lack the means to distribute and reproduce that 
creativity. The issue of accumulation that we begin to discuss here is one that is intimately 
tied to the biopolitical nature of children as collective beings, but also to the different 
temporalities or rhythms within which they might find themselves located. This is never 
simply about the accumulation of resources over historical time or the distribution of those 
resources in geographical space. In the context of children it is also a question of their 
accumulation and distribution with respect to biographical time and the infrastructuring of 
generational differences across different organisational spaces (such as school, family, social 
media, street and so on).  
Ricardo Paz left school at 11 years of age. He started as a foot soldier of a gang in 
Guatemala City. He killed ruthlessly. His murders were public spectacles and public threats 
which marked his reputation. He rose quickly through the ranks of the gang to the leader of 
a city zone by age twenty. He had killed over twenty people, bus drivers, gang members, 
shop owners and various others. He was in control of 200 gang members and was earning 
over £3000 a week (The Guardian, 29 June 2011: 23). The trajectory of Paz from age 11 to 
twenty is generational only inasmuch as it traverses people, rituals, weapons, know-how, 
courage, psychopathology, the partitioning of territories and inasmuch as elements from 
this trajectory are able to be accumulated with respect to his value within such an 
infrastructure. To measure the difference between Paz at the two ages without any 106 
 
understanding of the complex paths in between would be a facile exercise. The lack of the 
means to accumulate may be a consequence of the relatively short-lived nature of the life of 
a child. As childhood is a passing phase, children soon grow up and once adult are able to 
accumulate capital and to individually profit from that accumulation. It may be, though, that 
the appearance of the short-                                                                 
the means to accumulate. It is important, then, to avoid a notion of generation which simply 
presumes an interiorisation of growth within the human body, such that temporality is seen 
to reside within according to an interiorised logic and external to that body is an 
environment or context, which is largely seen as static. Conceptualising generation in the 
context of the assemblage implies considering the different temporalities and lines of 
growth and generation distributed across the network. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter, then, has considered children and childhood in terms of post-structural 
analyses of subjectivity. These forms of analysis problematise subjectivity inasmuch as 
subjectivity is understood in terms of its fundamental insecurity brought about by its entry 
into language, its alienation from an originary claim to experience and its agency decentred 
through relations across texts and performances. Forms of analysis and interpretation which 
                                                                                            
experience in terms of their complex performative fabrication. But although such 
interpretative methods enrich the sociological study of children and deepen our descriptive 
                                                                                         
and experimentations in the context of material arrangements and we have investigated the 
ideas of network, assemblage, apparatus, and infrastructure in order to foreground and 107 
 
facilitate an understanding of the experiences of children as thoroughly material and 
distributed through a material world. Moreover, it is only in that context can we properly 
begin to understand generational relationality, namely as a complex distributed effect and 


















Section Three  
 





















In this section I look at some of the major sites within which and through which 
children and young people live, experience, experiment and are constructed. My intention is 
to understand how particular significant problem-spaces have been formed, but to do so in 
the context of understanding the assemblage of languages, practices, technologies and 
                                                                                 I           
in particular, the spaces which have, in the present but also historically, attracted 
intellectual ideas, governmental strategy and economic capital. These spaces are key focal 
points for sociological writing. In particular, I consider ideas about family, school, crime, 
                                                                                T          
to me to be key sites for thinking through what the sociology of children and childhood (but 
also surrounding disciplines and sociological fields) has to offer an understanding of 
                                        y is understood as a complex arrangement.  
  The spaces I consider are, firstly, problem-spaces. The anthropologist Paul Rabinow 
defines these problem-                                                                
discussion of the pragmatist philosopher J    D                                       
experience. To think of problem-spaces is to think of how thought emerges from both 
experience and experimentation, but also importantly emerges between places (literally in 
milieu). Thinking is an action which comes into being through discordances, tensions and 
unevenness, that is as an attempt to put things straight, to realign things (Rabinow, 2003: 
16). These discordances bring into being a richness to thought, to the detail of thinking. 
Rabinow, further, defines these problem-                         F                    
                                       -spaces are those spaces in which thought does not 
simply represent a given thing nor does it bring into being a thing previously non-existent. 
These spaces are both discursive and non-discursive. For Foucault, they are spaces which 110 
 
bring something into light with regard to its truth or falsity, but for us problem-spaces have 
a character closer to that which Dewey poses with regard to experience and 
experimentation. Problem-spaces are spaces of thought, experience, experimentation, but 
also power, inasmuch as they constitute a way of thinking about the lines of force which are 
part of, or bring into being, particular assembla     T                                       
the context of the school cannot be divorced from the lines of force and the genealogical 
site of power through which the architectures and pedagogies of the school are brought 
into being. 
  Secondly, these spaces are spaces of description. Health, for example, is at once a 
definition of a state of being, in our case with regard to a child. But it provides a resource for 
                                                                                         
relation to things. Health also provides a productive site of metaphors and analogies, for 
                                                                                               
their purity. Descriptions of children, though, are often aligned with assessments, 
measurements, standardisations, normalisations, and judgements. The designation of a 
child as unfit or unwell also brings into play a series of potential actions, for example, the 
child needs either more exercise (if the former) or diagnosis and therapy (if the latter). 
Those simple judgements and actions are dependent on forms of measurement and the 
standardisation across populations with regard to understandings of fit and healthy 
children. Observation and the language of description, but also the devices which facilitate 
description are crucial. 
  Thirdly, these spaces are not uniform, either in the accounts we may give of them or 
in their material composition. With respect to the latter, these spaces are materially 
heterogeneous. They are not made up of one thing. In fact, their consistency and extension 111 
 
are dependent on their being composed of different kinds of things, different kinds of 
people, and different forms of mediation and translation between these. We argue that it is 
redundant to reduce, for example, the problem of consumption and consumer culture to a 
question of the interpretative agency of children in the context of overarching corporate 
       F                                                                                
ways as not to reduce them to flat ontologies and flat knowledges. 
  Fourthly, these spaces of experience, experimentation and power are sites of 
                                                    C                                        
political space which simply distributes resources in terms of those that have them and 
those that do not. On the contrary, the question of the value of resources and the dynamic 
                                                                                     
leverage within an             C                                                         
now by virtue of long historic alignments of forces, some political, some social, some 
cultural and some economic. 
  In this section, then, we survey some key problem-spaces in order to provide a sense 









Chapter Six   Family and Household 
  The family and household from the late nineteenth century, if not earlier, have been 
                                         O                                          
                                                                                       re now 
recognised as often disarticulated and as major sites of democratisation. Family and 
household are now seen to be generators of emotional economy and labour, saturated by 
media and communications, and often spaces of talk, fun, love and laughter, but also 
                                   B                                                Sonia 
Livingstone, in her research on young people and new media, rightly points to the 
                                                                                      
                                     H                                               
people in a particular place. It refers to the living of people together and the doing of things 
                                                                  domestic activities in 
         A         C                I                                               -
            G            ; Morgan, 1985 and 1996). In all these definitions there is a 
tendency to prioritise social relations predicated on condit           -                    
                                                                      -presence of individuals 
anywhere; it is the co-presence of individuals within a house or a flat, a particular kind of 
built place. Ownership or rentage of that built environment may be an important element in 
understanding co-residence; but it would equally disqualify any kinship group that had a 
nomadic existence. If the dwelling constitutes the concretisation and infrastructuring of 
living in place, then                                                                          
of non-fixed itinerant dwelling. There are certainly problems with a definition of household, 
                                                                                       113 
 
necessarily articulated with living in the same house or sharing the same activities. 
Households do not necessarily contain individuals related as kin. We may talk about student 
households or about friends living together as a household or about single-person 
            I                                                                                  
relationships predicated on kinship and life-cycle relations (brothers, sisters, fathers, 
mothers, grandparents, granddaughters, aunts and uncles) and it may also refer to 
particular ideologies which foreground particular relations of kin as social ideals (Barrett and 
M I              A                                                                
heterosexual reproduction, such that families may get defined t             -                
(as a series of social relationships) defines a series of relational positions for those not 
                             I                                                               
positionality and practice that may be taken up by a person not related to the child through 
                                B                                                         
                                                                          a relation not of 
      -       “      ly, lesbian and gay couples with children, or adoptive families, may 
                                            F                                          
closeness and distance. Thus, a single mother with children may refer to their household 
                                                                                          
                                                                                       E        
                                                                                 olds in 
order to foreground a close social relationality not predicated on conditions of co-residence. 
 H                                                                                  
physical as well as emotional and ideological sense of belonging. The trope of nostalgia 
(literally homesickness) is a recurrent theme in modernity.  114 
 
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, many commentators have talked 
about the privatisation of social life in terms of both the physical enclosing of social relations 
within the household, but also the social extension of family relations outside of a single 
household  I                                                     -                              
               A  M       B           M    M I              [t]he meaning of family life 
                                                                 P                   
                                                                                             
                                                  or live with familial guardians other than 
                                                                                               
parents may need to live apart for some of the time due to pressures of work or for other 
reasons; grandparents may re-marry and grandchildren may find themselves with new 
family members, new cousins, new nieces and nephews. Movement, re-location, and 
communication technology constitute significant forces in the changing social relations of 
family and household and in foregrounding understandings of social life that do not 
prioritise conditions of co-presence (Giddens, 1991). In this chapter I consider the changing 
                                                                                      
household. I do so by considering, initially, some historical and sociological research in 
emergence of the modern family and its relation to modern forms of power. I then discuss 
more recent research on the family as a space of democracy and changing forms of 
intimacy. 
 
Socialisation and System 
As we noted in chapter three, Parsonian social theory, but also much work in 
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having a defined functionality within the social system. The family and the school have often 
been seen as the two main institutions through which children become socialised. With the 
reach and growth of television from the 1950s and 1960s, the mass media was often noted 
as the third key institution of socialisation in modernity. Whatever, the problems with this 
historically dated model, many have declared the family as the quintessential unit of social 
reproduction. Thus, Christopher Lasch wrote in 1977: 
If the reproduction of culture were simply a matter of formal instruction and 
discipline, it could be left to the schools. But it also requires that culture be 
embedded in personality. Socialization makes the individual want to do what he has 
to do; the family is the agency to which society entrusts this complex and delicate 
task. (Lasch, 1979: 4) 
Such a model, in its very general form, often                                        assumes 
households  to be organized, by and large, on the basis of a division of labour between a 
                                                                B           M I       
1991: 7; Morgan, 1996). In its crude form, the family is understood in terms of social 
reproduction and the passage of ideological meaning from parent to child. For example, 
Louis Althusser, the French Marxist philosopher, conceived of the family as a central 
                                                        eologies of a social formation could 
be transposed from one generation to the next, but also such that the divisions of labour in 
society (between men and women and between manual and mental) could be ideologically 
reproduced (Althusser, 1971). In its more sophisticated form, the family has been seen to 
comprise not simply a means of ideological reproduction, but also a discrete social unit, or 
system, in itself, such that any understanding of that unit must pay attention to its internal 116 
 
dynamics and economy. Thus, power relations and dysfunctions are not the property of 
individual family members, but of the sociality and psychological dynamics of the family 
itself. For example, one version of this model, family systems theory, understands the family 
in terms of the emotional flows between family members. The misbehaviour of a child, for 
example, may equally be a consequence of the lack of communication and emotional 
antipathy between husband and wife or a consequence of the overinvestment by the 
parents in another sibling, hence producing sibling rivalry (Goodman, 1983). In this sense, 
socialisation is understood in the context of social interaction, inasmuch as social interaction 
is bounded within the familial and emotional relations of a particular household. 
Thus, in either its crude or more sophisticated form, a socialisation model   as 
presented across a range of theoretical and methodological paradigms and perspectives   
construes the family as the relay, or mediator, between society and the pre-individual, pre-
social child. The proper functioning of the family is understood in terms of the clarity of 
communication across generation and across the natural and the social. Such a model 
provided the broad rationale for a number of critiques of the family in the 1960s and 1970s 
from socialists to feminists to anti-psychiatrists (Firestone, 1979; Laing and Esterson, 1970; 
Poster, 1978). 
 
S                    G                  S       
Emerging from the context of a generalised critique of the family in the 1960s and 
1970s (often in the context of broader arguments about patriarchal power, liberal 
government and modern capitalism), a number of writers talk about the historical invention 
and development of the modern family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many 
writers discuss the changing nature of intimacy (primarily in relation to children) within the 117 
 
family from this period, but different writers provide different accounts as to the 
significance of  the family form  within contemporary society (Ariès, 1962; de Mause, 1976; 
Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1979; Lasch, 1979; Shorter, 1974; Stone, 1974). These writers 
offer different theoretical and political understandings of the family (e.g. regarding whether 
the family is in crisis, in need of support, or needing to be radically re-invented, or as a 
political technology). Lasch, for example, locates a crisis in the family, not in the 1970s, but a 
                       H                                                                     
with reference to th                                                                            
But instead of locating these forces in the 1970s, he sees their origin in the late nineteenth 
century. It is at this historical moment that the family begins to be massively reorganised 
and its relations of authority and expertise reconfigured. Lasch argued that the family was 
primarily a means to socialise children and for children to internalise parental authority. For 
L                                                            t unmodified by later experience, 
the child fears the terrible vengeance that his father can inflict even while he scorns the 
everyday father who never in                : 188-9). The refusal of the father to enforce their 
patriarchal authority and the lack of possibility for the child to stage a confrontation with 
that authority, for Lasch, was seen to have consequences not only for the developing child, 
but also for society. The consequence of children not contesting the authority of the father 
was that they were never able to take up a position of responsibility themselves. The child, 
now grown up, is never able to surpass their fantasies of retribution. They are forever to 
remain within a narcissistic personality structure, forever to remain childish.  
Furthermore, Lasch argued that a whole army of experts emerges and develops to 
support that new constitution of the self. L                                                    
An array of therapeutic experts assemble around the family to support its emotional 118 
 
instability, to offer knowledge and diagnosis, and to advise on what to do. Lasch argued 
that: 
The history of modern society, from one point of view, is the assertion of social 
control over activities once left to individuals and families. During the first stage of 
the industrial revolution, capitalists took production out of the household and 
collectivized it, under their own supervision, in the factory. Then they proceeded to 
                                                                              ic 
                                                                            F       
                                                                                
psychiatrists, teachers, child guidance experts, officers of the juvenile courts, and 
other specialists began to supervise child-rearing, formerly the business of the 
family. (Lasch, 1979: xiv-xv) 
L                                                                       T                 
                                                              T                                
                                                                                      
socialization or subjected family socialization to incre                                : 189).  
L                                   ered a lot of criticism, not least from feminist writers. 
B           M I                                                               L       
                                          -class family and his ignorance with regard to 
different contemporary and historical family forms and practices. But also they expose 
L                                                                                     
power (Barrett and McIntosh, 1991). Not least, there are problems with his analysis of 
feminism as itself seemingly a product of the socialisation of production and reproduction. 
For Lasch the feminist critique of wome              e home as the carer of children, the 119 
 
politics of allowing and recognising women into the public sphere of paid work, and also the 
anti-feminist argument concerning the professionalisation of childcare and housework are 
different sides of a single societal shift toward a rationalisation of the family, a devaluation 
of its traditional authorities, and its subordination to the authority of external experts, such 
as teachers, social workers, doctors, psychologists and others (1979: 10-14). 
Michel Foucault and those sympathetic to his genealogical understanding of power, such as 
Jacques Donzelot, make a series of arguments that are both very similar, but also very 
               L        A        F                                                           
                                                                    I  F          History of 
Sexuality, Volume I, he states that the system of noble estates and family alliances of the 
                                                                                    
                                                                                       
(Foucault, 1979: 106) and he talks of the family, from this time on, as at th                
between a system of alliance and a new regime of power and knowledge (in part based on 
new discourses of sexuality). A system of family alliances constituted a system of the 
exchange of women as wives. This was both a social and political system. Moreover, such 
                                                                                          
rested) included not only kin, but also servants and others within the extended household 
            F                                          this model of government to modern 
forms of power can be seen in a major shift in thinking and conduct. As a medium of power, 
it is argued by Foucault, that the discourses of sexuality allow a productivity and extension 
far greater than the system of alliances alone. To talk of sexuality in the context of the 
family, Foucault argues, allows experts but also family members themselves to interrogate 
their lives in terms of their fertility, in terms of their psychobiography, in terms of their 120 
 
development, in terms of their normality, and in terms of their perversions. For Foucault 
greater intimacy within the family is a consequence of a sexualisation of the social. Hence 
the opposition between incest taboo and infant care (                       M       
argument regarding the progressively better treatment of children by their parents) is 
deconstructed, such that sexual abuse may be seen alongside parental care within a broader 
investment in the family as a site of sexualisation and hence a central site, for Foucault, of 
                            B   F                                                         
works through an argument about modern governmentality. 
The governmentality that emerges in the eighteenth century is one that moves away 
from a historic form of the noble family and the power (potestas) of the pater familias to 
one of the  normal family , as an element within the population. Foucault argues that in the 
eighteenth century, partly as a result of demographic expansion, government based on the 
model of the ancient family became seen as limited and problematic. The model of the 
ancient family constituted a patriarchal system of powers and a system of alliance: namely, 
                                                                               sion of names 
                  F                             F                M              I  
D          supporting discussion of the family under the ancien regime, the system of 
alliances constitutes not the private realm of the family (separate from, impinged upon or 
supported by the state), but the domain of the public and the political. In this sense, political 
power was formed through the ability of a patriarch to mobilise support within and across 
the system of alliances, across kin, generations, patrons and servants. In this context, the 
economy, Foucault argues, was not an entity distinct from the family, rather it referred to 
the organisation of people and things within the household and the estate; in this sense, 
 oeconomie                     estic economy, the management of property and people 121 
 
(i.e. the estate) through the capacity of the father. But we need to be cautious about this 
argument, not least because some historians argue that there is little reliable evidence for a 
shift from extended to nuclear family at the time of industrialisation (Cunningham, 2005: 
88). That said, such criticism is argued on the basis of family size, rather than in relation to 
the broader Foucauldian argument about the nature of political rule and government. In the 
                                                                                  
infrastructures which support such agency, the issue is not simply about the size or 
composition of units of care, but the relation between family members and others and the 
mobilisation of capacities by virtue of those connections. 
In his work on governmentality, Foucault gives weight to the authority of statistical 
knowledge in its ability to provide an understanding of the totality of the population (i.e. to 
figure it as a measure of quantity). In the eighteenth century we see the emergence of 
                                                                                               
that the population is seen to have its own regularities (e.g. rates of birth and death, 
distribution of disease, and cycles of growth (Hacking, 1991). At this time, statistics (as a 
description of the state) is combined with the art of government; it becomes used as both a 
means of analysing the habits and forms of conduct, laws and regularities of a population 
living within a territory and as a means of government (Foucault, 1981: 252). Importantly, 
the population is now seen as directly related to the economic (in terms of the generation of 
wealth, spirals of labour, cycles of growth). The economic is now seen as a distinct entity, 
separate from the family and closely aligned to the population. It too is seen to have its own 
                              F                                                        
appears absolutely irreducible to the family, the latter becomes of secondary importance 
compared to population, as an element internal to population: no longer, that is to say, a 122 
 
                                                                                    
whatever information is required concerning the population (sexual behaviour, 
                                                                          F               
100). The family now emerges not as a model of government, but as an object and 
instrument of government:                                                                  
                                                F                     
For Donzelot the emergence of the modern family is linked to the redefinitions of 
                                                                H                            
                                                                                           
categories, fields, and forms of government. Liberalism as a form of government is 
predicated on the distinction between public and private, such that the latter is a domain 
                                                                      T                         
forms a solution, Donzelot argues, to the liberal definition of the state (1979: 53). In its now 
limited and modern definition, the family is seen as that which primarily supports the 
                                          T                                                 
which individuals and populations can be governed. While domestic privacies are protected 
through legal practices, families are normalised and regulated through public concerns 
about delinquency, child abuse, neglect, family disharmony and so on. Families are 
construed through the lens not only of the moral binaries of good and bad, but also the 
                                                  D                                            
experts (such as those practising psychiatry, paediatrics, psychology, psychotherapy, and 
psychoanalysis) whose knowledge maps out the mental spaces and times of the domestic. 
But others, such as Nikolas Rose and Valerie Walkerdine, have analysed the role of the social 
sciences (with particular reference to psychology) in the governance of the child, family and 123 
 
home (Rose, 1989; Walkerdine, 1984, 1997). Although the child is constructed as the object 
                                                                                               
such knowledge is deployed in relation to those who are not children as well. The family is 
not seen in realist terms (i.e. as form of social structure), but as an instrument and object of 
power and knowledge. It facilitates particular forms of regulation and governance and it has 
                                    D                                             the medical 
profession (i.e. the family doctor) and the mother of the bourgeois family in the nineteenth 
century. Through a discourse of family medicine and family hygiene, and through an address 
in popular medical and hygienic literature, the bourgeois mother becomes allied to 
particular forms of medical and hygienic expertise. She is made responsible, in these 
discourses and through these interlocking agencies, for the well-being of her family. She 
both educates her family and others through a mix of moralising philanthropy and 
promotional feminism. The children of these middle-class homes grow up within a 
                      M                                               V               -class 
mother was able seemingly to contain the limits of her familial world within the limits of her 
domestic supervisory gaze. In contrast, the working-class family was open to more direct 
and authoritarian forms of intervention from outside. The pathologised working-class 
family, now set against and compared to the middle-class norm, could be constructed as a 
site of constant surveillance and reform, initially by an army of philanthropists and latterly 
by those working for the welfare state. In both cases, we see a relation developing between 
forms of familial government, forms of mothering, and alliances with particular experts and 
forms of expertise. These forms of government have grown and developed over the 
twentieth century, in response to therapeutic expertise, medical knowledge and in their 
circulation in the media (Furedi, 2002   “          L                                         124 
 
                                     F                                                        
                                                                                      
series of social sciences and social experts can emerge and take hold. There are feminist 
                            “              B           M I                          D          
argument about the alignment of women as mothers with the development of the liberal 
state apparatus. 
 
Transforming Intimacy and Democratising the Family 
Research, in the late 1990s, by Carol Smart and her colleagues at the Centre for 
Research on Family, Kinship and Childhood, University of Leeds, paved the way for a 
substantial rethinking of academic conceptualisation of the family, of family policy, and of 
the agency of children in families. At a time when in the UK there was much discussion 
about the responsibilities and rights of fathers with regard to their children after the 
separation or divorce from the mother of the children, Smart looked not only to the adults 
for an understanding of parental separation, but importantly to the children as well, and in 
doing so helped to put flesh on the legal structure set in place by the C          A           
in the UK that legally provided for children to have some kind of voice in matters that affect 
their lives. Smart talked to children and young people and in doing so was able to begin to 
frame an understanding of their experiences of contemporary family life. Her research took 
one of its guiding frames from the recent sociology of childhood as articulated by James, 
J         P                 B       “                                                     
reflexive social actors is more than a theoretical perspective, for it raises questions about 
the whole tenor of child-                      “                       D                      
research methodologies, they argued that they were able to see how family relationships 125 
 
          iated over time rather than fixed by duty, law or the positional status of family 
          “                       I                                                       
thinking that Smart and her colleagues invoke is such that the family members are no longer 
                                                                                           
                                                    “                       T              
In other words, this approach eschews the tendency towards childre    
familialization... for it grants conceptual autonomy to individual family members. 
Within this formulation, then, children need no longer be invisible; they emerge as 
fully fledged family members, actively engaged in negotiating their own family 
practices and relationships. They no longer just belong to families; as reflexive 
agents of their own lives they are part of the creation of families. ((Smart et al, 2001: 
18) 
T                                                                                      in this 
    “                                                                                 
contemporary family life that pays attention to children, not only as agents, but as speaking 
subjects. Thus, for example, Jan Pryor and Robert E. Emery, in thei                         
                                 U“                                        d to be articulate, 
to express opinions on everything from bedroom décor to world events, and to be 
              P         E                  A        “   t and her colleagues are more 
                                                                                           
family, Pryor and Emery state clearly what may be underlying much of this discourse on our 
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A key reference in some of these debates is the social theory of Giddens. For the sociology 
of children, two aspects of his work are important concerning the transformation of 
intimacy and the growth of new family forms and also the individualisation and 
democratisation of the family in late modernity. In the first instance, drawing upon the work 
of Lasch on the narcissistic self,          ‘       “                                        
      G                                                                             A       
Lasch (Lasch, 1979: 19), Giddens argues that there has been a socio-historical movement 
from romantic love (and marriage as a facet of that enduring love) to more serialised 
relationships (inasmuch as marriage and co-habitation are now seen as transitory and non-
binding commitments).  He states that: 
The inability to take a serious interest in anything other than shoring up the self 
makes the pursuit of intimacy a futile endeavour. Individuals demand from intimate 
connections with others much greater emotional satisfaction and security than they 
ever did before; on the other hand, they cultivate a detachment necessary to the 
maintenance of narcissistic ego defences. The narcissist is led to make inordinate 
                                                                                  
                            G                   
As with Lasch, Giddens relates this phenomenon to the decline of the patriarchal family , 
                                I                                                             
thrives in a relation with new experts, a new breed of therapeutic experts who help support 
                   M                                                                 
                                                                                     
powerlessness and thus increases the reliance and the narcissism. But for Giddens such 
reliance is predicated on a self-reflexivity. Thus in relation to forms of modern marriage - 127 
 
that are seen to rely more on voluntary commitment than compulsion, that include fewer 
children, and that involve a division of gender that is less clear cut                             
restructuring new forms of gender and kinship relation out of the detritus of pre-established 
                       G                    These shifts, documented twenty or more years 
ago, are now sociologically well-entrenched. In the 1990s Giddens argued that (based on the 
empirical research of Judith Stacey on familial relations in California) we were witnessing a 
                                                   H  argued that: 
 ‘                                               rms of pre-established gender 
divisions, are being created; rather than forming a chasm between a previous and a 
future mode of existence, divorce is being mobilised as a resource to create 
networks drawing together new partners and former ones, biological children and 
stepchildren, friends and other relatives. (Giddens, 1991: 177) 
W                                                                     C                 
out that remarriages constituted about a quarter to a third of all marriages in eighteenth 
century Britain. These were the result largely of spousal death (Cunningham, 2005: 96). But 
what is more recent is the reason for remarriage (i.e. now largely divorce) and the diversity 
of marital forms (e.g. including lesbian and gay marriages, new forms of co-parenting, and 
so on). For Giddens, these new family forms are symptomatic of the declining significance of 
the family as an index of social relationships.  
If we look to data from the UK and the USA (namely two countries that might be 
seen at the forefront of processes of modernisation), then, with regard to this argument, 
that data is certainly ambivalent. In the UK the long term trend is argued to be one of 
decline in marriage from a peak in 1972 to its lowest rate in 2007 since marital statistics 
were first recorded in the UK in 1862 (ONS, 2009). That said, there were 17.1 million families 128 
 
in the UK in 2006 of which 71% were of married and 14% of cohabiting couples. In those 
families, increasingly both parents go out to work and there are 1.8 children per family 
(ONS, 2009). In the USA in 2007, 67.8% of children were living with two married parents. 
71% of all children were living in households with two parents (whether married, biological 
or adoptive parents) and 26% were living with single parents (of which the largest group was 
of single mothers, but this figure does not preclude single parents cohabiting with partners). 
The remaining 3% of children lived with no parents (but of which the largest group was of 
grandparents or relatives, rather than foster or other forms of guardianship). On the one 
hand, there is clear evidence that families no longer constitute an idealised nuclear family 
form (the form that was often reproduced in sociology from the 1930s to the 1970s), that 
there is slightly more diversity with respect to the patterning of family forms, and that there 
                                                                                              
life. On the other hand, there is clear evidence that children are predominantly raised in 
families, of one kind or another.  
In the second instance, Giddens talks of the increasing importance of the self as a 
reflexive project, as one guided toward self-actualisation, as one formed through 
relationships of mutual self-disclosure and one formed through a concern for self-fulfilment 
(Giddens, 1991: 125). Unlike Donzelot, who accords women no agency (only the status of 
                                   G                                                       
Smart and Neale, 1999: 9). But agency is accorded to all family members. Increasingly 
children are construed as having agency in the family. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim refer to 
this in terms of individualisation (2001). The process of individualisation refers to the 
increasing formation of iden             -                                                       
in relations of fixed employment and class, fixed normative family, fixed religious belief, and 129 
 
fixed lifelong geographical belonging, than in conditions of flexibility of work, consumption, 
lifestyle, and personal relationships. But it also refers to the role of state agencies in driving 
the processes of individualisation, and in our case, the individualisation of children as 
distinct actors within the family. Importantly, a key aspect of this process is that children 
and young people within families feel that they construct their own lives and shape their 
own biographies, rather than have their sense of identity and belonging stamped upon them 
(Beck, 1997; Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). This process of biographisation can be seen, in 
G                                -reflexivity in conditions of reflexive modernisation 
(Giddens, 1994). 
I                        G                                                               
idealised form of the de                  H                                                      
                           M                         
The family is becoming democratized, in ways which track processes of public 
democracy; and such democratization suggests how family life might combine 
individual choice and social solidarity... Democratization in the context of the family 
implies equality, mutual respect, autonomy, decision-making through 
communication and freedom from violence. (Giddens, 1998: 93) 
He constructs the democratic family as a policy ideal and political objective. Giddens was a 
close adviser to the Tony Blair New Labour government in the UK in the 1990s and his work 
                                                                                        T e 
                                                                       accommodates 
changes in family form (non-heterosexual families, fragmented families, and one-parent 
families), but also recognises the importance of family in the stability of childre                
children are seen to grow up more psychologically secure, better able to achieve academic 130 
 
success, and more confident in sexual and social relationships within the framework of 
constant non-conflictual co-parenting relations). The ideal of the democratic family is one 
predicated on emotional and sexual equality, mutual rights and responsibilities, co-
parenting, life-long parental contracts, negotiated authority over children, obligations of 
children to parents and social integration (Giddens, 1998: 95). And this ideal is set against 
                                                                                                  
                                      
Instead of seeing this as a shift from one theoretical position (Foucauldian) to 
another (broadly Giddensian), we might consider how the agency of children within families 
is facilitated and supported through governmental infrastructures, as mapped out by 
F         D         ‘     W                      T                           perts (Donzelot) 
around the family from the late nineteenth century and its sexualisation, psychologisation 
and therapeutisation through the twentieth century serves not to curtail the agency of 
children in the domestic, but to facilitate their capacity to speak. The speaking child 
becomes a central figure in the remaking of the modern family as a site of emotional 
communication and security. The health of the nation and the well-being of the family are 
seen to be dependent on the happy and talkative child. I  L                                 
self, a work that continues, but also re-articulates his earlier ideas, he argues that: 
The modern family is the product of egalitarian ideology, consumer capitalism, and 
therapeutic intervention. In the nineteenth century, a combination of 
philanthropists, educators, and social reformers began to uphold bourgeois 
domesticity as a corrective both to fashionable dissipation and to the 
                                       F                                             
sided with the weaker members of the family against patriarchal authority... They 131 
 
championed the rights of children, condemning the arbitrary power of parents 
allegedly exercised over their offspring and questioning their competence as well. 
One result of their efforts was to subject the relations of the state, as executed by 
the schools, the social work agencies, and the juvenile court. A second result was to 
alter the balance of forces within the family. Men lost much of their authority over 
children to their wives, while children gained a certain independence from both 
parents, not only because other authorities asserted their jurisdiction over childhood 
but because parents lost confidence in the old rules of child-rearing and hesitated to 
assert their own claims in the face of professional expertise. (Lasch, 1984: 185-6) 
Although we should be cautious of taking this argument wholesale, it is evident that any 
democratisation needs to be seen in the context of those infrastructures which both endow 
children with capacity to speak, but also the capacity of others to hear their voice. The voice 
of the child, as it were, is made possible by                                                 
 
Family Talk and Modernisation 
The construction of children with speaking rights, as it were, within the family is 
closely correlated with a broader narrative of the modernisation of the family. The 
construction of children as speaking subjects is often see as a significant lever with regard to 
the modernisation, not simply of the family, but of the social more generally. Thus, Smart 
and her colleagues argue that children should have a stake in the production of academic 
knowledge. They argue                                      with children rather than on or 
about them and, in t                                             “                       
                                                                      -producers of 
                        “                        Bren Neale, one of the researchers with 132 
 
Carol Smart on                                                                                 
                                                                                N            
Mutuality is increasingly seen to constitute a core ethic for research with children. The 
endowing of children as co-researchers (i.e. as co-producers of knowledge) suggests a 
                                                                                           
production and circulation. But, more than this, emphasis on the construction of children as 
speaking subjects, on an ethics of mutuality and on the alignment of children as co-
producers of knowledge facilitates a further rebalancing of the relations across children in 
                   L                                              
The idea of children talking on more equal terms in the family is also seen as a key 
facet of modernisation projects and of a narrative of modernisation across the globe. For 
example, Cindi Katz, in her research on children growing up in Howa, Sudan, discusses how 
one of her participants, Muna (whom she has known and researched since she was a child), 
suggests that her relation to her mother when she was young is very different from her 
relation to her daughter now. Although Katz disagrees with what Muna says, she settles on 
M                                                                                   
(something which Muna says she was unable to do as a child) and how she is able to talk 
more openly about matters such as hennaing and smoke baths. It is not clear whether it is 
the case that this represents a shift in parent-child relations from more hierarchical to more 
friendship-like relations. Muna wants her children to be educated, but also to know how to 
do the traditional tasks of farming and tending the land. For Katz the changes in Howa are 
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(primarily the men in the village travelling from home to work), new forms of consumption 133 
 
and the valorisation of schooled education (Katz, 2004). The changes which Katz is 
describing in the Sudan bear some similarities to those in the US and Europe, but with 
regard to the forms of state, governmentally and marketisation they are very different. It is 
important then both to understand the particularity of particular social formations and not 
to assume a simple mimetic relation between North and South within a simple model of 
dev                                                                    
These spaces of talk are not only the consequence of historic governmental shifts; 
they are also traversed by modern forms of governmentality now; and they are significant 
sites for the innovation of modern forms of power. We should be cautious, then, of 
overstating any democracy of the family, not least because even well-meaning statements 
                            UK C          A                                                
having a legal say in decisions of divorce) often play out in practice as vehicles for the will of 
competing parents or experts (see James and James, 1999). But also we must recognise that 
the attribution of voice to children comes with demands as well as rights. As Pryor and 
E                                                                                         
they are deeply affected by them. In our zeal for recognizing the rights of children we may 
                                                               (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 171). 
T                                                                                               
an obligation to be responsible. They argue that: 
Children often seem to understand that responsibility is the corollary of rights. 
Young children especially are clear that they do not want to be responsible for major 
decisions at these times [of divorce]. It may be, then, that adults are well advised to 
provide a scaffolding structure for children within which they are enabled to foster, 
maintain, and abstain from relationships as far as possible... to create and maintain 134 
 
an atmosphere... within which children can exercise agency in creating their own 
relationship network and identity. (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 186). 
Contemporary forms of governmentality of families, then, need not simply to address the 
parent as the relay of sovereignty, but to address individual family members, namely in our 
case children, in a manner that allows the interlocutor not only to speak, but also to stay 
silent, to have some control (whether actively or passively) over the conditions of 
communication and the relations of government.  
But any discussion of the family as a space of conversation must also be set 
alongside a history of violence. Much of the research on the democratisation of families has 
ignored or at least failed to properly integrate, the idea of family relations as relations of 
force, violence and abuse. If the 1970s saw an intensified academic investment in the family 
as an emotional and sexualised economy, then it was Lloyd de Mause, in his History of 
Childhood (1976), who wanted to talk about that economy as also an economy of violence 
and abuse and who provided a narrative (with some graphic descriptions of cases of the 
abuse of children by adults) of the development of parent-child relations from a history of 
                                                                     D  M       
psychohistory has been widely criticised for its model of linear historical development and 
progress and for its elision of the history of childhood with a history of child abuse, but in 
many ways de Mause is significant precisely because of his insistence on that correlation 
between family and abuse. Although his psychohistory has overshadowed his major 
findings, it was his understanding of the everyday casual nature of violence toward children, 
the correlation of that violence with the very construction of childhood as a social 
institution, and his understanding that emotional relations of care and intimacy would 
provide a surpassing of such abuse that set his argument apart from others who were keen 135 
 
                                                                                           
liberation from the institution of childhood. But we must be wary of seeing in history a 
reduction in family violence and conversely a growth in love and care. This is a common 
                                                                                          
communicational harmony.  
The relation between violence and intimacy is one that certainly cannot be reduced 
to an inverse antithetical relation; violence does not lessen as care increases. The role of 
intimacy in the demonstration of domestic violence is all too apparent, whether in its most 
negative presentation of violence as a consequence of decadence or violence as a 
                       T                                                                
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abuse, as Foucault argues, can be seen as an outcome of the increasing sexualisation of the 
parent-child relations and the emergence of modern forms of family relations from the 
eighteenth century onward (1979). But that said, there is an absence of research on children 
and violence that understands violence not only as an offshoot of moderns forms of power, 
but as a reasoned form of governmentality. To say this is not to return to monolithic models 
of violence and patriarchy that were circulated in the 1970s and 1980s, but to suggest that 
regular, everyday, localised and domesticated violence needs to be made visible in the 
context of its alignment with forms of reasoned government of children (Larson, 1999). 
Violence and abuse of children is as much a form of governed care as supervising television 
viewing or night-time reading or visits for health and development check-ups. The debates 
in the press, in Parliament, but also among parents in the school playground in the UK about 
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the contrary, such declarations should be read for what they were, namely a form of 
government of children constructed in such a way that aligned physical abuse with parental 
intimacy and care. And it is this alignment of violence and care that is the problem. 
 
Mediations of Family in Late Modernity 
F                                                                                   
family are all increasingly mediated, not only through localised practices and interactions, 
but through forms of mediation at a distance. The role of experts and expert systems (such 
as social workers, doctors, and welfare and health systems) play a significant role in modern 
forms of familial mediation, but also modern means of media and communications play an 
increasingly significant role. Again the work of Giddens has been highly influential in our 
understanding of forms of mediation in late modernity. His argument about the 
disarticulation of space and place and the shift away from social relations as constituted 
within conditions of co-presence to ones mediated at a distance is taken up by media 
scholars in order to think about the role of media and communications in familial social 
relations. Thus, for example, John Thompson, who was at Cambridge with Giddens in the 
1980s and 1990s, draws on this work to talk directly about the role of the media in 
contemporary social life. But also other media scholars, not directly drawing on the work of 
Giddens, have made similar kinds of argument. For example, Joshua Meyrowitz (1987) 
provides a wide-ranging argument about the role of modern media in the dissolution of the 
sharp boundaries between public and private, between physical and social space, and 
between the differentiating categories of childhood and adulthood. The electronic media, in 
this argument, are seen to be at the forefront of the dynamics and processes of modernity 137 
 
and late-modernity. What were once highly embedded local interactions become mediated 
and disembedded. A personal conversation about schoolwork between mother and 
daughter might just as well now take place on a mobile phone through text as a face-to-face 
conversation in the kitchen at home. The homework might well be through a dedicated 
educational website, such that the child inputs data through a screen interface on their 
computer at home and the teacher perhaps at school, but maybe at home as well, marks 
the work from a similar interface. Studies from the role of video media in South-Asian 
families in Southall, London (Gillespie, 1995) to the use of the internet by Trinidadian 
families geographically dispersed across the globe (Miller and Slater, 2000) have 
documented how media and communications technologies play an important role in 
contemporary familial social relations.  
Notwithstanding the wealth of research on ideological representations of family in 
film, television, and print media (see Brunsden, 2000; Haralovich, 1988; Spigel, 1992), 
research on the social interaction of and interpretation by family members with respect to 
media technologies and content has been pursued by sociologists and media and 
communication scholars. Pioneering work by David Morley on the nature of situated family 
television viewing in the 1980s helped to stage subsequent work with Roger Silverstone and 
by other scholars, such as Eric Hirsch, Sonia Livingstone and Shaun Moores, on the use and 
interpretation of information and communication technologies in the home (see Morley, 
1986; Morley and Silverstone, 1991). Later research, particularly by Livingstone (2002) and 
Moores (1993), sought not only to consider the use and interpretation of media and 
communications in the household, but also to consider how that use, interpretation and the 
technology itself helped to constitute the spatial differentiations, relations and positionings 
of the home (see also Morley, 2000; Oswell, 2002).  138 
 
The history of the family has been in many ways tied to the history of the built 
environment of the household. The division of the household into separate sleeping 
arrangements for parents and children emerges alongside an awareness of 
compartmentalisation of adult sexuality and the differentiation of children in terms of the 
sexual practices of the household (Foucault, 1980). Whereas before children and adults 
would have slept in a single room, in a household undifferentiated properly by room as 
defined by its function (i.e. sleeping, cooking, resting), now children not only have separate 
bedrooms, but occupy the household in different kinds of ways and through different kinds 
           T                                                                                   
be understood in terms of the mediation of the household and role of those media and 
communication technologies in the rearticulation of domestic geographies and the 
rearticulation of relations across domestic, public and transnational (Livingstone, 2002)l. 
Through e-mail, social networking platforms, texting, and various other technologies 
children and young people are significant actors in shaping their own personal relations with 
friends and families within and without the household, but also in using these forms of 
social and technological networks to reconfigure their position, relationality, authority, and 
expressivity in a family setting (Miller, 2011). Certainly for older children these forms of 
mediated interactions provide more evidence for considering children as significant 
producers of knowledge and of circulating that knowledge, sometimes locally and 
                    T                                                                           
example, provides an opportunity for commerce to market those lived visible cultural 
spaces and interactions. Sometimes through observing online chat or activities in virtual 
spaces and sometimes through directly targeting young people with questions about 
products and brands, children are brought into loops of knowledge production (although it 139 
 
would be difficult to see this as a form of mutual co-research) (Berriman, 2012). But also, 
                                                                                            
agency and interaction are mediated not through words alone, but through relations with 
objects. Objects in the home provide points of connection and disconnection; they mark out 
relations of generation and gender. Bedrooms, for example, are places in which bits of 
technology are horded by teenagers which separate them from the rest of the family, but 
connect them to others outside the built environment of the domestic. Thus, for example, 
Livingstone conducted research on children and families in the 1980s and 1990s that 
revealed how cultural practices in the home were highly differentiated according to 
generation and such that those practices and the spatial differentiations were articulated 
through the accumulation of media and communication technology, such as televisions, 
MP3 players, internet connections and so on. The post war period saw an increasing 
emergence and de                                                            
(Livingstone, 2002; see also McRobbie, 1991). This work helps to frame an understanding of 
the relation of children to and within families in terms of a notion of, what Livingstone 
                                                   I                                      
spatialisation can be simply analysed in terms of the greater individualisation of children 
within the home, but this process of separation and the use of objects and technologies to 
mark out that separation certainly helps to construct a form of collectivity which helps to 
define children and constitutes a space in which they are able to construct a sense of their 
lives (i.e. to construct their biographies) as a shared space. The material resources which are 
                                                                                          
the domestic) do not simply constitute a set of tools to be used by prior constituted agents, 
rather these resources realign and reconfigure that agency as a multiple innovation.  140 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed sociological ideas about the emergence of the 
modern family in terms of its being framed within a broader horizon concerning the growth 
of the modern state and the arrangement of relations across family, politics and the 
economy. But also the growth of a series of professionals, some of whom were and are 
aligned with the state, constituted a body of people and a set of practices of care which 
both surveilled children and families, but also provided the infrastructure for a growing 
individualisation of children. This was an individualisation which was importantly projected 
through an idea of children having a voice (both cultural and political). It is in the context of 
this governmental arrangement that we can also understand increasing declarations of the 
democratic family. 
 It is clear that families in North America and Europe do not suddenly discover intimacy, love 
and care for the children and for each other in the nineteenth century (or thereabouts). But 
what we do see is that the affective economy of the family does, from that moment, 
become a significant register of well-being, a means of regulation by internal and external 
agents, and a site of investment with respect to all family members. Moreover, the capacity 
of and encouragement for children to speak becomes a defining measure of the well-being 
of both family and nation. In addition, the domestic space of the household becomes a key 
site of investment in infrastructure. Interior decor and design becomes popularised over the 
twentieth century, but importantly over this period media and communication technologies 
become central sites of investment and infrastructuring. Children are a major driver in the 
building of the modern home.  
But family, household and home can no longer be assumed to be co-extensive and to 
offer an assured stability. The opening up of the family and household through new 141 
 
relations of intimacy, through mixed marriage, through migration, through new forms of 
media and cultural technology constitute possibilities for these children living in these 
families and these households. Where historically in the global North philanthropic and 
state agencies have supported and developed the distributed agency of children, now new 
                                                                                       
collective agency. But this is a particular social and historical trajectory. The formation of 
capacities and dispositions among family members and cultural differentiation of familial 
                                                                                                  
                                                                                           















Chapter Seven   School and Education 
In this chapter we consider the school, not so much as a site of learning and 
teaching, but as a particular kind of social setting. As a particular kind of institution it has 
brought children together and aligned them with regard to their measured and 
differentiated cognitive capacity. Far from producing docile subjects, modern schools 
                                               h as this has constituted both an explicit 
philosophy of the modern school (i.e. learning is through doing) and as this provides the 
                                                                  M                     
setting though, the school has constituted a diagram through which social and cultural 
practices more generally are, and have been, made intelligible as pedagogic, or subject to 
educational measure, but also importantly through which spaces of innovation and 
resistance have been constructed. 
 
The Emergence and Standardisation of a Common Childhood 
The Medieval historian Didier Lett opens a chapter on the education of children 
                                                                                P        A     
affirmed, people of th       M      A                                                
(Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999: 39). The males of noble families would start doing menial 
work in the household of another noble family from the age of 11 or 12 years and would 
then gradually be trained in the responsibilities of knighthood. Girls would similarly be 
trained in reading, riding and dancing in the service of relatives (Heywood, 2001: 157). 
Children from non-aristocratic families would also be sent to relatives or other households 
to learn through informal apprenticeships or forms of service. Children were instructed in 
particular crafts and skills; some were adopted into the family and instructed more generally 143 
 
in spiritual and moral matters; others were treated harshly and used only for their labour 
(Heywood, 2001: 158). As Heywood notes, the education of children through 
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unable to cope with a changing and growing mercantile and urban economy; (Heywood, 
2001: 160). 
The history of schooling in the early Modern period in Europe indicates that although 
there were some schools for girls and although there were some schools in rural areas, most 
schools were in towns and catered to the education of boys (Cunningham, 2005: 99). 
Schooling was largely religious in orientation and concerned the instruction of Christian 
(Catholic or Protestant) texts and philosophy, primarily through the catechism. Literacy, in 
this sense, was tied to religious teaching. Increasingly, Cunningham argues, schools catered 
to the demands for a literate population to administrate the growing state offices and to be 
able to comprehend the growing ordinances that came from that emerging state apparatus; 
but also, he argues, there was a growing literary culture which helped to facilitate a demand 
for print literacy (Cunningham, 2005: 100). There is also some evidence, Cunningham 
argues, for suggesting that young children were sent to school as a childminding service 
while the parents worked. In all cases, although there were some charitable schools, most 
schooling required payment and that indicated both the relative value of a taught education 
and the disparity between those who could pay (or saw the value of paying) and those who 
did not. The relative benefits and disadvantages of schooling at this time were reflected in 
the fact that those children that did attend some schooling often did so for three years or 
less (Cunningham, 2005: 101). While elementary schools tended to be available for all, 144 
 
secondary education was largely the preserve of the upper classes. Many of the schools 
were run as private and not state enterprises. They were not well-liked by children, but 
enforcement was encouraged by the parents. Increasingly over the course of the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the role of the state grew (although 
education was still largely religious in orientation). At the same time, schooling took place 
less in the homes of families, than in public buildings (Cunningham, 2005: 119).Increasingly 
attendance was enforced by church and state through fines and punishments (Cunningham, 
2005: 102 and 124). 
Heywood argues that over the period from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth 
                                                                  H                4). Over 
and above the resistance of parents and children alike, the enforcement of a national 
literacy was important for the shaping of the modern nation state and its popular culture. In 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, schools were seen to be able to provide 
the means for national identity and unity. Cunningham argues that this was in part a 
consequence of enlightened absolutist government in Europe (Cunningham, 2005: 122). A 
single form of education could be provided to a single population under the reign of a single 
monarch within a single sovereign national territory. The foregrounding of the nation within 
state governed education did not mean that the teaching of religious philosophy and 
doctrine became less important, rather the latter became more centrally aligned with the 
objectives of the modern enlightened state.  It was in this context that a universal education 
and compulsory school attendance was seen as a pubic virtue, but was difficult to enforce 
and was not able to be properly funded (i.e. through general taxation) (Cunningham, 2005: 
124; Heywood, 2001: 155). T                                                             
within a growing national state administration provided the potential means of separation 145 
 
from a European-wide religious government centre in Rome (i.e. the Papal centre of the 
Catholic Church). 
In the Modern period, schooling became compulsory and widespread across the 
national population. The idea of a universal education and the systematic and regulated 
relationship between the institutions of schooling and the state played a major and 
                                                                                        
childhood, and in the regulation of that normative ideal. Moreover, the consequences of the 
programmatic demands for a national literate population were such that, on the one hand, 
they helped to form children into a horizontally organised (through an egalitarian principle 
of reading and writing for all), but increasingly differentiated (by ability, but also increasingly 
by linear segmentation of age) mass of people and, on the other, that such an education 
required state investment and the formation of a class of adults increasingly differentiated 
from ordinary people by virtue of their professional training as teachers. No longer would 
education take place in the households of family or of others willing to pass on a trade or 
moral guidance; no longer would schooling be secondary to the everyday demands of 
familial economy and need (for exa                                                         
stable), rather than sit and be taught by a local schoolmaster. Modern education has sought 
to meet the needs of a modern economy to the extent that those needs have been defined 
by a state administration and the experts that shape its governmentalities and not directly 
by the localised everyday demands of ordinary people. Schooling in the nineteenth century 
became the object of increased intervention by educational experts. The emergence of a 
field o                                                                                     
shift from medieval apprenticeship to the birth of modern schooling. In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster developed, in the context 146 
 
of Anglican and Quaker schools in England, but soon distributed more widely, a monitorial 
system of schooling. We will discuss the monitorial system in the following section, but for 
the moment it is sufficient to state that some historians and sociologists have argued that it 
was primarily through the development of educational practices and compulsory schooling 
                                                                                    
normative ideal in relation to which children were standardised and made to fit that ideal. 
As John Sommerville has argued:  
In the course of the nineteenth century... [t]he desire to provide a proper 
childhood for every citizen forced changes both in education and in the public 
mind. The beliefs that were imposed through the state schools were reduced to 
those no one had yet doubted. And even liberals began to see merit in 
eliminating certain prejudices and habits through a standardized education 
(Sommerville, 1982: 193) 
T                                 layed a pivotal role in the construction of a new kind of 
            H                    T                                                      
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construction (although it was certainly that too), it was formed through institutionalisation. 
H                                                                                                
the school attendance officer, ... was able to impose its vision on unwilling pupils and their 
          H                And yet, Sommerville has argued that it was precisely because 
such a standardisation of childhood was an ideal that its institutionalisation and the 
                                                                 ng to the ideal could only be 
                                                            “                        T   
ideal (an ideology of childhood) that was presented in educational discourses, but also in 147 
 
literary and popular cultural texts, in welfare discourses and elsewhere, gave the impression 
of a standardisation and uniformity that was never actually realised. Moreover, it was this 
ideological construction of an imaginary ideal of childhood which constituted the object of 
libertarian critiques of schooling in the 1970s. For example, Ivan Illich states in Deschooling 
Society that:  
Institutional wisdom tells us that children need school. Institutional wisdom tells 
us that children learn in school. But this institutional wisdom is itself the product 
of schools because sound common sense tells us that only children can be 
taught in school. Only by segregating human beings in the category of childhood 
could we ever get them to submit to the authority of a schoolteacher (Illich, 
1971: 41)  
The disestablishment of schools or the deinstitutionalisation of learning harks back to a 
Rousseauesque view of the natural child learning through nature, but also fails to grasp how 
thoroughly learning is technologised and how significant the school has been in the 
development of social technologies. 
Scholars have argued that the distribution of educational technologies, such as 
intelligence testing in the twentieth century, helped to reproduce a society divided by class. 
For example, Brian Simon, writing on the progression in England from primary education to 
                                                                           of pupils at 11 
                                                                               -divided society 
which is not able to utilise the abilities of all its citizens, and so dare not develop them to the 
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through psychological measurement of intelligence into one type of school designed to 
facilitate mental ability and the progression to university and the professions and another 148 
 
designed to train children in the crafts and skills of physical labour. The children who go on 
to command the leading positions in government, the economy and the professions 
                                            “                 T                           
that it is from this class of children that teachers come. The intelligence test has a long 
history that traces back to Galton and others in the nineteenth century (Rose, 1989), but its 
advocate in the UK in the middle of the twentieth century was the psychologist Cyril Burt. 
Burt understood intelligence to be largely biological, innate and hereditary. The intelligence 
test, then, for Burt simply made visible an innate disposition. The process of testing, 
classification and selection of children was seen as an efficient distribution of children on 
the grounds of natural ability. Moreover, some could argue that it was a system that 
overcame class prejudice precisely on the grounds that the test saw through ostensible signs 
of class and poverty and simply looked at intellectual and cognitive ability. And thus it could 
be seen as a meritocratic system that allowed bright working class children to escape from 
their class position and to reap the benefits of grammar schools, university life and the 
professions. A number of commentators have lauded the 1944 Education Act in the UK 
precisely for those reasons. Critics of Burt and of this system of selection, though, were 
widespread and eventually led to the shift in the UK in the 1970s to a comprehensive 
system of secondary education. Nevertheless, attempts to redeploy the notion of 
intelligence testing on populations in order to govern the distribution of facilities and 
                                                                                 M            
the issue rose again with the publication of The Bell Curve in the US in 1994 by Richard 
Herrnstein and Charles Murray. 
The criticisms of intelligence testing are significant, but such criticisms often fall back on 
the idea of a common childhood, a common people that is divided and distributed through 149 
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men in the face of their inherent defects, stand like a barrier in the way of real 
educational advance... Instead, let us recognise that the most valuable capital of 
society is people and that the most important task to-day is to provide for the 
youth of this country the conditions for healthy, human development and the 
exercise of ability. (Simon, 1953: 111) 
The idea of a common childhood stood as the basis of an ethical and political critique of a 
system of education and schooling. But the irony was that the institutionalisation of 
schooling and its standardisation in the nineteenth century provided precisely that ground 
of commonality, of children as a common people. Such a perspective is not without its 
problems and we shall consider those in more detail in the next section. 
 
Discipline and Power 
In the 1980s research seemed to continue the focus on, and antipathy toward, 
technologies of standardisation and measurement, but it did so in the context of a 
Foucauldian model of knowledge and power and in doing so an anti-essentialist and 
constructivist notion of the child and childhood was pursued. Foucauldian scholarship has 
been able to provide accounts, not only for the figuring of the child within the government 
of and through the family, but also the extensive canvass of contemporary social life. 
Foucault himself talks about the monitorial schools of the nineteenth century (Foucault, 
1977). These schools were typified by their organisation of children in rows of desks, the 150 
 
regimentation of lessons and curriculum, the overseeing authority of the school master, and 
importantly the role of pupils both as learners and as monitors. James Donald refers to a 
contemporary description by Patrick Colquhoun in his New and Appropriate System of 
Education for the Labouring People (1806): 
The province of the master or mistress is to direct the whole machine in all its 
parts... It is their business to see that others work, rather than work themselves. The 
master and mistress, from their respective chairs, overlook every part of the school, 
and give life and motion to the whole. They inspect the classes [the children sitting in 
one row] one after another; they call upon the monitors occasionally to bring them 
up, that they may specifically examine the progress of each pupil. (quoted in Donald, 
1992: 21) 
T                             l, articulated and detailed control   to render visible those 
who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform 
individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the 
effects of po                                                                     F         
1977: 172). The lining of pupils in rows, instituting an observer and monitor who has 
oversight of that row, coordinating the monitors with reference to a master, and thus 
facilitating a relationship between those pupils in a row according to their ability or inability 
to complete the tasks at hand but also with reference to a single standard across the 
monitorial space and across the collectivity of children constitutes a simple technology of 
measurement, pedagogic and standardising as much as it is differentiating. This is a 
technology less aimed at whole individuals than at the eyes and ears of some and the 
cognitive facilities and dexterity of hands of others. These body parts are lined up with tools 
and objects that facilitate writing and desks and benches that permit the orchestration of 151 
 
bodies in lines. The school day is regimented according to clock-time and pedagogic tasks 
are delimited through temporal segments. This is l                                           
than a mixing of bodies, objects, spaces and times. The disciplinary architecture of the 
monitorial schools was distributed not only across pedagogic institutions, but could be 
found in the apparatus of the prison and in the army barracks. The administration of time 
                                                               F                    
constituted significant techniques in the production of individual and docile bodies across a 
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School Society, London, from Paul Monroe, A Cyclopedia of Education, New York, 
Macmillan, 1913 
 
This disciplinary architecture of the school remains until the middle of the twentieth 
century, but it also gets transformed. As we have seen, an understanding of the distribution 
of intelligence across a population is developed in scientific research from Francis Galton to 152 
 
Cyril Burt. Such understanding has implications for how different sections of the population 
are conceived and acted upon by government, but it also has a profound affect on the 
regulation of education according to intelligence difference. The division of schools has not 
only been according to age, but also with regard to perceived cognitive capabilities. Thus, 
children are divided into different ability groups within schools, but also divided across 
different types of school. The use of regular testing and examination has been central to 
these distributions. The classification of different levels of intelligence is used to 
differentiate a population in a way appropriate to wider divisions of work between mental 
and physical labour (Rose, 1979 and 1985). Although in post-industrial information societies, 
distribution of children on the basis of cognitive ability is less with regard to a division 
between mental and manual, than creative and mundane work. For some the division of 
children into school classes is closely correlated to the division of national populations into 
classes (Walkerdine, 1984). Jones and Williamson argue that: 
The new domain was defined at the point of intersection of two new ways of making 
statements about the population which were themselves formed during the 
nineteenth century, as the result of the constitution of town police forces and town 
health boards, on the one hand, and as a result of the reform of prison 
administrations and those of Poor Law institutions on the other. These two new 
ways of making statements about the population formed a topographical analysis 
and a historical analysis respectively: and by their intersection defined a new field of 
objects of analysis, that is to say, the classes of the population. A class was 
accordingly defined by a web of topographical connections, which also characterised 
conditions whereby children  were trained up as members of a class, and it was this 
that formed the moral topography of class. (Jones and Williamson, 1979: 96) 153 
 
Although there may certainly be a correlation between the distribution of children across 
school classes and the distribution of individuals across socio-economic categories of class, 
there are also certainly some major divergences. That said the deployment of mental 
measurement across both school and national populations certainly has been connected 
within governmental imaginations concerning class and classification from the nineteenth 
century onward. 
The histories and commentaries that emerged from a Foucauldian understanding of 
education were such that they focused on the school as one instance among many of a 
modern form of power, namely discipline. Discipline, as distinct from punishment (which 
may be seen as the inflicting of pain with respect to the failure to achieve a particular goal 
or the crossing of a particular boundary), was oriented toward the manipulation of 
populations and bodies, such that their docility become apparent and such that individuals 
are formed through administration of time and space. In this account, the modern school 
has an effect of individualising children, but only inasmuch as that individualisation is 
coordinated within a disciplined grid of time and space. In that sense, the progression 
through the schooling system, from primary to secondary, and the division of schools 
according to intelligence, but also the organisation of the school day according to fixed 
times slots (lessons, break time and so on) can be seen in terms of the disciplining of 
children into docile subjects. In this Foucauldian model the child does not exist prior to its 
individualisation. The individual child, inasmuch as it is seen and it is acted upon, is an effect 
of such a disciplinary apparatus. In this model, there is no individual child with ability and 
capability that can be brought forth in the critique of power and standardisation. But also 
the focus on individualisation downplays the focus on children as a collectivity. Their 
serialisation within conditions of discipline certainly emphasises and invests in particular 154 
 
children, but only inasmuch as it impacts on all children subjected to this pedagogic 
technology. 
But also many Foucauldians working on children and education were critical of the 
notion that children were docile subjects. They pointed to the context of modern child-
centred classrooms in which children, especially young children, were seen to have 
significant freedom in the classroom. Moreover, children in contemporary classroom 
settings were seen to learn not through passive induction, but through active learning. The 
child learner of the mid- to late-twentieth century was defined through their agency, not 
through their docility. From the 1950s onward, the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget 
and others helped to frame a context for the national adoption of a child-centred pedagogy 
                                                                      growth. Children were 
now conceived within formal educational institutions as learning through doing. The 
emphasis within this pedagogy was not teaching, but learning and the supervising of 
suitable contexts for learning. The child was produced at the centre of learning. They were 
seen to learn at their own pace according to the facilitating environment around them. 
Individual children within the classroom were seen to require different forms of attention as 
a consequence of their different levels of development. As with pastoral care generally, the 
teacher, like the priest, was able to care for all their class individually. New techniques (such 
as record cards and student notes) and a new architecture of the classroom (namely the 
organisation of the room into different learning spaces within an open plan environment) 
were deployed (Walkerdine, 1984). Of course, this pedagogic space does not see the demise 
of teacherly supervision, but rather its reconstruction within a child-centred pedagogy. The 
teacher has an omniscient vision and has the power to organise the children of different 
abilities and to disperse them appropriately around the classroom in different groups. The 155 
 
teacher is constituted as needing to be able to see each child learning and needed to be able 
to supervise their learning (i.e. across or through these differences); they need to be able to 
                                                     (Walkerdine, 1984). In this sense, 
then, the Foucauldians argue that there is a continuity between the early monitorial schools 
(and the disciplinary apparatus within which they were formed) and the regulated freedom 
of child-centred schools, but they point to a contrast in the two regimes of power, 
knowledge and subjectivisation inasmuch as the two regimes rest upon different 
epistemological, administrative, and architectural foundations (i.e. they are constituted 
within different forms of governmentalisation). The two regimes are based on different 
ideas about the child, different systems of knowledge, and different notions of learning. The 
architectural spaces of the classroom in the two instances, for example, are very different. 
Walkerdine refers to two different diagrams of the traditional classroom and the child-
centred classroom and she considers how the teacher and their relation to the pupils and 
their learning are very different in each case. She talks about the novel orchestration of 
learning in the child-centred classroom: 
W                                                  I                   ngement 
of the desks from rows (listening to the teacher talking) to groups (thereby 
severely limiting the possibility for instruction of the whole class). The teacher is 
                                 T                           T                      
d                                   T                                        
                                                          W                      
A central tenet of this discourse and its materialisation is the psychological discourse of 
Piaget and developmental psychology. What is important in these child-centred spaces is 
that the teacher is not there to discipline the child (although that may be one of their 156 
 
functions), but to facilitate their freedom. Play becomes constructed as a central figure 
                                                 T   P       ‘                      
primary schooling in the UK in 1967 is a pivotal policy shift in this regard. Moreover, this 
understanding of children as learning through play had implications for child-centred 
schooling, but also for modern forms of mothering (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989). 
 
Example of Child-Centred Primary School Classroom 
 
Children learn on their own terms, through play, through stimulation, not by rote, or 
                        W                                                          ose the 
child as a subject that is socially and historically specific. The truth of the child   what the 
child really is   is not external to these practices. The child is not only produced through 
these techniques, but also through the administration of their bodies in space. And, for 
Walkerdine, this regulation of children is predicated on class differentiation in terms of the 











and a gendered construction of the normal cognitive subject as masculine (Walkerdine, 
1986). But we cannot assume that a Piagetian discourse was simply applied wholesale to 
educational practices in the UK or elsewhere and this in turn has implications for how we 
construe the relevance of an understanding of child-centred pedagogy as a diagram of 
power and knowledge as described by Walkerdine. Of course, the pressures of being a 
teacher and the contradictions that might surface in any actual classroom situation (for 
example, when faced with an unruly child or a child that is too good or a classroom that is 
half-built or equipment that so new that it becomes a fetish for the children) might lead to 
                                                                                            
theo                 L               
 
Social Interaction in Educational Contexts 
Methodologically, Foucauldian analysis has often relied on historical documents 
written by adults and many sociologists of children have sought an understanding of 
               cy through observation of children present before them and through their 
words. An exemplary study in this respect is that of Susan Danby and Carolyn Baker on 
children between the ages of three and five years and their teachers in a preschool 
classroom setting in an inner city in Australia. In a paper from that study,   W          
          ‘         “      O            P         C                , they state that their 
methodological perspective is derived from conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, 
that they are interested in conversation and discourse as social interaction, and that they 
are interested in agency and the capacity for particular forms of agency only in the context 
of particular social settings, encounters, or situations. They are interested in social order 
only inasmuch as it is constituted in the process of social interaction. In that sense, their 158 
 
work draws on the analysis of Hutchby and Moran-Ellis (1998). They want to provide an 
argument that suggests that social structure does not pre-exist, as a determining entity, 
actual social interactions. Structure or power does not stand outside of the interactions of 
the children and teachers; social order is formed within and on the basis of those social 
interactions. T                                                                              
                                    Danby and Baker, 1998: 157). They are interested in how 
the interactions of the young children they observe constitute a peer culture and how those 
interactions construct and reconstruct the participants of those interactions. In contrast, for 
example, to a normative model of social institutions, these authors view children as 
                                                                                        r as 
                                             : 158). But also in contrast to some models of 
                                                                                            
The resources that are deployed have value only inasmuch as they are constituent aspects 
of that interaction. Of particular importance to Danby and Baker are conversational 
resources and interactions. It is through talk that social order is accomplished. Sequences of 
                                      occasioned and situated activity       : 159). This talk is 
ordinary and everyday social practice. 
Notwithstanding the issues regarding how adult researchers might gain access to 
these young children's localised interactions and how they might collect data unobtrusively, 
Danby and Baker videotaped the interactions across three weeks. Let me here consider two 
cases of social interaction between a teacher and the children. The first case concerns an 
interaction between Amelia and Portia (both aged 4), Elana (aged 3) and a teacher. Amelia 
and Elana are playing. Portia joins in. Portia tells Elana that she is not her friend and Amelia 
pretends to lock Elana in jail.  Elana then opens the door and declares that she has the key. 159 
 
The jail and key are all constructs of the conversation and have value only in that context. At 
           P            E                                                               “   
                                E                     The second case is of David (aged 4) and 
John, Colin, Andrew and Connell (all aged 3) and the teacher. Connell, as he is only just 3 
years of age, has only just started attending the preschool. John and David start picking on 
C        T                                                                                      
                   B                                                                     W      
they are saying this, they move closer to Connell until he starts crying. In the first case, the 
                                          E                   ed by Portia inasmuch as the 
pretence of the play is broken and she starts crying. Similarly, in the second case, D       
                              C                 Thereupon, in both cases, the teacher 
intervenes.  
I                                                                                       
not to settle or resolve a conflict or dispute, but for them to take sides. It is an attempt at 
strategic mobilisation. The intervention of the teacher is such that they move close to the 
scene and then assign responsibility, not for the supposed wrong caused, but for explaining 
what has happened. Danby and Baker argue that teachers (as with parents) have an ability 
to asymmetrically intervene. T             W                                               
to speak. T                                                                                   
                  In both cases the teacher does not ask the hurt child for their explanation. 
That child is not given full speaking rights in the communicative exchange. The teacher, 
D         B                                                                                
                                                                                              
                                                ert her teacherly social order. The 160 
 
accomplishment of social order for the teacher is different than for the children. Danby and 
B                                                                                          
out the problem according to her developmental child-centred criteria), then leaves the 
                                                        : 168). 
In both cases the teacher intervenes in order to resolve a problem. But, Danby and 
Baker argue, the resort to crying by Elana and by Connell are different inasmuch as they are 
articulated in two differently gendered sequences of interaction. Although once the teacher 
has had demonstrated (as a performance) the resolution of the conflict (through a hug 
between the different parties) and once she has left to allow the child to continue playing, 
the children themselves need to repair their social order according to their own relation. 
Danby and Baker comment on the non-verbal repair that the girls and John do with regard 
   E              The repairing of social order for the girls is very different than for the boys. 
David is not concerned about making Connell feel better. David does not continue the 
                                                                                   E          
          T                                                             P          A            
                                                         D                                
                                                                      M             or the 
girls, the repair restores their connection with each other; for the boys, their repair 
                                                 : 169). 
The question of gender comes up more pronouncedly in another piece by Danby and 
Baker from                         I   H                                       D         
Baker compare the scenario between David, John and Connell with an earlier interaction 
between John, David, Matt and Andrew. For Danby and Baker both interactions repeat the 
sam                                                                                      161 
 
strength and size, threats of violence, enter the apprentices, repetition of sound and close 
physical proximity, cry for help, to the presence of the teacher (1998a: 158). Danby and 
Baker show how the two groups of boys progress through these phases of social interaction. 
In each case the level of aggression and the threats of violence increase until the teacher 
intervenes to diffuse the confrontation. Even then, as we saw above, the intervention of the 
teacher merely interrupts the social order of the boys, but does not properly take command 
of their localised masculine order. Danby and Baker show how these interactions are not 
only about the exclusion of one boy by a group of boys, but rather also about the inclusion 
of that boy into a masculine social order inasmuch as such interactions constitute forms of 
ritualised initiation. Danby and Baker by taking the case of John show how this child is 
transformed from a child excluded by the group of bigger boys (in the confrontation with 
David, Matt and Andrew) to one included in their aggressive and threatening practices (in 
the scene with David and Connell). They argue that this constitutes a rite of passage in 
which John moves                                                                          
                                                                                         
                                                  
Although Danby and Baker methodologically f                                            
                                  B                                                        
interaction. Thus, the escalation of aggression among the two groups of boys discussed 
above is seen (although not reflexively scrutinised) in terms of the relation between talk and 
action. Danby and Baker argue that: 
These boys have taken up the position of assertive masculinity through their use 
of scatological language and threats of aggression and power. Declarations of 
male power are manifested as verbal or physical threats and call on outside 162 
 
objects of power (sword, police, robot monster shark). (Danby and Baker, 1998a: 
165) 
As the researchers suggest, this could be seem as fantasy play, but what is significant for us 
is the way in which the boys themselves, or at least the principle antagonist, David, refers to 
his and his compatriots actions when asked to account for himself by the teacher by saying 
 W                           H                                                                    
not- physical violence, but also talk as a form of physical violence. The raising of the boys 
voices, the assertion of more cacophonous sounds (such as car noises), is accompanied by 
the clapping of hands near the younger child         A                                     
interaction is not dysfunctional, but part of the everyday interaction through which young 
children negotiate their collective living (1998a: 168). Marjorie Harness Goodwin, a US 
linguistic anthropologist, in                                                              
spaces, though, warns against any simple division between the interactions of girls and 
               H                                                                    
approach that differentiates between different forms of aggression along a spectrum of 
physical to verbal force, such that boys might be seen to be more physically aggressive or, if 
not, then might be more verbally aggressive than girls. Such a distinction, she argues, is 
often the result of research that focuses on individual behaviour, whereas research on social 
                                                                                           
social behaviour in terms of their aggressive demarcation of boundaries and of forms of 
inclusion and exclusion (Goodwin, 2002). 
Conversation analytic and ethnomethodological research, such as that by Danby and 
B                                                                                               
Such micro-sociological accounts are able to conceive of children as significant actors in 163 
 
their own right and hence able to substantiate broader claims in the sociology of childhood 
                                B                                                       
resources t                                          C                               
conceptualised as an a priori, true for all social settings. There is much value in such 
research in that it hypostatises neither agency nor structure. But the methodological focus 
on the here and now tends to leave unquestioned the historic accumulation of resources 
and competencies and the consequent asymmetries regarding such accumulated resources 
and competencies. It is, in many ways, no surprise that the teacher reinforces her social 
                              M                                                       
social interaction, for example in the Danby and Baker research above, tends to fail to 
recognise the broader discursive, institutional and technical infrastructures within which 
such interaction is itself situated. Does it matter, for example, that the children are 
interacting in a preschool setting? What resources are ready to hand as a consequence of 
that particular institutional and discursive setting?  
  What we d                D         B                   -school brings together 
children of similar, but also differentiated, ages, histories and backgrounds and provides the 
infrastructuring of those children through supervised spaces of play, but also mediated 
conversations and negotiations, emotional struggles and hostilities, and social interactions 
between children, teachers and other support staff. This is a novel space of interaction for 
                                                          also (as we have seen earlier) a 
                                         I                                                  
                                                                                         
mediated settings and in the context of where those resources are ready to hand.  164 
 
I                                                                               
interaction and agency, namely, in aligning speech with agency and silence with passivity. 
Thus, for example, one researcher concludes a paper on child                              
                                                                                                
                              T                                            E                
101). In contrast, we might look to the research by David Silverman and his colleagues on 
                                                -teacher interviews. This research shows how 
these interviews between parents and teachers (designed so that teachers can inform 
parents as to how the child is doing at school and so that the parent can ask questions and 
raise concerns) are constructed in such a way that the parent and not the child is the 
designated recipient of the conversational address of   the teacher. But when the child is 
purportedly d                                                                               
to the question or the invitation to speak. Silverman and his colleagues show how such 
                                                                                           
              “                            T      -                                          
        I                                                                              
          T                                                                as a form of 
interactive work in relation to the design of the talk between parent and professional. By no 
                                                  “                            
 
Cultural Politics of the Classroom and Popular Culture 
From the late 1980s and early 1990s a growing body of research emerged from the 
application and development of a series of ideas and problems concerning culture, identity 
and power that were associated with the development of cultural studies. Research coming 165 
 
from a cultural studies of education and schooling provided a major platform of 
understanding of children and childhood in contemporary society. There were two main 
themes addressed in the research: on the one hand, the investigation of different forms of 
cultural identity formation and identification, primarily concerning gender, sexuality, race 
and ethnicity, and, on the other hand, research on the relation between power and 
pedagogy inside, but more importantly outside the classroom in the playground, on the 
street, in the home, and in popular culture. 
A central feature of the research on cultural identity formation was that it was highly 
                                                                                                
self identity that presumed that a) the self was formed as a discrete and whole unit separate 
from, in the first instance, the social group and the natural world, b) the integration of the 
self into society was through particular mechanisms of socialisation, but that through those 
mechanisms of socialisation the self remained nevertheless a discrete and distinct 
individual, and c) that underlying the individual self were certain key hard-wired features 
and although the specific features might be open to contested views, by and large they 
included gender and sexuality and intelligence as essential features of the make-up of 
individual beings. In contrast to essentialist assumptions of the self, research on cultural 
identity formation put forward theoretical ideas that drew heavily from traditions of 
                      -                                                                   
argued that the self (or subject) is always and only ever a cultural construction and that 
there are no hard-wired traits that determine who the child is or might become, b) the 
cultural construction of the self is primarily linguistic or discursive, c) the discursive 
construction of the self means that within different discourses different identities are 
formed such that the subject, or self, is constituted through those different discourses in 166 
 
different, sometimes contradictory, ways, d) the subject is always plural and never an 
individual as such, and e) cultural identity is always in process, never fixed and always 
contestable in fields of power and strugg    T       M       M      G                        
making of masculinity, he delineates a shift from the study of the socialisation of children 
                                                                                                 
the context of                                                                         
                                                                                          
identities in relation to major influences, including increasing central and local state 
regulation, changing family networks, restructured local labour markets, changing sexual 
                                                                                     
            M      G                                                                   and 
cultural construction of sexual and gender identities in school children, including notably in 
the UK the research of Debbie Epstein. Epstein in collaboration with Richard Johnson argue 
                                                                 roup identities in schools and 
that schools are sites for the active making of such identities and of meanings around 
                                                                                               
                                            cultures of both teachers and students, which are 
intrinsic to the dynamics of schooling, for example in relation to control, resistance and 
              (Epstein and Johnson, 1998: 9). 
Some of this research has drawn on, but radically developed the ethnographic 
research of Paul Willis on schooled masculinities and work from the mid-1970s. The 
research of Willis itself was ostensibly a revision of the Bowles and Gintis (1976) argument 
that schools had an ideological function, namely to socialise children in order to fulfil the 
requirements of a capitalist society. Thus, children learned their social position and the skills 167 
 
required for their adult labour. Willis argued that in the classroom a group of working-class 
                                         ast to the other main group of boys in the 
                                                                                             
their future labour in the classroom, but rather through their resistance to the teacher and 
formal education (and their positive construction of a working-class culture). It was in the 
context of that culture that they learned the kinds of masculine identity required for their 
future jobs as manual labourers (1977). For Mac an Ghaill the school classroom is not only 
produc                                                                                      
                                                                                           
              E            M      G                                            exception of 
the latter) were mixed white, African-Caribbean and Asian and that they were typified by a 
fluidity, rather than a fixed subcultural identity (1994: 54-5). For Mac an Ghaill this typology 
was used less as means of revealing fixed and distinct masculine cultures, than a heuristic 
device for making visible peer-group identifications (1994: 54). In the structuring of these 
positionalities, there are continuities and discontinuities across generations, thus sons 
would not necessarily follow in thei                            W                  I              
of a social landscape typified by a shift from industrial to post-industrial production, the 
cultures of working-class masculinities have been shaped by fragmentation and crisis. Thus, 
for some                                                                             
labour, but for unemployment (Stafford, 1981). 
‘                                                                                      
formation has bee                 M      G                                           
O D           “              I                 M                        UK  L      A        
work (2001 and 2003) has been influential in foregrounding the changing identity formation 168 
 
of Asian boys in the context of rapidly changing national and trans-national cultures of 
                                   T                                                        
masculine identities in the context of the playground and classroom, the shift f     E        
                                                 UK              P           B               
trans-national identification with a global Umma, and the negation of self and group 
alongside boys, and importantly girls, who are white, African-Caribbean, African, and other 
ethnicities makes for an empirically complex mix of factors leading to the construction and 
contestation of modern masculine school identities. 
The work of Walkerdine has been significant in these debates not only for her 
contribution to Foucauldian poststructuralist ideas of children and education, but for 
synthesis of those ideas with a psychoanalytic approach to subjectivity that permits an 
understanding of the articulation of the social and the psychical constitution of the schooled 
subject. She argues, for example, that the powerful discourse about girls, schooling and 
                                                                                                    
                                                           ed both on the historical 
construction and alignment of modern educational rationalities and gendered 
differentiation and on the splitting of gendered subjectivity. On the one hand, this relies on 
                                                           tructed and regulated within social 
          I                                                                       W           
1987: 270). Moreover, the production of signs of the child is such that the child is 
differentiated according to understanding                                          I       
way, the child is regulated according to such regimes of truth and normalisation. But, on the 
other hand, the truth of educational discourse and practice is not such that there is a simple 
division between                          O                                                -169 
 
centred educational discourse is that it is embroiled in both truth and fantasy and that the 
identifications of both girls and boys are dependent on the psychical structures of fantasy 
(1987: 274). This means, for Walkerdine, that the regimes of truth through which schooled 
subjects are produced (and for her particularly the gendered construction of girlhood) are 
always laden with unconscious desire and affect. She states that: 
If gi                                                                         
tenuous grasp of male academic superiority, then any engagement with these 
issues in practice cannot rest upon a rationalistic base of choice or equal 
opportunities. Not only must the fiction of the gendered splitting be taken apart, 
but the psychic struggle engaged in by girls and women to live out the 
impossibly contradictory positions accorded to us must be addressed, as must 
                                                         cess as a (conscious 
or unconscious) threat to their position of superiority, shaky as it is. This requires 
a strategy that engages with the educational politics of subjectivity, a politics 
that refuses to split the psychic from the social and attempts to understand the 
complexity of defence and resistance and to find new ways of dealing with those 
for teachers and students alike. (Walkerdine, 1987: 279) 
For many working in the sociology of childhood, but also more generally, the engagement 
with a post-Enlightenment problematic that refuses to separate the claims to truth from the 
circulation of desire has been a hard task. More often the claim to truth and knowledge has 
been held up to fend off the emotional, the affective and fantasy. 
The second major theme within cultural studies research on education and schooling 
has come from a concerted effort to see education as not limited to the school classroom, 
                                                                                         170 
 
but also the social and cultural world outside the school gates. In part, this has been thought 
as an issue to do with the shaping of the school curriculum and the exclusion through that 
curriculum of other, local and everyday knowledges and practices. In this sense the school 
curriculum is understood in the context of a broader struggle over culture, high and low, 
elite and popular and with the elision of that cultural differentiation with a generational 
differentiation between adults and children, teachers and school pupils. Thus, for example, 
in the opening pages of their book Cultural Studies goes to School (1994), David 
Buckingham, and Julian Sefton-G                                                         
                                                               And it is unsurprising that 
these two writers have sought to foreground the politics of this issue in terms of value and 
                                   T                                                      
media education at all levels of the education system has re-awakened traditional anxieties 
                                                                 F                             
of what is taught   especially for Buckingham and Sefton-Green in this book with respect to 
the English curriculum   concerns the hegemonic control of both a social order and a 
national culture. The denial of certain forms of learning and cultural practice on the grounds 
                                                                                        
particula           E                                                                            
                       B                                                                 
“                                                                                         
(1994: 4-5). Central to Buckingham and Sefton-G                                     
                                          electronically mediated culture: the book is no 
longer the single privileged means of representation that it may have been in earlier times. 
Literacy in the late 20
th century therefore cannot be seen as something that is confined to 171 
 
                                                        F                                 
                                                                  T                         
and pedagogic change is seen to come from an understanding of modernity with respect to 
                                                                                          
need to ensure that we are able to engage with those radical and diverse notions of reading 
                                                                                          
Forms of media literacy and media education are and have been central to this vision. 
Moreover, the general thrust of this argument is one that is now widely accepted by both 
educational, media and government institutions.  
O                                                         that come from the work of 
the Brazilian radical educationalist Paulo Freire (Freire, 1989), but equally the writing on 
                                                                                I       
Communist Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971)   have provided part of the genealogical 
context for research that has directed its attention to understanding pedagogy as more 
broadly framed than within the walls of the schoolyard. Gustavo Fischman and Peter 
M L                                                                                       
enough to understand any given educational reality: there is a pedagogical mandate to 
transform it with the goal of radically democratizing educational sites and societies through 
                              A                                                            
power in the context of schooling and the demand for the promotion of a critical 
consciousness able to resist and change social inequalities with respect to a notion of the 
good radical democratic society, work in this field has also sought to understand pedagogy 
outside of the context of formal schooling so as to include a broader understanding of, what 
H     G                                                                                      172 
 
           G                  C                                                 
interconnected formation of cultural practices as practices that shape people in certain 
ways rather than others and that do so in the context of social relations of power. For 
Giroux, culture is centrally important for understanding this broader pedagogic and social 
context and cultural workers (as broadly defined) are centrally important to any social 
transformation with regard to a society based on the principles of social justice. Thus Giroux 
                                                -                                           
articulate a wider project that connects artists, educators, and other cultural workers to an 
insurgent cultural politics that challenges the growing incursions of corporate power while 
simultaneously developing a vibrant democratic public                       G             
    G                                                                                           
This might mean that hip-hop, for example, is understood with respect to the tensions 
between more commercial and socially conscious artists and the long traditions of popular 
cultural workers as educators. This is to understand hip-hop not only in terms of how school 
teachers might draw on the music genre, as with other examples from popular culture, in 
                      ls in learning, but to understand how artists, such as KRS-One or 
Rakim have seen themselves as popular cultural teachers, as radical educators of issues and 
curricula marginalised and excluded from formal school apparatuses. For cultural analysts, 
such as Greg Dimitriadis, rap and hip-hop constitute public and performative forms of 
pedagogy that operate outside of the traditional spaces of school learning and teaching 
 D                        D       K                   G                                   to 
be theorized in terms of a variety of public sites that shape, mold, socialize, and educate 
              M                                                                        
everyday life, as well as institutions such as schooling and cultural sites like museums, 173 
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popular culture is seen as centrally important for understanding children and young people 
(but in fact for understanding all people) inasmuch as it is a major space in which those 
people construct and experience their lives and identities. Of course, it is important to 
understand the articulations of schooling with other cultural practices, but there is also a 
danger in overstating the case such that we return to a rather outdated notion of 
                 
 
Conclusion 
  Research has pointed to the significant relation between education and the economy 
inasmuch as forms of education may be seen to be systemically related to particular modes 
of production. Thus education changes across different social formations from medieval 
agrarian, to mercantile and a growing state administration, to industrial production and 
Fordist divisions and specialisations of labour, to post-industrial, post-Fordist symbolic, 
cognitive, emotional and informational labour. Traversing this rather simple story of 
economy and education are the invention, emergence and deployment of particular 
technologies of learning, examination, assessment and judgment, but also the creation of 
peripheral and cultural spaces of interaction, play, performance, resistance, and 
negotiation. The school classroom and the playground provide the contexts for different 
kinds of localised interactions between children of similar and different ages and between 
children and teachers and assistants. The shaping of those interactions are also framed 
within the built environment of the school, its architectures of both control and learning, 
but also the assembling of different objects and relations in different spaces, such as chairs 
and tables in classrooms (arranged according to particular diagrams of power and 174 
 
knowledge), lines marking out football or netball pitches in playgrounds, climbing frames 
and slides and perhaps a sandpit for younger children. Across the interactions, spaces, 
technologies, and knowledges different agencies and resources are mobilised to ensure 
supervision, examination, development, good behaviour, but also friendships, hostilities and 
other passions. The modern classroom, in its development from monitorial to child-centred 
space, constitutes a particular moment in the history of pedagogy. Learning now is both 
formed in the contexts of that history, but also certainly not contained within the built 
environment of the school nor the authority and expertise of those who work within its 
borders. At a time when pedagogy happens as much within as outside the school, the value 
of accredited and certificated education has grown (and become increasingly tied to 















Chapter Eight   Crime and Criminality  
This chapter explores the way in which children and young people have been 
considered as criminal subjects, but also as the victims of criminality. All of us on a 
reasonably regular basis commit a criminal offence, whether dropping a sweet wrapper, 
playing music too loud at night time, watering the garden during a period of restriction and 
so on. Some offences are seen to be more serious. Across the range of crimes committed, 
some people are typified as more likely to commit more serious crime. Across the range of 
crimes, some people are more heavily policed and sentenced and more likely to be caught 
up in the judicial system. The visible range of illegalities that are, and have been, committed 
by children and young people is large and wide and is dependent on legislation, judicial 
process, policing, cultural and many other factors. In many cases children are the victims of 
crime, whether committed by adults or other children. That said, both sociological research 
and governmental intervention has tended to more consistently focus on a limited range of 
issues and problems. In this chapter I consider the changing nature of that limited range of 
problems. The chapter focuses on the construction of children and criminality in terms of 
                                                                                      I  
mapping some of the discussions in these areas, the chapter follows a trajectory that sees 
marked distinctions, but also continuities, from a criminological and penal discourse in the 
context of nineteenth century welfarism, hygienism, and moralism to a late modern 
configuration in the context of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideological projects and a 
series of technologies and technical discourses on risk, probability and prevention. 
Moreover, each of these strategies of figuration is marked by complex scalings across local, 
national and transnational, as well as dynamics across expert and popular mediations. Thus, 
each strategy rests, for example, on highly overdetermined figures such as the neglected 176 
 
child, the youth gang located in the black or Hispanic ghetto, or the genetic and somatic 
criminal identified in the nursery (which we consider in the following chapter). Of particular 
significance is the territorialisation of children and criminality as a hybrid confluence of 
public and domestic.  
 
Origin Stories: Urban Degeneration, Family Neglect and the Problem of Delinquency 
T                 “      B                                            riminology was 
centrally defined by its concern with the ill-defined concept of delinquency, and with the 
                                                            B                 J    
Muncie, another criminologist, has argued that the notion of delinquency allows behaviours 
to be criminalised only by virtue of their being conducted by children or young people. He 
                                                                                           
public are considered to be problematic only when                             M       
2004: 39). Modern criminology properly begins with the problem of delinquency, but its 
social and historical aetiology is also rooted in a geographical demarcation of immoral 
behaviour, hereditary degeneration of the population and familial decadence and 
                  I                                                                    
criminal behaviour are often understood through the ideas of delinquency, urban 
                                                                     -wired traits. In 1985 
Richard J Herrnstein and James Q Wilson published their Crime and Human Nature which 
argued in part that hereditary features of human nature, importantly intelligence (as 
measured by IQ), constitute a significant determining factor in crime statistics. Although 
there are subtleties to their argument, the explanation (vis-a-vis genetic hereditariness) of a 
correlation between race and crime has been a major concern. Much of the broader 177 
 
discussion of this work has been framed in the context of racist and eugenic discourse of 
crime. In a later work, The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Charles Murray push further a eugenic 
discourse which considers social stratification, race, and intelligence in terms of the 
                                         B                                                      
a question of social influence or genetic determination, the government of crime betrays a 
more strategic and less dogmatic approach to the complex layering of individual behaviour, 
environment and biological factors. 
 
Hygiene and Delinquency 
In the nineteenth century the process of industrialisation and the migration of 
people into the growing cities made visible the problem of urban degeneracy, of the 
concentration of vice, of prostitution, of violence, of theft, of abuse, of all kinds of 
criminalities and immoralities. Certain parts of the city were seen to be outside of society 
and civilisation. But these places were also seen as the breeding ground for immoralities and 
crime that would spread like a disease and infect the remaining population if left 
unchecked, unregulated and unpoliced. The disease would spread through the movement of 
the poor outside of the slums into the rest of society, in the migration of ideas of bad 
exampl                                                                              
immoral habits to their offspring who were brought up in an overcrowded, insanitary, 
atmosphere, forced at a tender age into contact with sights and experiences of corruption 
and         ‘                N       ‘                                                  
which attempted to break up these enclaves, to render them accessible to the influences of 
civilised society and its systems of regulation and police, to disperse these teeming 
multiplicities, regulate the promiscuous intermingling, eliminate anti-social habits, produce 178 
 
                                                        ‘                ‘                
                               C       B                          ee emerging a new 
conception of demoralisation, as a cumulative process with long term effects upon the 
                                                  T                                        
                                                             t those who were so 
thoroughly stained by poverty and degeneracy that they were not fit for industry. 
M                                               ‘                                              
urban] inhabitants was not now seen as a consequence of the effects of conditions of life 
                                                -social behaviour [e.g. crime, lack of religion, 
                                                                                      
problem newly conceived was either sterilisation or segregation (Rose, 1985: 53). Alongside 
moral and religious discourses concerning the good and the bad, a hygienist discourse 
constructed a correlation between dirt and individual and environmental disorder. At one 
level this allowed for understa                                                            
environment in terms of high levels of risk both to the individual child and to society more 
broadly, inasmuch as the child may grow up to commit crime. A hygienist discourse though 
was also more broadly significant in its making visible the individual, the population and 
their environment, or milieu, in terms of the question of health and thus in making possible 
the implementation of measures to ensure the good health of individuals and populations. 
Giovanna P                                                                                 
rules                                                    , rules of hygiene in the workplace, 
hygiene in marriage and procreation (of Malthusian fame): hygiene for these authors is a 
grid of social relations, a system which serves at once to canalize them and to invent new 
path                                                                 P                      179 
 
The translation of moral conduct into medical terms and procedures and the 
identification of the family as a central site of biological heredity communication across 
generations has been a longstanding feature of the discourse on crime and children. Rose 
argues that: 
Medico-hygienic expertise began to elaborate a set of doctrines concerning the 
conditions for rearing healthy children and to pose many issues of moral conduct   
(drunkenness, debauchery, viciousness, masturbation, insanity)   in medical terms. 
They not only were detrimental to individual health but arose from weaknesses 
incurred through faulty government in childhood and could themselves be passed 
down from parents to children in the form of a susceptible constitution. (Rose, 1989: 
128) 
A hygienist discourse of crime thus figured both the slum and the family as geographical and 
hereditary conditions regarding the circulation of immorality, as like a disease. For Rose, the 
construction and government of this complex of social pathologies is significant in the 
formation of the psychological individual in the twentieth century and in the figuration of 
the delinquent. Rose argues that: 
In analogy to the new hygienist techniques being developed for minor physical 
ailments, these disturbances were construed as arising from faulty techniques of 
child rearing, that is, poor mental hygiene. It now appeared that major mental 
disturbances in adults, leading to crime and social inefficiency as well as to insanity, 
had their origins in minor and apparently inconsequential disturbances of emotion 
and conduct in childhood. Early recognition and treatment were as crucial for 
promotion of mental health as for physical health. Lack of mental hygiene, like 
physical hygiene, was a recipe for future social distress. (Rose, 1989: 153) 180 
 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries children were by and large imprisoned and 
punished alongside adults. Children below the age of seven were though treated alongside 
fools and the insane as incapax; over the age of fourteen they were treated as capax (unless 
seen to be insane); and between the ages of seven and fourteen the court needed to make 
a decision as to their ability to have discretion (Rose, 1985: 166). The fact of children 
imprisoned with adult criminals gave rise to concern in the mid-to-late nineteenth century 
and to the segregation of children who had committed criminal offences from adult 
criminals. The emergence of the criminal subject in the nineteenth century (in contrast to 
classical notions of the penal and punishable subject), which demarcates the constitution of 
criminology as a disciplinary knowledge (Pasquino, 1991), is closely tied to the development 
of the category of the delinquent and the generational differentiation of criminality across 
children and adults. The classification of the delinquent in the context of the emergence and 
development of psychological knowledge and expertise in the twentieth century rests upon 
the nineteenth century construction of children as both  in danger  and  dangerous  
inasmuch as the children who roamed the street committing crimes were seen as already 
dangerous and children might be seen to be in danger by virtue of parental neglect, poverty, 
or peer-                                     I                                            
reinterpreted with respect to notions of instability, difficultness, adjustment and 
maladjustment. In the context of the juvenile courts, established in England in 1908, the 
young criminal was conceived alongside the neglected child; thus, criminal                 
only the outcome of neglect, and                                                  ‘     
1989: 153).  
In the early to mid-twentieth century the delinquent was firmly located in the 
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symptomatic of broader shifts that construe the child in the context of the emotional 
                                    ‘                                                          
medicine, for the jurisdiction over the behavioural disorders of childhood, on account of 
the                   ‘                 B                                                
becomes a distinct department of this new science, a branch of individual psychology; and 
the handling of the juvenile offender is, or should be, a practical application of psychological 
             B               P           B                                                  
behaviour and not simply symptoms. The foregrounding of emotional and psychological 
neglect, as opposed to purely physical neglect, was central to the work of John Bowlby on 
maternal deprivation. In framing childhood criminality as a mental problem psychological 
and psychologised discourses both drew on earlier ideas about family environment, 
hygiene, immorality and crime, but also rearticulated them in the context of the emotional 
economy of the family and the psychology of the individual. Bowlby, in major research for 
the World Health Organisation and presented in a series of public talks and populist 
publications, made the distinction                            (              -          ) and 
                              (                     ). For Bowlby it was not sufficient for 
health workers to notice the signs of physical ill health or mistreatment (such as dirty skin 
and clothes, bruising, stale body odour, unkempt hair and so on), they also needed to be 
aware of the invisible signs of psychological ill health (such as disturbed behaviour, 
withdrawnness, overly clingy behaviour, and so on).  
At least two forms of neglect can therefore be recognized   physical neglect and 
emotional neglect   and, though they may often coexist, it is of prime importance to 
distinguish them, since they need very different remedies. Broadly speaking, it will 
be found that, while physical neglect is most often due to economic factors, the ill-182 
 
health of the mother, and ignorance, emotional neglect is the result of emotional 
instability and mental illness in the parents. Mental defect may contribute to both. 
(Bowlby, 1965: 90) 
For Bowlby, it was these signs of psychological ill health which were of primary importance 
and were seen to be far more enduring in terms of their impact on children and their 
development into adulthood. B                                                      
distinction is prefaced by the supposition that good and proper care for the child is 
necessary for the psychological well-being of the child and the form that this should take is 
of a loving attachment between child and adult carer (in most cases between the child and 
the mother). Hence, the argument that Bowlby   given his research comes just after WWII 
when large numbers of women were in the public world of paid work   was part of the drive 
to bring women back into the home (as mothers and housewives) (Wilson, 1987).  
 
Blaming Mothers... and Fathers 
The attribution of responsibility for criminality, in addition but sometimes in contrast 
to an understanding of the distribution of crime in the moral topography of the city, is one 
that has been laid at the door of the family, but particularly the mother. The repetition of 
this blame is as unsurprising as it is insidious. Notably t                                
                                                                                
Criminologist Alison Young has documented some of this discourse. She points to 
newspaper articles that talk about, for example, the relation between the deprivation of 
parental care and criminality and of the compounding of poverty through the breakdown of 
the family. She argues that in these discourses                                        
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The legislation of marital discord lies at the heart both of criminological theories of 
the familial production of delinquency and of governmental policies relating to single 
mothers. Marital discord is one of the preconditions for divorce... and one of the 
alleged preconditions for the generation of delinquents in the home. (Young, 1996: 
173) 
But equally, from the 1990s, the correlation between criminal behaviour, delinquency and 
                                                                                       
abhorrent behaviour of fathers (whether directly through abuse of the children or through 
abuse of the mother) but also the problem of fathers absent from familial care of their 
children. Controversially, Charles Murray, in his writing on the underclass identifies a clear 
                                          M                                                 
child in a one-                                                                      H         
that: 
The central problem is that kids tend to run wild in communities without fathers. The 
                                              ‘                               g 
children have no set bedtime. It can mean that they are left in the house alone at 
night while mummy goes out. It can mean eighteen-month-old toddlers are allowed 
to play in the street. It can mean children who treat other children too aggressively. 
(Murray, 1990: 12) 
For Murray the causes of crime do not lie solely with unemployment and single-parent 
families, but also with the neighbourhood effect. For Murray if there are a large number of 
single-parent families in a poor neighbourhood, then criminal behaviour is likely to occur 
(Murray, 1990: 12-     F   M                                                      
                                            M                  I      UK     U“  the 184 
 
                             is seen to be heavily racialised. As Pamela Abbott and Claire 
W              M                                               A       A               
tradition of male unemployment and female-                                               
         A          W                   T           helped frame neo-conservative social 
              U“         UK  A  A          W               T                              
by the New Right is that there has been a large increase in single-parent families, that these 
(mainly female-headed) families are welfare-dependent, raise children who are trapped into 
welfare dependency and who do not develop moral values so that they become criminals, 
                                      A          W                    T                
further racialised after the publication of The Bell Curve in 1994 by Murray and Richard J. 
Herrnstein which argued that poverty (but also criminality) was closely correlated with 
                                                                                            I  
doing so, despite denials to the contrary, they returned the arguments about poverty and 
crime to nineteenth century ideas about heredity, race and intelligence, but in the context 
of a reworking of longstanding images of errant, now racialised , fatherhood. 
 
Delinquency as an Ambivalent Sign 
The problem of delinquency is thus figured as a problem of degeneracy, 
uncleanliness and moral topography, as a typification of social scientific expertise, as the 
consequence of neglect and a familial pathology, and as a product of ethno-racial 
classification and stereotyping. Delinquency was conceived as a social problem and one such 
that children who had not even broken the law may be seen to need care and protection 
(Hendrick, 1990: 43). Hendrick quotes a mid-nineteenth century author who describes 
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a little student man already   he knows much and a great deal too much of what is 
called life   he can take care of his own immediate interests. He is self-reliant, he has 
so long directed or mis-directed his own actions and has so little trust in those about 
him, that he submits to no control and asks no protection. he has consequently 
much to unlearn   he has to be turned again into a child... (Hill, 1855: 1-2, quoted in 
Hendrick, 1990: 43) 
Delinquency is an ambivalent sign. It figures                                                   
and protection) and as a non-child inasmuch as the non-child has no controls and no need 
for protection. The construction of delinquency figures either a demand (as in the quotation 
above) that the non-                                                      -child absolutely 
and a casting out of the abject into a land of moral degeneracy. This ambivalent trope is 
evident in nineteenth century as in contemporary discourses on childhood criminality. For 
example, James and Jenks have argued that public perceptions and contestations of 
childhood criminality may settle in such ways as to figure crime as pathological to the 
symbolic construction of childhood. In their discussion of press reporting of a high profile 
case in the UK concerning the murder of a two year old boy, James Bulger, by two ten year 
old boys, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, in February 1993, they consider how public 
discourse enacts a symbolic purgation of the troublesome ambivalence of children 
committing murder. The construction of Venables and Thompson in the press as not human, 
               but importantly not children (i.e. referred to as teenagers and youth) allowed 
the media to maintain a version of childhood innocence and hence maintained a certain 
version of social order. For James and Jenks, the ambiguous figuring of the child as non-child 
needs to be symbolically purged in order for social order to be secured. They draw on the 
work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas in her analysis of the purgation of dirt as matter 186 
 
out of place (Douglas, 2010).  James and Jenks argue that children who kill are symbolically 
expelled from the category of childhood (James and Jenks, 1996).  
However, we need to be careful with this analysis, not least because it collapses a 
series of specific, but overlapping discourses on childhood criminality and treats them 
according to just one moral schema, namely that the expurgation of anomaly within a 
division between the sacred and the profane. Douglas notes the difference in meaning 
                                                                                             
                                                               inction has no practical 
purpose (Douglas, 2010: 47). James and Jenks implicitly follow this line of argument. And yet 
the implication of this is that they are unable to sociologically understand the very major 
differences in discourse and governmental reaction between, for example, a series of moral 
populist reactions to the murder of James Bulger as typified in press and media discourses 
(which called for the boys to be locked up indefinitely) and a series of paediatric and 
psychological responses that saw Venable and Thompson not as evil or non-human, but as 
children neglected and in need of proper care (Oswell, 1994 and 1997). In contemporary 
governmental practice moral discourses of children and crime tends to be populist, 
antipathetic to expert knowledge and demanding punishment; whereas social scientific 
discourses tend to be rarefied in their governmental circulation and tend to favour 
processes of care that reintegrate the child into social normality. What is striking is that 
despite attempts to strategically reconfigure the child in danger and the dangerous child, 
the problem of children and criminality so consistently returns to the delinquent as a 
figuring of the couplet victim/criminal, such that the latter implies the former. The child 
criminal is the damaged child. 
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Children in Danger and the Cycle of Crime 
It is noticeable that within criminology and the sociology of crime much research on 
young people has focused on children as the perpetrators of crime, rather than on them as 
victims. Sheila Brown has been a significant figure in extending the criminological field to 
                                                                                        
                                                                                         
                                                                   This is surprising, as children 
and young people are more likely to be victims, rather than culprits. Children (especially 
babies and infants) are more likely to be killed than any other age group. Children, along 
with women, are more likely to suffer domestic violence (in the form of smacking, but also 
physical beatings) and sexual abuse. By and large these crimes are committed by family 
members or within the context of the household. Whereas youth crime (and the increasing 
re-                                                                      ) is largely seen as 
the masculine occupation of public space, the construction of children as victims of crime is 
regularly presented as a private affair. That said, there is greater recognition now of children 
being victims of crime in public spaces. In the UK, the murder of 10 year old Damilola Taylor 
in Peckham, South East London in 2000 was a significant case. 
I am not, then, suggesting that there has been no research on children as victims of 
                                                                                              
                                                                                          
                  rms of bullying and hence within the disciplinary remit of educational 
studies). The issue, then, is not the absence of research, but the epistemological division 
which differentiates and distributes children as perpetrators or victims according to 
different sociological and social scientific sub-disciplines rather than seeing the two as 188 
 
perhaps more intimately related. In addition, there is a major question as to whether we fall 
                                                                                            
whether we consider a different kind of framing of the problems in such a way that 
                                                                                          
exploitation, but also the milieus within which conduct is understood, perpetrated and 
received as criminal and the uneven circulation of criminal conduct and enrolment of people 
and agencies in that circulation. It has long been thought that the conditions for crime 
perpetuate a cycle of crime, but also in such a way that victims may become perpetrators of 
other crimes notwithstanding the relative uneven weightings of different types of crime in 
the circulation of conduct. For example, the child beaten at home by an abusive father may 
be the same child that shoplifts, takes drugs and is aggressive at school. Moreover, as in the 
case of sexual abuse, as Linda Gordon has documented from social work cases in the US in 
the late nineteenth century and twentieth century, the victim of domestic sexual abuse was 
often seen by social                                                                       
child. It was thus the child, wayward and promiscuous, who was seen to be at fault and who 
was in themselves morally contaminating (Gordon, 1989; see also Pleck 2004) 
As a start then, c                                                                    
an interdisciplinary framework allows us, firstly, to understand crime not simply in the 
context of a system of criminal justice, but within a broader set of state agencies. To a large 
extent, in the UK the idea of, what under the Blair Labour government in the 1990s came to 
                    -                                -                                   
crime and victimhood. In the UK this multidisciplinary approach to child protection 
(including paediatricians and other medics, teachers, law enforcement agencies and social 
workers) certainly has a much longer history (Ferguson, 2004). If someone at school is being 189 
 
bullied, ideally a teacher may inquire into the home situation of both bullied and bully, call 
in social workers, talk to local police officers and collectively work out a strategy for all 
parties. In practice agencies can miscommunicate, have their own agendas and work 
pressures, and fail to meet properly with respect to the best interests of the child. The 
recent history of widely publicly reported child abuse cases in the UK highlights these kinds 
of issues (e.g. Laming Report, 2003). Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, an 
interdisciplinary framework allows us to consider the interrelationship across these state 
agencies with regard to the production, constitution, circulation and regulation of 
vulnerability, abuse, resilience, exploitation, and criminal conduct. Poverty is the least acted 
on and most enduring facto                                                        B         
for example, the systematic failure regarding children in state care and the throughput of 
young people from care homes to young offender institutions and then prison indicates at a 
crude level a relation between child care (or the failure of it) and criminal conduct. Of 
course, the relation may be one of the failures of care homes to ameliorate educational pre-
existing underachievement, but it may also be that the care home serves to continue rather 
than amend a history of physical and sexual abuse (Daniel and Ivatts, 1998: 214 ). But as 
Ferguson argues in many countries the response, for example to child abuse, has been 
largely managerial with regard to systemic problems. Thus, he continues,                   
came to be seen as the inter-professional system, due to the demonstrable need and 
difficulties of agencies and professionals working together and communicating effectively 
                                     F                     I    sponse to the failures, then, 
government proposes new legislation and better bureaucratic structures. Mechanisms, such 
                                                                                        “   
Offenders Register in the UK) identify both perpetrators and victims. Lists, referrals, case 190 
 
review meetings and so on do not, however, take account of the broader political-economic 
implications of the cross agency forms of governmentality.  
Although critiques of social welfare in the 1960s and 1970s rightly noted that 
concern about children as victims of neglect and abuse was often closely correlated with 
concerns that these same children may become a future threat to social order (see Dingwall 
et al 1983) and hence noticed the long governmental history of the pairing of dangerous 
children and children in danger, there is certainly a question as to whether more recent 
                                                                         
governmentalisation. More likely, since the 1970s high profile cases of abuse (physical 
and/or sexual) have been widely publicised in the media and then have led to government 
inquiries focussing largely on professional and systemic failings. In the UK the cases of Maria 
Colwell (1974), Jasmine Beckford (1985), Tyra Henry (1987) Kimberley Carlile (1987), 
Cleveland (1988) and Victoria Climbie (2000) (all of which were cases of adult abuse of 
children leading to their death) were investigated and put to trial amidst much media 
reporting, then framed by major governmental inquiries and calls for changes in protocols 
and practice. Ferguson refers to the structural relation between aggressive media reporting 
                                                         F                     B            
argues, in the context of both familial domestic abuse and physical and sexual abuse in care 
                                                                                          
                                                                                            
Moreover, she argues with regard to domestic abuse, the naming of the crime as such 
                                                                                                
familiar patriarchal and liberal trope which construes those crimes which occur in the home 
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The perpetrator/victim binary is largely a facet of both criminological and moral 
discourse, whereas a child protection discourse has largely been concerned with the welfare 
and well-being of all concerned. It is worthwhile briefly commenting on a case which 
occurred at the time of the murder of James Bulger in 1993 (which I mentioned earlier in 
this chapter) in Norway. A young five year old girl, Silje Redegard, was killed by two six year 
old boys in October 1994. Instead of there being a media panic and demand for the 
symbolic expurgation of the perpetrator, the children were not sentenced to a custodial 
sentence but given care in the community from which they originally lived and from within 
which the crime was committed. The problem with the bifurcation of the victim/criminal is 
that it forecloses the ambivalence of the sign of childhood criminality and permits a 
discourse of exclusion similar to that which James and Jenks describe (1996). 
 
Hooligans, Ghettoes and Gangs 
If the first trope of children and criminality concerns the biography of delinquency as 
a transition from a child in danger to a dangerous child, the second major trope concerns 
the urban gang, once a neighbourhood now a more transnational phenomenon. As a 
modern phenomenon it foregrounds relations of agency, generation, territorialisation and 
representation or mediation. Although the arguments about youth crime as moral panic are 
part of this discussion, they are only a part of the broader issue.  
 
Hooligans and Moral Panics 
Geoffrey Pearson in his study of the history of hooliganism in the United Kingdom 
talks about the amnesia and lack of communication between generations and the 
communication across a single generational cohort. He argued that: 192 
 
The terms and limits within which the problems of lawlessness are understood and 
acted upon are established within a form of public discourse which has been with us 
for generations, each succeeding generation remembering the illusive harmony of 
                                                              T                  
materials of the human condition   whether the feelings of nostalgia or the facts of 
youthfulness   provide some basis on which it is possible to understand how the 
                            -and-                                            -
construct itself across these broad acres of time. These raw materials do not 
constrain human possibility by universal decree, however, and nor do they 
predetermine the formidable constancies of this preoccupation with social ruin. 
Rather, they are recruited and harnessed in a much more specific way within public 
discourse   as ideology. (Pearson, 1983: 229) 
O                                                                                        
                                                                                            
structural generational difference is one that appears in different form in the work of Stuart 
Hall, Tony Jefferson, Dick Hebdige, and others, in the edited volume Resistance Through 
Ritual (1976). Importantly these writers foreground generational conflict inasmuch as it is 
articulated with class. They talk about how youth subcultures are subordinate to the parent 
cultures of a dominated working class. They discuss how youth subcultures therefore have a 
relation not simply to any dominant hegemonic culture, but also to parental cultures in their 
symbolic expression of class and generational struggle. Often crime and youth are collapsed 
                                                                                          
constituted an undifferentiated threat. H                                                  
the social order, such a movement attracts and will continue to attract attention, to provoke 193 
 
                                                                             (Hebdige, 
1979: 19). In his later work Hebdige states that:  
When disaffected adolescents from the inner city, more particularly when inner city 
unemployed adolescents resort to symbolic and actual violence, they are playing 
with the only power at their disposal: the power to discomfit. The power, that is, to 
pose   to pose a threat. Far from abandoning good sense, they are acting in 
accordance with a logic which is manifest   that as a condition of their entry into the 
adult domain, the field of public debate, the place where real things really happen, 
they must first challenge the symbolic order which guarantees their subordination by 
                                                                 H                  
Much of this work, though, talks more about youth, than it does about children. In the 
context of questions about crime, this distinction is significant as the division can easily mark 
                                                                   I                      
historic threats have focussed more on youth, than on children and childhood. It is 
noticeable that the generational differentiations of geographical space have tended 
historically, in the context of crime and criminality, to construe youth as a problem 
regarding public space and children as a problem regarding private space. Children in the 
home were very much conceived within the purview of dangers, neglect, deprivation; youth 
on the street were conceived as the active pursuers of crime. Of course, this geographical 
separation is one that is heavily gendered as has been argued by Angela McRobbie (1976). 
That said, it is noticeable that the gendering of youth criminality has increasingly figured 
young women not necessarily as more masculinised, but certainly more present as a public 
threat (Schaffner, 2006). Young women on the street have recently either been construed as 
gang members (and are constructed in terms of the changing violence and aggressivity of 194 
 
young women) or they are constructed as drunks (on the one hand bawdy, but also 
vulnerable sexually). This separation and spatialisation of crime has meant that public 
spaces, such as streets, shopping centres, playgrounds, and so on, in some areas are very 
much seen by young people themselves as spaces of threat and danger. A consequence of 
this has meant that there is an increasing tendency for young people to pursue their 
activities, friendships and leisure pursuits at home (Livingstone, 2002). Some commentators 
have suggested that it is predominantly middle-class children who are fearful of public 
spaces (James, Jenks and Prout, 1998: 51). 
In the work of Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson and John Clark in their 
investigation of youth crime in the 1970s, t                    he first phenomenal form 
                                                                                      moral 
panic               moral panics issues directly into a law-and-order society   H           
1978, 323). In their neo-Gramscian analysis, the narrative of moral panic takes form through 
                                                                                               
pu                                                                               
campaigners, lobbyists and others) (Becker 1966); legislation is enacted and then, as its 
outcome, we see the emergence of a social formation, racist and concerned with law and 
order  H                                                                                       
territory of the ghetto. Mugging was seen as                                               
               H                       M       K                      f this text, talks about how 
                                                      a                                        
racist practices of criminalisation and                               K                 K           
                                lision of the ghetto as metaphor and the ghetto as reality: a 195 
 
fictional black colony that signifies criminality in racist discourse and a factual black colony 
                              K                  
 
Hegemony and Offensiveness 
In the sociology of childhood, the ethno-racial spatialisation of crime has been 
downplayed in favour of an emphasis on hegemonic constructions and contestations 
between adults and children. Thus, James and James understand criminal offence in the 
                            the rebelliousness and non-                                   
                                          T                
[T]he offending behaviour of the young challenges not only the power and authority 
of the adult generation to control children but also valued and often idealised 
notions of childhood. It is interesting to pause, in passing, and consider that if we 
talk not of criminals but of child or young offenders, it raises the question of what 
else it might be they offend against other than criminal law. Our answer would be 
that their offence is also against hegemonic adult perceptions of what childhood and 
children are. Part of these is how they should behave and in this sense, their 
offending behaviour is also an offence to adults. Thus, as well as the identification of 
the particular needs of children as a corollary to the emergence of childhood as a 
separate social status, we have also seen the increasing identification of crime as 
being a particular problem associated with childhood. (James and James, 2004:167-
8) 
The visibilisation of crime as a correlative of childhood and youth and the pathologisation of 
                                                                                   
declarations of the need to purify public space of unruliness. Some scholars in the discipline 196 
 
of geography have talked, then, about the hegemonic control and contestation of space. Gill 
Valentine has argued that: 
A                                                                            
therefore be seen as attempts to draw or reinforce boundaries between adults and 
                                                                 T              
therefore demonstrate first, the taken-for-granted nature of adult spatial hegemony 
on which these controls are predicated; and second, the importance of space to 
                                                T                                       
                                                                                        
act in loco parentis where parents are perceived to be not governing their children in 
                                     V                     
She continues: 
U                                                                                 
appears to be an assumption that the streets belong to adults and children should 
only be permitted into public spaces when they have been socialised into 
                                                         A                       
appear to be automatically perceived to disrupt the moral order of the street. In the 
                                                                                     
the media, and so on) appear to be articulating a need for greater spatial controls to 
be exerted over young people in order to maintain the boundaries bet              
         V                     
I                                                                                            
                                                                                         
such and we should be equally wary of reducing the spatial organisation and containment of 197 
 
young people to a cognitive and identitarian apparatus (that labels, classifies and is 
mobilised ideologically). In many ways responses to crime are not cognitive, but emotional. 
Adult fear of young people on the streets or their images circulated through media channels 
is often an affective response to a complex social situation (see Skeggs and Wood, 2009). 
But in other ways what becomes apparent in these writers is that agency cannot be 
assumed (as in moral panic theories) to reside in the state or in adults and that children and 
young people cannot simply be assumed to be the object of representation. Instead, what 
becomes apparent is that the figuring of children and criminality constitutes a significant 
representational space in which children and young people have, and are seen to have, a 
stake inasmuch as their agency is played out and negotiated as a question of both 
representation and territory. But it is race, ethnicity and class, not only gender and 
generation, which are, and have been, key markers in this discourse. 
 
Media Typologies 
M                                                                              
of public spaces of the streets and shopping centres have been significantly inflected by 
discourses of both race and class. What is striking is that race and class have in public, media 
but also expert discourse, often been presented in terms of style and consumer culture. In 
these discourses there is often a collapse of criminal conduct onto forms of dress in such a 
way that the styling of self is disclosed in the context of new taxonomies of criminal 
personality types. Although there are certainly differences to the classification of criminal 
types of person from the nineteenth century use of documentary, portraiture and 
photographic technologies (see Tagg, 1988), the circulation of video and photographic 
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(working class kids dressed in particular kinds of branded sportswear and stereotyped as 
drinking excessively and being loutish in public (see Tyler, 2006 and 2008)) feeds the loop of 
representation and control. But also the public media circulation of these images invests 
these young people with capacity, to occupy pubic space, to threaten and to ward off any 
potential incursions. Moreover, whilst contemporary images of hoodies and chavs certainly 
repeat the tropes of nineteenth century juvenile crime (Pearson, 1983) as well as the long 
history of iconic figurations, contemporary iconographies of criminal youth are caught more 
systematically within consumer culture. In this sense, the signs of criminality are not 
necessarily signs of exclusion. For example, the criminologist Jock Young looks to Carl 
N                                          P                                    N            
2003). He states that Nightingale argues that the culture of the ghetto is not one of 
                                                                           mainstream 
A                                                                                        
                                                                                        
             Y                 T        N            Y              s a means of compensating 
                                                        Y                              
                                   N                                                    
earlier ideas about delinquency, but he holds onto a notion of the two stigmas that the poor 
                                                                                             
                                                    Y                 T                   
poverty finds its form in the essentialisation of gendered, ethnic, and territorial division. 
Hence, the confrontation between gangs defined through territorial demarcation and the 
                                                                               F   Y      
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children who learn the trademarks BMW, Nike, Gucci from an early age, who value designer 
labels, watches, and blatant jewellery... The American poor eat their way to obesity in 
pursuit of the American dream. Yet they are flawed consumers, the market welcomes 
micro-consumerism just as it flaunts wealth while excluding the poor... [I]t is not simply that 
structures oppress the agents, but that the social agents themselves contribute in a pyrrhic 
                                                Y              -3). 
 
Racialised Ghettos 
That said, although the offence of childhood criminality (as James and James might 
put it) is seen to have spread across the social landscape, youth crime has been most 
consistently seen to be generated within particular ethno-racial urban containers. In much 
                                                                                              
Hispanic) ghetto in the US major cities (Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles), rather than the 
nineteenth century Victorian slum, that is seen as a significant contemporary point of social 
origin. The origins of the contemporary US black ghetto are seen in terms of three 
significant factors: unemployment, lack of two-parent family structure, and evacuation of 
middle class African-Americans from poor neighbourhoods (Jencks, 1993; Wilson, 1987). 
These factors are seen to be socio-structural factors dependent in large part on the 
transformation of urban space and its populations in the context of post-Fordist 
restructuring from the 1970s onward. In US sociology and social policy the ghetto has a 
particular privileged place as the container of poverty, crime, but also a racial underclass. 
William Julius Wilson, in his The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) but also other works such as 
When Work Disappears (1996), has been a significant interlocutor with regard to our 
understanding of the contemporary formation of the black US ghetto. For Wilson it is the 200 
 
historic, rather contemporary, forms of racism and the structural impact of changes in the 
economy that shape the black ghetto. For us, it is also the fact that these places have a high 
percentage of young people (Wilson 1987). 
Loïc Wacquant onetime colleague, co-researcher and co-author with Wilson, 
                                                                          -twentieth 
                    -de-                                                              
bounded and comprising the full complement of black classes bound together by a unified 
collective consciousness, a near-complete social division of labour, and broad-based 
                                                                                                 
organizational configuration characterized by conjugated segregation on the basis of race 
and class in the context of the double retrenchment of the labour market and the welfare 
state from the urban core, necessitating and eliciting the corresponding deployment of an 
intrusive and omnipresent police and penal appara                        F   W            
growth of the ghetto as a de-proletarianised space is an effect of neo-liberal social and 
economic policy that places the ghetto alongside the prison as parallel spaces of 
containment and carceral power (2008b). For Wacquant the ghetto, the prison and low-
paid, precarious forms of post-industrial and post-Fordist labour form a complex of 
interrelated factors that constitutes a new form of the government of poverty (also see 
Procacci, 1991). It constitutes not simply a reaction to crime, but a new form of state and 
social policy and policing (2008b). A central platform, especially in the USA, has been the 
removal of welfare programmes under both Democratic and Republican administrations 
since the Clinton regime in the 1980s. Informal economies became more consolidated 
                                                          J             M              T   
punitive ideologies and government programmes of the 1990s were, according to 201 
 
Wacquant, not so much a reaction to                                                   
government of social insecurity. The lack of jobs and the growth (and in part privatisation) 
                                                                                      
metropolis in a carceral-assistantial net                                                      
them onto the track of deskilled employment through moral retraining and material 
                                                                                B     B     
or in the peni                                                                                
     F   W                                                                             
screen that hides this structural dynamic (2008b, 18). 
Although Wacquant does talk about the translation of this carceral and economic 
regime to Europe and elsewhere, he is careful not to collapse the spatialisation of urban 
poverty in the US with apparently similar spaces elsewhere. In his comparative analysis of 
France and the US, the differences between the urban banlieues in France and the ghettoes 
in the US are explored, not least in terms of the very different levels of crime and insecurity 
in each location and the corresponding levels of policing, but also the different levels of 
state welfare intervention and the different forms of community (homogenous or diverse in 
terms ethnicity and race) (2008a). But what is important for us are his comments on youth, 
not so much his dismissal of political and ideological statements about youth delinquency, 
but his description of everyday interactions of young people on the streets. He states that: 
 I                                             L  C                                   P      
France] is felt mainly at the level of representations and collective sentiments, violence in its 
most brutal forms   including assault and battery, shootings, rape and homicide   is so 
intense and prevalent inside the hyperghetto [the particular reference Wacquant is making 202 
 
here is to the Chicago South Side] that it has forced a complete reorganization of the fabric 
                W                      
“      V                                                            C       “     
Side reveals a less dramatic and more liveable picture of the everyday precarious lives of 
young people in one of the most notorious, now demolished housing projects in the US. 
Although the built environment of the Robert Taylor Homes Project had all the hallmarks of 
a contained urban space (inasmuch as it was couched the other side of a major freeway and 
                                                   V                               W           
the University of Chicago) humanises the forms of social organisation in this ghetto in terms 
not so much o                                                                                  
making do, their local forms of justice, the helping out and solidarity, the making of money 
and the complex politics (2009). Venkatesh is keen to stress the lineages of gang life not to a 
black hypermasculinity nor to the history of migrant protection and violence (as is often told 
of Irish gangs and Italian mafia), but to forms of social movement and political organisation, 
both in terms of community action, black rights and gender equality (see Venkatesh, 1998; 
also Schaffner, 2006). In these accounts, there is an emphasis on the resources and 
accumulation strategies of those without immediate access to formal, state-defined and 
controlled forms of authority and power. What is brought out in this later research is not 
                                                          M    D                            
power for the otherwise powerless from their control of small urban spaces: street corners, 
slums, playgrounds, parks,                                                   D            
xi). 
In Lagos, Nigeria, Olawale Ismail argues that neo-liberal policy in the shape of the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank initiated structural adjustment programme 203 
 
(SAP) rolled back the state and deregulated and privatised services. This led, he argues, to 
the deskilling of young people (through lack of training programmes, apprenticeships and 
                                                                                       
invol                             H                                              E       
well as that of Nigeria, largely a patchwork of uncoordinated, splintered and informalized 
             I                   F   I                                           l and spatial 
                                                                    T              
neighbourhood meeting places for young people to socialise, discuss politics and sports; the 
latter are spaces of largely illegal economy at the junctions of roads. The young who hang 
                                     T                                                
                                                                                       
                      T                                                            T        
laboratories of social solidarity and change (Ismail, 2009: 464-5). There are clearly 
differences across the locations of South Side Chicago and Lagos, but also striking 
similarities. The neo-liberal withdrawal of the welfarist state from the city, the geographical 
exclusion from the formal labour market (through the stigma of place, but also the 
socialisation of the wrong skills or none at all), and the strategy of policing and incarceration 
create spaces of emergent solidarities and precarious social and economic innovation. But 
despite populist and political talk of gangs spreading across the US or across the Hispanic 
diaspora (e.g. from the US and Latin America to Spain as in the case of the Latin Kings), 
much of the evidence points to highly localised forms of organisation. The symbols, names 
and insignia of gang identity certainly travel far and wide and often gangs with no actual 
organisational connection adopt a gang name and insignia (Hagedorn, 1999). Certainly also 
some gangs are formed through family and ethnic connections forged through migration. 204 
 
But there is little evidence to suggest that children and young people have mobilised gangs 
which in organisational form are transnational. These forms are largely local. They are 
restricted by the capital (of different forms) that young people are able to mobilise. 
Economic poverty, precarious infrastructure and geographical containment consolidate an 
enforced localism. As Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck argue in the c          A           
possibilities of becoming seem constantly curtailed by cultural, political, and economic 
constraints that work hegemonically to pin them down to localized place and imprison them 
                                             H       and De Boeck, 2005: 7). 
 
Representation and Governmentality 
Let me return to the question of representation and mediation. The misrepresenting 
of crime with respect to young people is an important factor (Halsey and White, 2008). For 
example, the almost daily reporting of knife and gun crime in the UK is often slanted in a 
way that figures black youth in ethnically-                             B          H         
etc) as the core of the problem. A recent report from the London-based Runnymede Trust 
stated that most youth stabbings and gun crimes are not committed by black or ethnic 
                  A                H              “                  W            W       
at stake is not only misrepresentation, but the distribution of power or agency across 
representation and territory and the accumulation of capacity with respect to both. 
W                                                                                           
adequate theorisation of the ghetto as an analytical category (2002). In particular, he is 
critical of forms of moralisation that see the inhabitants and forms of social organisation of 
these urban spaces not in negative terms, but in terms that humanise and positively 
evaluate their daily existence. But this epistemological hierarchy of                    205 
 
analysis and description) effectively excludes certain spokespersons (including children and 
young people) from having any equal stake in the coalescence of factors that accumulate to 
constitute the problem and solution of the ghetto. Children and young people by and large 
are not able to accumulate intellectual resources and sustain those resources over time in 
such a way to counter the accumulation of resources and time available to an academic 
such as Wacquant (i.e. the logic of analy          W                                            
certain form of training and constitutes a particular form of labour). Those marginal youth, 
those folk scripts and those ideological forms need to be factored into the complexity of 
agency of representation and not simply bifurcated into a myth/reality or 
analysis/description binary. As Michael Keith has argued (although not in the context of 
                                                                                K             
                                                                                             
they live are not isolated from the representations of the ghetto in the scripts of the 
bureaucrats, policy makers, politicians and academics whose temporalities may have more 
dist               K                                                            -naming of 
city spaces and their official or analytical cartographies might aid and not detract from an 




  Contemporary understanding of children and criminality to a large extent still rests 
on the historical figuring of the delinquent. The delinquent is presented as a couplet, 
                                                                                   young 
                                                                                         A   206 
 
the splitting of this couplet offers no simple solution inasmuch as victim/perpetrator is seen 
through the lens of innocence/evil and inasmuch as the latter is expurgated from the 
symbolic construction of childhood. Although the construction of the second figuring of the 
urban gang (often black or Hispanic) draws on the discourse of delinquency and on the 
family (inasmuch as the gang constitutes both the other of the family and also its symbolic 
return), it foregrounds the relations of agency, territory and representation in such ways to 
                                                                  T                       
simple message of hope, but it does mean that any understanding of children and 
















Chapter Nine   Health and Medicine 
Much of the sociology of childhood, as already indicated, has sought to offer an 
account, which although acknowledges the biological immaturity of the child, considers the 
child as a social being. Much of the criticism has been directed to biological accounts of the 
                                                                                              
                                                      B                                         
not a single bifurcation of the social and the natural. When children brush their teeth in the 
morning or forget to do so, when they go to the dentist every six months or fail to do so, 
and when their teeth fall out and are given silver coins from the tooth fairies, there is not a 
keen division between social conduct, habits and regularised routines, on the one hand, and 
the work of the human body, either passive to the social or steadfastly determining, on the 
other.  Over the course of a young lifetime, a child, with a chronic illness whose regimen of 
care dictates the taking of different pills over the course of the day and visits to the 
paediatrician for examinations regularly over the course of the year, does not disclose the 
natural or the biological more than any other child. Nevertheless, what is clear is that a 
sociologist, a psychologist, a psychiatrist or a paediatrician are often interested in different 
                                                                                          
different relations of scale. They certainly understand these through different rationalities, 
methods and methodologies. But sociologists over recent years have become more 
interested in the movement of a disease or the habits of a medication in the context of 
different scales of materiality and association (Fraser, 2001; Mol, 2002; Rosengarten, 2009). 
In this c                                                                                
an object of medical science and as an object of concern regarding health. And in particular 208 
 
we inquire as to how our understanding of this disclosure might lead us to re-assess our 
understanding of agency with respect to children. 
 
Observing Children: From Experimental Observatories to the Smell of Practice 
C       D              A B            “            I            ) provides an account 
of the activities of his young children. His notes are detailed and yet they lack over-
conceptualisation. He provides, as he says, a sketch of the infant which is both ordinary and 
commonplace. And yet his account of the conduct of his children has a precision and 
measure regarding the age of his children in terms of days, the nature of the movement of 
actions and feelings, the objects of attachment and association, and the organs and parts of 
the body motivated. His description is focused on the development of the infant and in 
particular the relation between habit and instinct. At one level in his description there is a 
clear distinction between experience (the experiential and habitual association of actions 
and ideas) and instinct, between will and reflex. And yet, in the example he gives of the 
nervous disposition of his 66 day old son after experiencing the sneeze of his father, Darwin 
states that for an hour afterward his son started at any slight noise, but also that for some 
time after he started and winked more frequently. Darwin states that the winking (a 
                                                                                           
286) and yet the context in which the winking and starting occurs and the role of memory in 
the repetition of the response suggests that a distinction between will and reflex (habit and 
instinct) are less than clear cut. 
Darwin presents the child as an open book. He does so in a manner which assumes 
the body of the child to deliver its meaning in clear and demonstrable terms. The evidence 
o                                                                                          209 
 
Smiling is assumed, similarly, to imply pleasure. Of course, you may say, smiling and 
                                            T                            D                   
only on the basis of analogy.  We know the inner feelings of the infant by analogy with 
ourselves. But such an epistemological stance assumes a priori that adult observer and 
infant are similar in such respects (i.e. a simple unfettered continuity between infant and 
adult) and thus voids the philosophical basis for an empirical investigation of the infant. The 
assumption made then is to treat the infant as semiotically transparent; they are what they 
show; and bodily signs, in this sense, are not deceitful and do not lie. Moreover, their 
                                           D                                                
instinct (as interpreted by the adult scientist) and will (as assumed to originate within the 
child).  
Claudia Castañeda has argued that Darwin in this paper treats the development of 
the child through a Spencerian narrative which progresses from simple to complex, savage 
to modern. In doing so, Darwin offers a model at odds with the model of evolution which we 
ordinarily              D          I       B            “                                        
the ancient and it is from this savage that instinct emerges (Castañeda, 2002). Castañeda 
argues that such a narrative, derived in part from Spencerian biology, is a racialised 
narrative which mimics the colonial discursive opposition between savage and European 
man. This is a narrative which we certainly see in many places from the eighteenth century 
                            ‘                                           t. The little savage 
                                     N                            D                     
difference he marks between the younger infant and the older child. Darwin tells the story 
of his son Doddy at just over two and half years old exiting the dining room with pickle juice 
staining his pinafore. Of interest to Darwin is the fact that Doddy has attempted to conceal 210 
 
his actions. The child is seen to be able to lie and such lying is understood in moral terms. No 
longer then is the child at this age typified by their semiotic transparency, but by their 
disarticulation of image and meaning and by their deliberate and wilful dissimulation. 
The account Darwin provides could be not only of his children, but of any children. 
Through his observations of the growing child and through a detailed writing of the 
minutiae of their activities he is able to take account not only of his particular children in 
                                                                                       
          , but also for the developmental process of all children (1877: 19). What is 
significant about this is not so much the observation in itself (as this is typical of many 
parental viewings of their or other children), but the documenting of the observations and 
their recording in a form (writing on paper) which will endure through time, the units of 
measurement in that documentation, their publication in a journal of science and the 
                           I                                                   their 
growth and in circulating this paper among a community of scientific peers, Darwin makes 
available these observations for further detailing, scrutiny and refinement. Moreover, the 
community of peers to whom the paper is circulated has implications as to how the 
observations get read and used. In contrast, a parent watching their child play in a 
playground and then commenting to a friend sitting next to them about a gesture that their 
child makes before their eyes has little consequence. They are words said and gone. They 
may matter to the parents or they may matter fleetingly to the friend, but they would often 
have little enduring significance. 
We know also how over seventy years earlier Jean Itard had kept detailed notes on 
the habits and conduct of              V       V                                        
observed, so too were his table manners, his likes and dislikes, his feelings and so on 211 
 
 M          I             I                   I                             V              
to say or not to say provided his peers with an understanding of infant language acquisition 
in the context of physiological growth. Similarly at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
    ‘               H                              L     XIII                      death in 
                                                                                            
among other things (Marvick, 1993). Certainly by the end of the eighteenth and beginning of 
                                                               re regularly observed, 
not only by physicians but by parents as well. Carolyn Steedman notes that: 
The observation of children was an Enlightenment injunction, and parents of the 
                                                                             gress 
of their children in a book kept for that purpose, in order that they might attain a 
                                       T                                          
unfolding of the human mind, and those mothers who left records paid most 
attention to the development of language and of the moral sentiments of their 
children. (Steedman, 1994: 68) 
By the late 1820s the focus had shifted toward the signs of sickness and toward the interior 
of the body. Steedman states: 
T                                                                             
                                                                                    
sickness might be read (many of these books advertised themselves as home 
doctors); and whilst they may have built on a habit of domestic observation, they 
                                                                             -century 
practice... Because of the established practices of child observation, the reading of 
signs in children seems to have been taught to nineteenth-century parents long 212 
 
before it was recommended to doctors in training... In urging on mothers the daily 
                                                                   E      C    
                                                         B                  B      
end of the century this semiology of infancy had spread far beyond the home and 
                                     “                 -70) 
There are two issues that are significant: firstly, a circuit of information begins to form 
between medics (but later psychologists and others) and parents (mainly mothers) such that 
observation in itself becomes subsumed within the accumulation of observations, their 
documentation, analysis and discussion and, moreover, the language of expertise itself 
circulates among parents in a way that shapes subsequent observations; and secondly, the 
                                                                                            
and the parent. For Donzelot this move places the mother as an ally of the doctor and as a 
relay in the government of the family. Before the mid-eighteenth century, Donzelot argues, 
                                                                                   
                                                                                       
tactics is directed toward the maximal growth of the child and their protection from harm or 
corruption (Donzelot, 1979: 19). For Steedman, though, what is important is that the 
figuring of the child becomes a way of pursuing a puzzle about the growth and 
                                                                                         
                                     “                    
As we move into the twentieth century we see new forms of observation in relation 
to the growing knowledge of psychology (particularly developmental and cognitive 
psychology). We see forms of observation that take place outside the home in the 
laboratory proper and a clustering of expertise around the laboratory. At the same time, we 213 
 
see the parent (mother) still construed as an observer of the child (in matters of health and 
well-being), but increasingly denuded of expertise. We also see the development of the 
centres of calculation and knowledge production and the emergence of new spaces and 
architectures of observation concerning the growing child. Arnold Gessell is one notable 
psychologist who devised a means of observation that involved putting a child into a large 
glass dome, within which the child was surrounded with domestic objects (depending on the 
age, a cot, toys, and so on) and through which the scientists could observe the growing child 
                             
 
 
Gessell talks about his device accordingly: 214 
 
The one way vision screen is a device which permits an unseen observer to see. It 
enables him to see many things which he could not otherwise see at all, and brings 
him closer to the realities of child behaviour because it removes the distorting and 
disturbing influence of the observer. It is not merely a laboratory gadget but an 
adaptable technique which has many practical uses both for controlled and 
naturalistic observation and for educational demonstrations. It is a contrivance 
which combines intimacy of observation with detachment. 
The principle of the one way screen is relatively simple. Perhaps you have had an 
experience like this: You walked down a sunny path of a garden; you opened the 
screen door of a porch located at the end of the path; to your surprise you found in 
the shadow of the porch someone whom you had not noticed at all while you were 
in the garden. Yet all the while this person could see you plainly ... one must imitate 
these conditions. (Gessell, 1943: 370) 
A       B                                     F  cault, 1977), the idea was to observe 
without being seen, thereby maintaining certain relations of power through relations of 
seeing/being seen.  
The location of the observer's station is of critical importance. The station should be 
as dark as possible ... Care should be taken so that direct light from windows or from 
lamps will not strike directly through the screens. Such direct rays of light tend to 
reveal the observer's eye-glasses and light coloured objects. Invisibility is increased 
by wearing dark clothes ... The walls of the observation station should be painted 
black or midnight blue. Dark carpeting draped on the walls and thick carpeting on 
the floor serve to silence sounds inadvertently made by the observers. Placement of 
plate glass behind the screen excludes sound but interferes with ventilation. Strict 215 
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                    G        1943: 371) 
The child is always constructed as the object of the gaze, never its subject. The relations of 
seeing are also relations of knowledge. The child is always the object of knowledge, never its 
subject. It is the apparatus   as an apparatus of power and knowledge   that secures such a 
`relation. This kind of apparatus involves a fair amount of financial investment. The building 
of the dome, the staffing of the observations, the documenting and filing of notes and much 
more is such that not everyone can afford to have a Gessell dome and as with the physical 
sciences there is often an accumulation of authority that attaches itself to such investment 
(e.g. as with big well-equipped laboratories). Nevertheless, the apparatus of scientific 
observation was one that travelled more lightly as well. For example, Albert Bandura, in his 
well known experiments on the nursery children of Stanford University staff, placed infants 
and small children in a laboratory made to look like a family sitting room. The children 
watched filmed sequences of aggressive behaviour and then were allowed to play with 
some nursery toys (including a Bobo doll). In the corner of the room psychologists watched 
the children surreptitiously and made notes. The laboratory made to look like a domestic 
setting allowed Bandura to make claims about the causative influence of film-violence and 
                                 B                        O              T                 
process of observation, documentation, accumulation and discussion of data was such that 
it could be adopted across multiple locations in such a way that the experimental setting did 
not require the built environment of an actual laboratory.  
Although visual forms of observation predominated in contexts of understanding 
children as physiological, social and psychological beings, other sensory forms of expert 
experience and documentation should not be ignored. For example, Harry Ferguson talks 216 
 
about the role of smell in social work practice throughout the twentieth century. He refers 
to a case of neglect from 1909 in which was reported concern about four children aged 1, 3, 
10 and 13 years. The family were inspected and a report stated that: 
The woman and two youngest children were at home, but for more than twenty 
minutes she refused to open the door, she simply cheeked me through the window. 
But, when she did open it and I went inside the hot musty and dirty stench drove me 
out again and I had to have the back door open too. The woman and two children 
were as black as tinkers. 
Moreover, the Inspector reported that he had caught fleas from the children. Other officials 
were equally appalled by the family. The County Court Bailiff stated that:  The smell of the 
house is so disgusting that I am compelled to smoke to keep the taste out of my mouth . A 
doctor who visited the family also reported:  the stench was abominable and I had to ask 
the Insp                                 (quoted in Ferguson, 2004: 64-5). Ferguson argues 
that before the end of the twentieth century these kinds of smells were not indicative of 
moral and psychological failure, but in the twentieth century they increasingly come to 
signify abnormality, pathology and danger. A discourse about moral and physical hygiene 
that circulates in the late nineteenth century begins to change not simply how we see 
children and danger, but also how we smell them, how we feel them and how we hear 
      E                                              e local and short-sighted) (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988). As Ferguson states: 
V                                            g eyes on children and families, remained 
central to the ideals, the                                B                               
practice smell and touch took on increased significance in sensuous hierarchy in 
ways that were more important even than what professionals were prepared to hear 217 
 
from parents and children about their experiences. Smell in some respects organized 
sight. But in many respects they complemented one another... smell can be taken as 
a useful metaphor for the contingent and unpredictable nature of child protection as 
a modern practice. (Ferguson, 2004: 69) 
Across these different practices and different moments of history,                       
disclosed and observed in relation to a series of adult bodies and the material bodies of 
laboratory equipment, the architectures of buildings and rooms, and so on. It is within these 
practices and forms of observation, among others, that we witness the growth of the body 
of the child and the growth of their mind.  
 
Charting Physical and Psychological Growth 
A                                          A                                  
invention of childhood in the modern period has been to similarly think that children prior 
to the eighteenth century were not regarded in terms of their bodies, in terms of their 
health and in terms of the care and treatments of them in their sickness as separate and 
distinct from adults. As I have already noted in chapter two, historians have certainly 
          A                                                      health and illness. Hannah 
N                                                                                    
eighteenth centuries makes the argument that certainly from that time and before children 
were understood as having a different physiological constitution to adults and that the 
treatment and care of them at times of ill health was also often different (Newton, 2010). 
She argues that, as with medicine generally in this period, medical understanding and 
treatment of children was based on the ancient Greek Hippocratic and Galenic traditions. In 
these traditions living bodies were conceptualised in terms of the four basic qualities of 218 
 
heat, coldness, moisture and dryness and it was thought that these qualities corresponded 
with the four humours (or liquids) of blood (which is warm and moist), choler (warm and 
dry), phlegm (moist and cold) and melancholy (dry and cold). Newton argues that medical 
texts at this time showed how different ages of personhood were characterised in terms of 
the distinct mix of these qualities and humours. The division of age into infancy, youth, 
adulthood and old age accorded with longstanding divisions of age, not only medical. 
C                                                                                          
(Newton, 2010: 470). Medical understanding and treatment of children was different to that 
of adults on that basis, but also inasmuch as children were not, by and large, distinguished 
in terms of gender whereas adults were. Children were understood to be more prone to 
certain diseases such as smallpox, epilepsy, diarrhoea, nightmares and teething (Newton, 
2010: 461). Children were similarly treated differently in terms of their relative weakness 
and humoral constitution. 
Certainly from the late eighteenth century, with the decline of Galenic medicine and 
the development of modern forms of anatomical and physiological medical knowledge and 
                                                                                                
differentiated according both to its size and its stage within a process of development. 
Children begin to be measured according to height and weight from the late nineteenth 
century and on a regular basis from the early twentieth century. The institutionalisation of 
such measurement occurred in part due to concerns about malnutrition. For example, in the 
             U“A                                                                           
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this time infants were weighed on a regular, often weekly, basis; in doing so, health workers 219 
 
had records of weight over time and could thus assess appropriate weight gain or loss. But 
in the 1910s, weight was measured on one-off occasions (e.g. at weighing festivals aimed at 
reaching large numbers of the infant population) and was assessed according to a standard 
norm. As a consequence, a large number of children were now deemed to be underweight 
and malnourished (Bosco, 2001: 1386). Weight began to be measured against height in 
terms of a standard rule. The Emerson rule dictated that malnourishment constituted 7% 
under the average weight for height. Nevertheless, paediatri                             
health, growth and development could not be assessed by untrained people, but could only 
be done through a range of tests, devices and indicators (not simply weight measurement) 
by professional medically trained experts. It was only in this context that child malnutrition 
could be properly diagnosed. The care of the child by specially trained physicians was 
                                                                                                 -
                         in infants homes. In the clinics a range of tests and immunisations 
were conducted on children as part of a widespread preventative health programme. In the 
1930s the American Academy of Pediatrics was established and paediatricians could claim 
an expertis                                                                                 
                                           B                -9).  
Both weight and height charts were deployed as mechanisms of measurement 
across clinics, schools and homes. At a specific age, the weight and height of the child could 
be mapped. These figures were then charted and assessed according to normal percentiles 
(in this case growth lines) according to low, medium or high rates of growth. Every child 
could be measured and every child could be assessed according to normal rates of growth. 
Moreover, those children whose height or weight was below the low or high percentile 
could also be noted, closely monitored and assessed for physical abnormality, family 220 
 
pathology or dysfunction. The case of a child who is obese might be monitored in relation to 
whether this is a continuing problem and if so, to what extent the problem is a result of 
physical abnormality (hereditary disposition) or due to family dysfunction. A simple test and 
standard could set off a whole discussion of possible pathologies regarding unhappiness at 
home (and eating as compensation) or habituated family practice of unhealthy eating (due 
to lack of appropriate dietary knowledge or wilful gluttony) or lack of physical exercise. The 
measurement of weight and height is institutionalised alongside the inspection of children 
on a regular basis not simply in terms of their physical, but also their psychological, growth 
(Armstrong 1995 and 1983). Developmental tests, which would ordinarily take place in the 
                                   , are conducted by a qualified person (for example, 
registered health visitor, nurse or sometimes a GP doctor). In the past the tests would be 
completed at home by one of these experts or in the GPs surgery. Now, although the tests 
are still conducted formerly by these experts, parents are encouraged to take a greater 
interest in the developmental health of their child and hence given developmental charts to 
complete.  Now the parent is expected to notice signs of abnormality and to report any 
concerns to the local GP or health visitor. Over the course of the twentieth century the 
measures might now include ones for head-size in infancy, waste-size or body-mass index 
(BMI). 
As with all these tests and forms of measurement, the normality/abnormality of the 
child is measured according to the whole population (i.e. from statistics from across the 
whole population and also in comparison with other national statistics). Normal 
development (i.e. that which is assumed to be internal to the growing body of the child) is a 
generalised norm, a trajectory of points on a series of graphs that are assembled from a 
collective body, from the whole population. The gathered data is categorised according to a 221 
 
notion of age (i.e. measured daily, monthly and annually). The division of age provides us 
with a constant and against this constant we can differentiate according to expectations at 
particular age-periods, or stages, and we can accord these age-                             
These differentiations are different from the marking of ages, for example, on a wall or chart 
at home; domestic charts tend to be done in a more arbitrary manner (i.e. without a 
uniformity of temporal spacing) and understood in relation to more localised, less expert 
knowledges (i.e. Charlie was taller at 6 years than Alice, etc). Moreover, those children, who 
at certain times do not match up to the normal and who are classified as abnormal, are only 
done so on the basis of arbitrary decisions about what distance or area is acceptable around 
                                                                                           
                                                                                     -         
an examination). The standard is based on conventional wisdom at the time and changes 
according to that conventional wisdom and to social policy demands. The statistical 
mapping of child             feeds into national social policy. The healthy child population is 
defined through indicators which are increasingly global. The profile of a population is a 
point of comparison with other national samples. Yet these indicators have significance in 
the context of national particularities and exigencies. Thus what might constitute a health 
problem at one time may not at another time. For example, recent concerns about obesity 
can be seen to be correlated with other policy concerns (concerns about absenteeism at 
work, NHS costs, aging population, etc). The normal curves are constructed according to 
concerns about the collective, but they function also according to the responsibilities they 
place on the individual (child or/and parent). The curves are constructed in terms of how 
they make visible certain sites of intervention at a personal level. Although obesity due to 
heredity facts might involve drastic measures regarding medication, etc, in most cases it is 222 
 
framed according to what the child and parent can do. Social policy is predicated upon 
things that can be done. At an individual level, due to the shifting of responsibility 
downward to the parent and child, the normal curve becomes an instrument for 
understanding what should be done. Of course, a parent/child can always not do what is 
required and often there are few consequences to these actions. But sometimes and in 
relation to certain areas, the not doing what should be done results in the parent/child 
                                       T                                                
developmental health problem) are further pathologised (i.e. lack of recognition is seen as 
lack of concern and thus a sign of neglect). 
 
Interiority and Development  
The measurement of height and weight was institutionalised alongside forms of 
psychological measurement over the twentieth century. The emergence and embedding of 
developmental psychology across schools, hospitals and homes has been central to the 
                                                   O                                     
work of Jean Piaget, who underst                evelopment in terms of their ability to act 
and interact with the world. Piaget was primarily concerned with cognitive development 
                                                                                     
determined, but rather it                                                  which is an 
interactive relationship dependent on two processes of accommodation and assimilation 
and with regard to a balance or equilibrium. According to Piaget the child develops 
cognitively (in terms of how they know and interact with the world) according to a set and 
structured passage across specific stages. These stages mark the transition of the child 
toward a normal adult rationality. These stages are sensori-motor (birth to 18 months), 223 
 
preoperational (18 months to 7 years), concrete operational (7 years to 11 years) and formal 
operational (12 years onward). Broadly speaking, the progression is from, as it were, hands-
on thinking to abstract thought. At each stage there is an expectation that the child will be 
able to perform different capacities and dispositions and that the temporal succession of 




The measured and standardised temporal ordering of the child emerges at a time 
                                                        A                             
sciences in the nineteenth                                                                 f 
in the understanding of who we are as human beings. This is what differentiates Darwin 
                                          eighteenth century. It is at this time that we see the 
figure of linear development and progress stamped not just in relation to the question of 
human growth, but in relation to the growth and development of nations and civilisations. 
From the amassing of huge amounts of empirical data (from skulls to rock formations), the 
temporal ordering of the world and of civilisations within it could be charted. At the height 
of European colonial power, the world was mapped in its images, through its timeline. This 
was a naturalised temporality that was internalised not just on the body of the world, but 
on the body of the child. And thus a correlation could be observed and regulated between 
                                                                    Castañeda  talks about this 
in relation to Darwin. She argues that development is coded with regard to social power 
through 'temporal distancing'. She notes Darwin's use of 'savage' to differentiate between 
biographical time of the human and ancient time of the species. She draws on Fabian's 
(1983) notion of 'temporal distancing :  what could be clearer evidence of temporal 
distancing than placing the Now of the primitive in the Then of the Western adult?  (Fabian, 
1983, 63 cited in Castañeda , 2002: 13). Castañeda  argues that:  As the infant biography 
suggests, the Now of the primitive was not only placed in the time of childhood, but also in 
the child-body: the child was seen as a bodily theater where human history could be 
observed to unfold in the compressed time-span of individual development  (Castañeda , 
2002, 13). We have already noted that this correlation of the temporalisation of civilisation 225 
 
and the temporalisation of the child is common to a range of texts in the nineteenth 
century, from Spencer to Charles Fourier. But what concerns us here is not so much the 
social construction of the biological body, but the relation between different forms of 
regulation and ordering and the historical shift which occurs such that the growth of the 
child is seen to be internal to its body, as a self-regulating organism (Canguilhem, 2000). 
Carolyn Steedman                                       of the child as a central image 
of growth in the nineteenth century is significant for us. She considers how the notion of the 
interiority of the child has been a determining characteristic of modern childhood. The life 
of a child is somehow internal to itself. The child grows and develops like a tree grows from 
a seed. But what typifies the growth of the child, at least from the nineteenth century 
onwards,                                                                             the child 
to physiologically change over time in such a manner that the transformation is seen as an 
advancement and that enables the growing child to acquire knowledge and develop the 
skills and capacities for knowledge acquisition. A range of discourses assemble to construct 
the                                                                                           
relation to notions of the development of society or civilisation, as an entities that progress 
to a certain ends). Steedman takes the story up to the nineteenth century with her 
discussion of physiology and cell-theory. The child becomes the figure upon which internal 
growth is imagined. She says: 
The building up of scientific evidence about physical growth in childhood described 
an actual progress in individual lives, which increased in symbolic importance during 
the nineteenth century, whereby that which is traversed is, in the end, left behind 
and abandoned, as the child grows up and goes away. In this way childhood as it has 
been culturally described is always about that which is temporary and impermanent, 226 
 
always describes a loss in adult life, a state that is recognised too late. Children are 
quite precisely a physiological chronology, a history, as they make their way through 
the stages of growth. (Steedman, 1992: 37) 
As the child is increasingly taken to be the site through which the problem of generation 
could be investigated, others (including natural historians and philosophers) begin to talk 
about the life of the species and the life of society in terms of a linear temporal progression 
that is coded through the metaphors of human life (birth, childhood, maturity, old age and 
then death). The growth of the child is a biological and psychological development and this 
notion marks a stark difference from ideas of preformationism, such that the child is 
preformed from conception, or of the continuity of the soul as an indivisible form. 
The notion of development is central to the story of modern childhood, to modern 
child psychology and to modern paediatrics. David Armstrong, for example, considers the 
emergence of paediatrics in the UK. Paediatrics was seen not to be a specialism of general 
medicine, but rather paediatrics was itself a form of general medicine, including a range of 
medical disciplines and expertise. The argument was more for the establishment of 
                                                                                       
ophthalmology, dentistry, psychiatry and so on) within the general study of children in 
health and disease (Armstrong, 1979: 9). Paediatrics relied on the classification of life into 
different stages (for example, from infancy, childhood, adulthood and old age), but it also 
provided the basis for the emergence in the 1920s and 1930s of a distinct discipline studying 
                               C                                                               
and institutional needs. Paediatricians studied not only diseases in children, but also 
diseases of children. In that sense, the study and classification of diseases of children could 
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growing and developing bodies which required not a comparison with a standard and static 
chart or measure or table of classifications, symptoms and diagnoses. On the contrary, 
                                                                                            
history. A  A                  P                            graphy of traditional medicine 
with a multi-dimensional property space whose main axes were temporal. Medicine was 
taken from its compartments, from its form of reduced abstractions and opened out; no 
longer was the model strongly classified and static, instead the intersection of the axes of 
human growth and development and of the full natural history of disease in all its 
                                                                                   A          
1979: 11). For the child normality was no                                                    
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conditions may not be so at another age and another set of conditions. In contrast to 
                                                                                           
1990s, Armstrong shows how the consolidation of paediatrics relied precisely on not 
treating children as miniature adults. He quotes Apley from an article in the Lancet in 1965 
stating that  C                                                                           
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evidenced by Brosco, 2001) emerged as a predominant form of expertise and authority with 
                                     and life because it was able to claim that children 
required more than a reduction to abstract measurement. The paediatrician was, precisely 
because of their training and their singular focus on the life of the child, able to account for 
children unlike no other. As Armstrong argues, the paediatrician alone                      
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reducible to static measurement, but to a form of expertise and care oriented to a particular 
type of personhood defined by its futurity. Development, then, unlike growth which had 
extension and could be measured in quantitative terms, was governed by a qualitative 
epistemology. Development was not defined according to a single scale, but was rather 
defined by it being intensive and qualitative. Difference and change was defined in 
qualitative terms in the context of its becoming or development. 
 
A B                    C          E        L  es? 
Paediatrics moved out of the hospital and into the population at large. It was 
concerned not simply with disease and illness, but with health and well-being. It was 
concerned not with the spatialisation of illness in the clinic (Foucault, 1973), but the life of 
individuals in a national population and the risk and probability of ill health in the 
           A                                                                         
dominant as a form of medical organisation from the end of the eighteenth century with the 
                                              P                                                  
century (1995). The former was organised around, what Armstrong refers to as, three 
spatialisations of illness: a primary spatialisation according to symptom (which was the 
subjective experience of illness), sign (the interpretation of illness through the expert eyes 
and examination of the physician) and pathology (which was thus diagnosed as the basis of 
                                        body); a secondary spatialisation, which allowed the 
                                          -dimensional object within which the pathological 
lesion could be identified and importantly in the context of which medical techniques of 229 
 
examination (through sounds and observation) could be invented and developed; and a 
tertiary spatialisation, which was formed within the clinical space of the hospital itself, such 
that the clinical space constituted a neutral and clean space of observation and treatment. 
In hospital medicine, Armstrong argues, the illness is observed, examined and treated in the 
context of the clinical space. But with the advance of surveillance medicine the issue was 
not to bring the illness within the hospital nor even necessarily to treat illness as such, but 
to act on the population in the context of its normalisation. For Armstrong it is the child that 
is central to the extension of surveillance medicine and particularly the child as a developing 
subject. The child is examined and observed not only in the clinic, but also in schools, in 
nurseries and at home. Medics and health workers are able to go out into the community in 
the context of preventative health programmes and not simply to cure disease. Such 
programmes required a constant surveying and examination of the population, but also the 
promotion of campaigns, for example, around diet, exercise, sex and so on. Medicine in this 
sense was embedded in the everyday conduct and lives of people inasmuch as it provided a 
means of understanding and acting in the interests of the health and well-being of the 
population. As such, it was not the relation between symptom, sign and pathology which 
was of importance, but the probability of illness or ill health. It was thus through a concept 
of risk that well-being was now governed, not in the clinic, but across the land. Such a 
medical concept of risk meant that illness did not reside within the body of the patient as 
observed and examined in a clean clinical space. Rather, illness was seen in probabilistic 
                                                                                            
an aggregated series of factors and not a unitary human body as such (Armstrong, 1995: 
401). 230 
 
Of course, the growth in what Armstrong refers to as surveillance medicine, 
constitutes one aspect of what Michel Foucault and others have uncovered with respects to 
more general shifts in the nature of modern power. Foucault considers the huge changes in 
government occurring from the eighteenth century onward in terms of a generalised shift in 
knowledge and power. He lists the emergence of a series of issues that arise at the end of 
the eighteenth century   concerning rate of births, fertility of the population, and rate of 
deaths, epidemics, endemics   that are concerned with the life and well-being of a 
population. Mortality and propensity to illness are conceived in terms of a general care for 
                                 F                                                    
These are the phenomena that begin to be taken into account at the end of the 
eighteenth century, and they result in the development of a medicine whose main 
function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coordinate medical care, 
centralize power, and normalize knowledge. (Foucault, 2004: 244) 
 For Foucault the family, but also importantly the child, is central to the growth of biopower. 
Thus, in a discussion of the medicalisation of the family and the positioning of the child 
therein, he states: 
The family is no longer to be just a system of relations inscribed in a social status, a 
kinship system, a mechanism for the transmission of property. It is to become a 
dense, saturated, permanent, continuous physical environment which envelops, 
                                         H     it assumes a material figure defined 
                                                                                     
tending increasingly to become its basic framework for survival and growth. 
(Foucault, 1980a: 173) 231 
 
The concern with health and hygiene can be seen in the rise of eugenic discourses in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such that control of reproduction was seen to be 
essential to the well-being of the species. Nikolas Rose makes this clear when he argues 
that: 
Attempts to act on reproduction were widespread, ranging from popular advice on 
                                                                                  
and welfare benefits for mothers, to segregation and sterilization of those thought to 
be physically or morally unfit. Infused with a more or less virulent racism, eugenic 
policies of forced or coerced sterilization of those considered threats to the quality 
of the population                                                       -minde        
those deemed incorrigibly immoral or antisocial   spread across the United States, 
Europe, to Latin America and beyond. (Rose, 2007: 61) 
For Rose, as with Foucault, a eugenic discourse was visible in the broader conceptualisation 
of a biopolitics of health. Rose continues: 
The specificity of the biopolitics of the first half of the twentieth century lies... in the 
links established between population, quality, territory, nation, and race. It involved 
more than the idea that, other things being equal, healthy individuals were more 
desirable than those who were unhealthy. Health was understood in terms of quality 
  of the individual and of the race   and quality was understood in a quasi-
evolutionary manner, as fitness. (Rose, 2007: 62) 
The implications for such an understanding of health and medicine are wide ranging, but it 
is sufficient for us here to stress that from the eighteenth century onward the health of the 
child is increasingly considered, in terms of both individual and societal well-being. 232 
 
Much has certainly changed since the eighteenth century in terms of a shift from 
classical mechanical and geometric conceptions of the body (as anatomy and physiology), 
even from simple electro-chemical neurology, toward notions of communication and 
genetic coding (see Canguilhem, 1994). Advances in medical knowledge, practice and 
technology have shifted the terms of understanding, but also government. Sarah Franklin 
thus states that: 
We are currently witnessing the emergence of a new genomic governmentality   the 
regulation and surveillance of technologically assisted genealogy. This is necessitated 
by the removal of the genomes of plants, animals and humans from the template of 
natural history that once secured their borders, and their re-animation as forms of 
corporate capital, in the context of a legal vacuum. This dual imperative, to take 
evolution in one hand and to govern it with the other, is a defining paradox of global 
nature, global culture. (Franklin, 2000: 188) 
‘                                                                                      L        
become reengineered, Rose argues, on a now molecular scale. But also, and not necessarily 
co-extensive, the production of knowledge and forms of government of life have 
increasingly a political economic dimension. Not only with regard to the capitalisation of 
                     T                                                                        
                                                                                             
involves the forceful presence of commercial interests.  
In the field of psychiatry we see a striking shift, not in terms of the tropes of 
infantilism, but in terms of the language of the molecular and the deployment of 
neurochemical treatments. Regarding the former, Foucault has argued that the separation 
of childhood from adult maturity constitutes a significant development in the discipline of 233 
 
psychiatry. He talks about the case of Henriette Cornier, who as a child had been happy and 
cheerful, but from adolescence she became sad and quiet. She grew up to a difficult life and 
was imprisoned for murdering and chopping-up the young baby of her next-door neighbour. 
Foucault argues that: 
Childhood, then, must be separated from the pathological process so that the latter 
can effectively function and play its part in the deresponsibilization of the subject. 
You can see why the signs of infantile wickedness were a stake and the object of an 
important struggle in the medicine of mental alienation. (2003: 302) 
In contrast to this case, Foucault recounts the case of Pierre Rivière. He talks about how the 
                                 ‘                                                              
                                                                         lling of his mother, 
brother and sister. Foucault argues that instead of seeing a difference between childhood 
and adulthood, psychiatry notices a continuity between, for example in the case of Rivière, 
the signs of wickedness and the later adult criminal insanity. Foucault argues that 
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[F]ar from considering childhood as new territory that is annexed to psychiatry at a 
certain point, it seems to me that it is by taking childhood as the target of its action, 
both of its knowledge and its power, that psychiatry succeeds in being generalized. 
That is to say, childhood seems to me to be one of the historical conditions of the 
generalization of psychiatric knowledge and power. (Foucault, 2003: 304) 
And he elaborates on this as follows: 
The presence of any kind of trace of infantilism is enough for conduct to fall within 
the jurisdiction of psychiatry, for it to be possible to psychiatrize it. As a result, 234 
 
inasmuch as it is capable of fixing, blocking, and halting adult conduct and of being 
                                                                                        
inspection. Conversely, all adult conduct can be psychiatrized inasmuch as it can be 
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thoroughly scoured since it may contain an adult fixation within it. Conversely, adult 
conduct is scrutinized for any possible trace of infantilism. (Foucault, 2003: 305) 
Not only were the lives of children scrutinised with respect to symptoms of adult 
psychopathology, but also toward the end of the nineteenth century children were 
increasingly disclosed as themselves having significant psychiatric problems.  
  In recent discourse there has been a focus on genetic disposition. Jeremy Rifkin, for 
example in his The Biotech Century                                                    
economic consequences of shifting to genetic causation as an all-encompassing explanatory 
                                   NIH H     G      P                      G       
F          C                    nitial cancellation due to public concern about racist science 
                    ‘                                                                          
debate shifts from environmental factors that affect crime, like lack of educational 
opportunity,                                                                                
                  O             ‘                                                   
demographics of crime and the overrepresentation of African Americans in US prisons, 
serves a racist and anti-poor agenda. 
Research into serotonin levels has been linked with impulsive and aggressive 
behaviour (ibid: 159), but equally psychologists such as Jerome Kagan have argued that 
people with lower heart rates and blood pressure (i.e. those calmer under pressure) may be 235 
 
more prone to violent crime (ibid: 160) and he goes on to claim that in the near future 
scientists will be able to identify children with violent tendencies through genetic testing 
(ibid: 160). The use of PET scans and other brain visualisation technologies (such as CT and 
MRI) have been significant in demonstrating violent tendency in particular areas of the 
       ‘                                                                                          
on brain scans in deter                                                            B       
Joseph Dumit has argued, the use of PET scans functions as a form of persuasion such that 
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interpretation are occluded by the insistence of the factual nature of the brain image 
s                              D                                                       
and social behaviour is mediated by molecular biologists, psychologists and other brain 
scientists, but also by journalists, film-makers and others. As such he shows how the early 
public discourse on the discovery of a gene for crime, for example, was caught up and 
deeply embedded in the marketing and fictionalisation of scientific claims (Dumit, 2004: 
185). It should be noted though that those scientists (molecular geneticists, neurochemists 
                                                                                      
aggressive behaviour (Rose, 2007: 225). The courtroom has been a key site for the 
articulation of biosocial and penal discourses and expertise (Rose, 2007: 229). Rose has 
                                                                                          
suggests that biological and genetic defences have largely failed to displace older 
conceptions of responsibility within the practice of the criminal law, at least in the United 
“                                                                         ‘           236 
 
      M                  PET                                                               
                                                                           ‘                
often subjected to legal scrutiny in the courtroom in such a way that any simple truths are 
                                             A       ‘                                        
molecular biological and neuroscientific knowledges in shaping legal process, Rose offers a 
                                                                                    
subjected to the same destabilization if they begin to enter the criminal trial process on a  
regular b                   ‘                                                              
with regard to arguments about diminished responsibility or free will, but with regard to the 
determining of the kind of sentence meted to the condemned. He argues that it is with 
                                                                                            
containment of the pathological person. These persons are thus incarcerated   not only in 
prisons, but in other forms of medical-carceral institutions   due to their being considered a 
threat to society (ibid: 235). He argues that biological explanation is now put forward in the 
context of societal protection and a series of questions about risk factors (ibid: 238). 
Criminality is understood in terms of the probability as to what might happen in the future 
and hence the need to control persons with respect to tendencies demonstrated at an early 
age and with respect to family and genetic history. This Rose argues, despite its apparent 
similarity is a far cry from the kind of eugenic arguments put forward by people such as 
Charles Murray. 
David Healy, Professor of Psychiatry at the North Wales Department of Psychological 
Medicine, Cardiff University, and a leading international psychiatrist, in a review of a book 
on the history of ADHD stated that: 237 
 
It seems clear that a dam has been breached and that a taboo on giving drugs to 
children has gone. Indeed, children, almost more than any other party in the USA, 
are probably most at risk of ending up on physical treatments and indeed 
combinations of physical treatments for behavioural problems, where little more 
than a decade ago this would have been inconceivable... ADHD is the most visible 
symbol of the bio-medicalisation of childhood disorders... (Healy, 2006: 177-8) 
In the nineteenth century the combination of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsive 
behaviour in children would have been understood and acted upon largely in the context of 
moral terminology and control, but such a combination of behaviours now are understood 
in the context of the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) or the World Health Organization International Classification of 
Diseases Manual as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or hyperkinetic disorder. 
Across different countries there are differences in diagnosis and treatment, but the core 
features include easily bored, easy loss of interest, preoccupied by moment-to-moment 
attention, behaviour inappropriate for particular situations, inconsistent sometimes rude 
          T                   T                                                     
significant degree of co-morbidity with other early childhood risk factors, most notably 
                                                  increasingly a link between ADHD and 
                                       “                             T                  ADHD 
is often seen as a contributory factor in the exclusion of children and young people from 
school for disruptive behavioural problems and yet in making such prognoses other more 
enduring risk factors (such as sustained family socio-economic disadvantage and poverty) 
are seen as secondary or symptomatic of a genetic hereditary disposition (see Bynner, 
2001). ADHD is seen as a disorder that is located in the prefrontal cortex, part of the 238 
 
                                                                                              
          C             ADHD                                                               
use of dopamine to communicate (Tucker, 1999: 218). Although ADHD may be treated by 
careful and constant expert supervision in order to modify behaviour toward situationally 
appropriate conduct, the cost of such treatment is high and demands the commitment of 
expert support teams (including parents, health workers and psychiatrists). Since the rapid 
rise   initially in adolescents but increasingly much younger children   in the diagnosis of 
ADHD in the USA, but also the UK and other countries, the disorder has largely been treated 
through prescription of methylphenidate (or Ritalin), but also dexamphetamine (or Adderall) 
which acts on dopamine transporters and increases the time dopamine binds to its 
receptors (Tucker, 1999: 218). A disorder that is seen largely in the USA, largely since the 
1980s, and largely in the context of behaviour seen to be inappropriate in an educational 
schooling context is treated through an amphetamine-like drug, a drug with similar effects 
to cocaine, which increases motivation and attention. The production of Ritalin, consumed 
largely by the USA market (accounting for 90% of the worlds market (Breggin, 2000)), rose 
by 450% in the early 1990s (Transit, 2003; see also Rose, 2007:209). The prescription of 
Ritalin in the USA is written by paediatricians and family practitioners rather than 
psychiatrists (Schachar, Tannock and Cunningham, 1996). But also in most cases the initial 
referrals are made by teachers and it is this which moves the classification and government 
                                                                                       
clinically labelled psychiatric disorder (Rafalovich, 2004) and it is in this sense that some 
critics                                                         ADHD  O             
significance is the role that pharmaceutical companies play in educating teachers about the 
disorder with regard to its identification and referral (Phillips, 2006). Phillips argues that 239 
 
such brokerage is not necessarily a disinterested activity for the teacher inasmuch as the 
referral can become a device for managing disruptive conduct in the classroom (Phillips, 
2006). What has become a worrying trend is that it is no longer adolescents who are being 
diagnosed with ADHD but increasingly younger pre-school children. We should be wary of 
simply arguing that ADHD is largely an effect of psychiatric labelling                         
        M          L                                 ction of such conduct to a biological 
disorder and the determination of its aetiology does not necessarily dictate the form of 
treatment (i.e. inasmuch as biological diseases might be treated through psychotherapy or 
behavioural relearning), but also inasmuch as those directly affected by the disorder might 
find comfort in its naming and in the support networks (clinical, family, friendship, and 
political) facilitated through such naming. 
Although ADHD has dictated a huge amount of coverage regarding the 
bi                                                                                            
health have identified a rise in the numbers suffering from behavioural and mental health 
problems (e.g. WHO European Ministerial Conference, 2005). Twenty percent of children 
and young people across the world are seen to be suffering from disabling mental health 
problems (WHO, 2001). Increasing in significance is the diagnosis of bipolar disorder. In July 
2000, a US newspaper the Star Telegram reported that a mother of a two year old child, 
H       N                      ADHD               P           P         The Bipolar Child, 
requested that her doctor re-                                                             
Healy, April 2006: 443). Two years later in August 2002, Time magazine ran a cover story on 
the increase in paediatric bipolar disorder in the USA  H                                 
                                          A                       H          a: 443). The 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, Healy argues, is largely dependent on subjective criteria and 240 
 
judgements (namely, through reports of parents and other family members) and on the 
basis of these judgements pharmacotherapy is prescribed. The prescription of Zyprexa, 
Risperdal and other antipsychotic drugs, which are more likely to be prescribed by 
psychiatrists, has risen dramatically since the 1990s (New York Times, 6 June 2006). These 
are drugs designed initially for adults and with little proper testing regarding dosages or 
effects for children. These are drugs increasingly used for treating preschool children (Healy, 
2006). This is similarly the case with the diagnosis of childhood depression and the 
prescription of SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors such as Seroxat, Prozac). Large 
pharmaceutical companies, which spend large amounts of money developing a drug for 
adults and with little commercial incentive to redevelop and retest the drug for children, 
market antipsychotics, antidepressants and stimulants to children. Drugs originally designed 
to treat one disorder are remarketed with regard to a collection of disorders, disorders 
which are themselves labelled and designated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM). The relationship between DSM labelling, pharmaceutical marketing 
and the growth of children and young people suffering psychiatric disorders is not always 
clear cut (Rose, 2007: 209-15; Applbaum, 2006). But also the growth in citizen and patient 
groups, which are aligned to forms of disorder and treatment, have grown in number and 
                                                  ‘                                           
(Rose, 2007). Although some activist groups are certainly shaped by the anti-psychiatry 
movements and philosophies of the 1960s and 1970s regarding the social nature of mental 
health problems, others not only accept but promote the biological nature of the disorder 
as a positive point of political identification and mobilisation and social and empathetic 
support. Some groups are directly funded by the pharmaceutical companies. Many of these 
groups existing largely in on-line environments and their political mobilisation and support 241 
 
networks are conducted via the internet. In doing so, new forms of agency and solidarity are 
formed as a consequence of new pharmacological knowledges, medicines, but also new 
communication technologies such as the internet and social media platforms. 
 
‘          C          A      
Before concluding this chapter, I want to look at the significant and influential early work 
of Pia Christensen in order to foreground more clearly the implications of our earlier 
discussion for an understanding of agency with respect to children. Christen               
comes more directly out of the new sociology of childhood paradigm which emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. This work, as already presented in chapter two, stressed the role 
                                                           n terms of the dynamic structuring of 
                          C                                                              
                                           C                                                 
illness has focussed at different times on children between the ages of six and 13 years old 
at home, school and in after-school centres in Copenhagen, Denmark. Her research has 
been largely ethnographic and included observations, but also interviews and other forms of 
data collection includ                         I want to consider two arguments that 
Christensen makes in two research papers from 1998 and 2000.  
I   D              “           H   C          C             C              I           I   
T                , Christensen considers                        “               
competence is not a psychological property of the individual, but a relation between social 
persons in contexts of negotiation. The question for her then is not what children are able 
or not able to do, but how their competence about illness is performed and in the context of 
what kinds of social interactions. She considers illness and therapy in the context of 242 
 
everyday interactions and she looks at how symbolic boundaries between illness and health 
are constructed in social interaction. “                                              
negotiated competence adjusts our understanding of the deployment of formal medical 
hierarchies in the family inasmuch as children might ordinarily be viewed in terms of their 
lack of competence and knowledge in contrast to an adult, professional expert medical 
knowledge. She argues that a                                                            
                                            C                                    
competence becomes suspended; their subjective experiences of their own bodies do not 
                                               . Duration acts                           
                                                    For example, parents are prone to saying, 
 G                                                                     Adults use time as a 
                            claims to be ill. They may assume that a child is faking illness 
and that a child would not be able to sustain the performance of illness for any length of 
time, or they may assume that child may want attention, or maybe that a child just lacks the 
competence to judge themselves whether they are really ill or not. Of course, sometimes 
also illness (as demonstrated through a high body temperature) may arise at night and 
subside by morning. Body temperature is a key issue for both children and adults. But for 
adults the testing of temperature is significant in ascertaining the authenticity of the illness 
and in objectifying the illness. Taking temperature is seen alongside other forms of adult 
competent conduct, such as opening medicine (who opens the bottle? who is allowed to go 
into the medicine cabinet?), and determining the medicine, dose and therapy. For 
Christensen the relation between adult and child and the use of mediating devices is seen in 
                                                                                      
inasmuch as children are not deemed reliable speakers of objectified truth whereas illness 243 
 
mediated by a thermometer does constitute a form of objectified truth, `[i]llness 
classification indicates the position of the child as incompetent (as well as dependent, 
passive and subordinate) while the adult is seen as competent, act                   
(Christensen, 1998: 193). These forms of conduct concerning examination and medication 
rely on the complicity of the child. Children need to act and agree. For Christensen, then, 
                                                          n primarily in terms of the 
relationship between children and adults, not such that these are defined and differentiated 
as prior categories, but rather as relational positions formed through the practices and 
objects in which competence is performed. We s                              C            
account does not attend to children with chronic illness who are more likely to have control 
and responsibility for their medication and therapy (Clark, 2003). 
In a second paper  C                 C        C               V          B             , 
Christensen starts by considering a distinction between the                                   
body and the interior body. She considers how vulnerability constitutes a penetration of the 
body (literally, a wounding). Christensen draws on the work of Ronnie Frankenberg to make 
a distinction between the                                         The somatic body is an 
                                                                                    
diagnostic instant... A partial, often technologically mediated, clinical view, restricted in time 
            (Frankenberg, 1990 quoted in Christensen, 2000: 45). T                        
unity of past, present and future simultaneously experienced from inside and outside... The 
perspective of the incarnate body lacks the boundaries in both time and space and is 
permeable to            (Frankenberg, 1990 quoted in Christensen, 2000: 45). Whereas 
                                                                                       nce 
and relates illness to acts. Illness for the adult is conceptualised with respect to symptoms,  244 
 
names of symptoms, measures and technical therapies. For the child, illness concerns, for 
example, the disruption to daily routines (e.g. not being at school, being at home, not being 
with friends, etc). Children talk with respect to a notion of the incarnate body and adults 
talk with respect to a somatic body. M                                                      
divided (interior and exterior). Thus, attending to the exterior body (clothing, washing, etc) 
is reflected in a contented and well interior body. M                                     
indicative of the well-                              . Christensen states that: 
C                                  eriencing vulnerability also related to the 
experience of losing their social position, activities and relationships and changes to 
their environment. This suggests that, from children's perspectives, they are their 
world and did not see themselves as separate from the part they take in processes 
and events and their experiences of them. Children, then, spoke from the 
perspective of the body incarnate, the body as experience, in action, involved with 
the environment as well as in interactions with others. (Christensen, 2000: 47) 
In this later paper, we see that illness is performed with regard to adult and child 
relationally defined, but also through the binary technology/experience. A division is thus 
set up between a system world (of expertise, knowledge, technology) and a lifeworld (of 
experience). The former is socio-technical and technocratic; the latter is more 
phenomenological. This gives rise to the question of the bifurcation of adults and children 
and to the anomalous status of the child with chronic illness. It also suggests that experience 
is itself not always mediated through devices (whether linguistic, medical or other). It 
figures the child as the site of an almost pure experience, which is itself denied the status of 
truth.  245 
 
This is a powerful way of describing the lives of children, but we should question its 
analytical validity. We might want to question Christensen   tendency                     
experiences as if they themselves were innocent and unmediated and the notion that 
children can simply speak from experience. Christensen too readily reads medical 
terminology and adult practice not simply as different, but as different in kind. For 
Christensen, a                                                                   n predicated 
on experience, but action that seeks to control the experience of another. Although 
Christensen and others help us to think about the agency of the child in the context of social 
interactions with other children and with adults, we need to locate such ideas not as a 
critique of new forms of biomedicalisation (as if we could simply situate the social agentic 
child as separate and distinct from social and technical processes, including those which 
construct subjectivities), but in the context of biopower in such a way as to explain the new, 
differing and distributed forms of agency available. Moreover, in this context we would 
want to have an understanding of the plurality of agencies, negotiations and devices. The 
teenage child with HIV, for example, does not stand in opposition to adults and adult 
objectifying technologies, but rather their regimen of care is distributed across paediatrician 
and nurses in the clinic, the daily dosage of medicines, and their own responsibilities (with 
regard to treatment, sense of self and relation with others) (Boulton, 2012). The experience 
                                                                                         
                                                                                             
as a space that surfaces at particular moments to contest others, as a political space of 





  C                                              the invention and development of 
particular technologies of observation, measurement and standardisation. The tabulation of 
                                                                                            
                      C                ctions with the material world of objects and other 
people are mapped and recorded. Their health, illness, well-being and increasingly also 
happiness (largely recorded through the negative indicator of mental health problems) are 
not only points of surveillance and normalisation, but also sites of negotiation and 
           C                                                             T                   
                                                                                  C          
bodies are multiple, as Mol might say (2002). But they are neither holistic nor fragmented. 
T                                                                           T         
aggregated bodies statistically assembled through huge amounts of testing over many years 
                                                                           B               
produce a single adequate image. The paediatrician draws on this data not to reduce the 
child before them into a single uniform mould, but to deliver a form of care which is 
particular to that singular body. And yet the treatment of that body albeit framed within a 
form of professional care and ethics is directed to particular body parts. The governance of 
children with respect to the biomedical has grown and intensified. It has spread from the 






Chapter Ten   Play and Consumer Culture 
T                                                                                   
household purchasing of everyday domestic items (such as soap powders and breakfast 
cereals) or large household items, such as cars, houses, and holidays. Many of these items 
are manufactured by a small number of global corporations, such as Procter and Gamble or 
Toyota, with global brands, sold through the main supermarkets and other retail outlets in 
conjunction with the main global advertising agencies. Advertisers often refer to the role of 
                                                                                               
talk of agency and negotiation. However, instead of considering this, in this chapter I want 
to look at how from the mid-eighteenth century onward and rapidly developing in the 
twentieth century there has been a convergence                                         er 
                            T                                                              
how it has become a site of invention and innovation. It considers how the central tropes of 
play   freedom, growth through interactive object relations, and performance in and 
through friendship   provide the basis for the massive development of a consumer culture 
of childhood and its extension and mediation across many forms of everyday life (in the 
context of both adult and children). W                                                       
                                                       ion with objects, followed by a 
sociological account of play as peer-group interaction. We then set this in the context of a 
social and cultural history of play paying particular attention to the close relation between 
commerce, toys and play from the nineteenth century onward. In contrast to a standard 
                                                                  commerical business, 
what we see is that the marketisation of play has been a site of productive innovation in 
                                                                   proliferating and 248 
 
multiplying its forms. Recent advances in robotics, artificial intelligence and thinking about 
biological life have had an interesting synergy with developments in the toy industry and in 
reconstructions of play spaces and forms. But to look at the issues in this way is certainly not 
to ignore any very serious concerns regarding market dominance by a few global 
corporations and centres of knowledge, technology and capital accumulation and the 
differential impact on children and adults in this respect. 
 
Toward a Sociological Account of Play  
A standard textbook understanding of play is offered by the psychologist Catherine 
Garvey in her book on the subject:  Play is most frequent in a period of dramatically 
expanding knowledge of self, the physical and social world, and systems of communication; 
thus we might expect that play is intricately r                                 (Garvey, 1977: 
7). She argues that something that is seemingly as simple and frivolous as play is actually 
something that is of the utmost importance to the healthy development of the child. 
C                  not chaotic and ungoverned, but rather it is rule-governed and well-
regulated. Its ordering and consistency are not always obvious to observers or to the 
children themselves. Garvey lists what she sees as the significant descriptive features of 
play: 
1. Play is pleasurable, enjoyable... 
2. Play has no extrinsic goals. Its motivations are intrinsic and serve no other 
objectives. In fact, it is more an enjoyment of means than an effort devoted to some 
particular end. In utilitarian terms, it is inherently unproductive. 
3. Play is spontaneous and voluntary. It is not obligatory but is freely chosen by the 
player. 249 
 
4. Play involves some active engagement on the part of the player... 
5. Play has certain systematic relations to what is not play. (Garvey, 1977: 10) 
On first viewing these descriptions may not seem contentious, but on closer inspection we 
may want to question some of them. The context for these definitions, in part, comes from 
H                                                      P                    velopmental one. 
G                                    H                                             
provides an important frame. Play is, for Huizinga: 
                                                                                          
but at the same time absorbing the player intensively and utterly. It is an activity 
connected with no material interest and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds 
within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in 
an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to 
surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their differences from common 
world by disguise or other means. (Huizinga, 1949: 13) 
More apparent is the Piagetian debt. Very crudely, Garvey maps out a Piagetian frame 
which identifies three forms of play                                                 
cognitive stages: 
a)  Sensori-Motor (infancy - 2yrs old) – Play involves repetition of 
movement, sound, and so on; it involves the child’s mastery over motor 
skills and experimentation with touch, sound and sight; and there is a 
pleasure in making things happen. 
b)  Two to Six Years Old – Play is symbolic and representational; it 
encodes experience in symbols; and it demonstrates a symbolic 
creativity and use of imagination. 250 
 
c)  Six Years and Over – Play is with rules; it involves games and 
organised sport, often including competition, co-operation, and 
teamwork; it involves strategic and objective thinking (Garvey, 1977: 
13-4). 
Writing, as she was, in the mid-1970s G                          P                    
                                                                                         
of social context and social interaction is fairly typical of the period (see Donaldson, 1978). 
Piaget is seen to offer a rough-and-ready schema of development, but instead of making 
cognitive development the primary issue, Garvey reverses this and emphasises the social 
nature of play. Interaction with others becomes a central motif. G                           
inasmuch as a whole range of infant behaviour   from baby smiles oriented to others, to 
externalisation of fantasy in make-believe worlds, to formal games and pastimes   is 
understood as play. The specificity and singularity of the behaviour is reduced to a universal 
orientation toward play with others understood along developmental lines. 
We can place this alongside an account of play which comes out of the 
psychoanalytic literature (notably from Melanie Klein and D. W. Winnicott)               
development and relationship to their mothers. Winnicott, who was a paediatrician and 
psychoanalyst, offers perhaps the most interesting account in his analysis of the role of toys 
in facilitating the separation of infant from mother and in the construction of play as a 
therap            W                                                                         
                                                                                               
for its mother in the process of separating from that mother. Transitional objects are 
                                                                                    
                           I                                                            251 
 
separate being and the world is constructed as a world of independently existing objects. 
Transitional objects constitute that realm of objects between need and desire, inside and 
outside, reality and fantasy. The sucking of thumbs, blankets, teddy bears, favourite dolls, 
an old sock with holes in it can all function as transitional phenomena inasmuch as they 
provide the infant with a sense of a world external to itself and the mother, but not quite 
                    Winnicott argues that: 
Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong to the realm of illusion 
which is at the basis of initiation of experience... This intermediate area of 
experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner and external (shared) 
                                                                    I                        
course,                       T                                                          
of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation to the mother as 
something outside and separate. (Winnicott, 1986: 16-17) 
Winnicott understands play through t                                              
transitional phenomena. Play is not psychic phenomena, but equally it is not properly 
                   P                                        T                                    
if in a dreamlike world (of      -                                                       
manipulated accordingly. This interactive space is not purely cognitive (although this is one 
aspect); it is emotional and bodily. Moreover, play is directed toward satisfaction (i.e. the 
mobilisation of agency is motivated by desire) (1986: 60-1). 
The sociology of childhood has investigated the phenomenon of play broadly in 
terms of, firstly, considering play as a means of differentiation from adults and, secondly, as 
                                                 -group interaction. Firstly, play is seen as 
something that children                       T    B     M                                  252 
 
 A                                                                hing like that... They just go to 
work most of the time, and when they come home they just want their dinner and then 
sleep afterwards  (quoted in Mayall, 2002: 133). Mayall states that: 
Young people do not refer to a developmental need for play (as learning) but they do 
refer to their need for a break from the adult-oriented day; and for them the 
function of play is to enable them to experience delight and fun, usually, but not 
necessarily, in company with friends. (Mayall, 2002: 135) 
Secondly, play is understood in terms of peer-group relations and friendship formation. For 
            A       J                                          that: 
Friendship is not simply a cognitive relationship of affectivity. It must be affirmed, 
confirmed and reaffirmed through social action. This explains how the emphasis on 
                                                               wearing the same 
clothes, eating the same food, liking the same football teams   works to mitigate the 
significance which any differences might have. It represents one visible 
demonstration of friendship, for it is through such public performances that children 
evaluate and acknowledge their friendships with one another: being friends must 
not only be experienced but seen to be experienced. (James, 1993: 215) 
I                                                                                           
peer-group cultures (see also Sanders and Freeman, 1998), but it is also a significant factor 
in the performative relationality of play. Play is both something which is experienced and 
done, but it is also commented on and constantly stage-directed. Play as social relationality 
is both experienced and rehearsed. Thus, children spend much time setting up what is going 
to happen and talking through what is about to happen just before and during its 
happening. It is a highly reflexive form of social relationality. 253 
 
Social and Cultural Histories of Childhood Play 
Across the disciplines there are clearly   over-and-above superficial similarities - 
major differences in understandings as to what constitutes play. The different phenomena 
that are understood as play - within the different perspectives outlined above   would 
suggest that any history of play and its association with childhood is far from a simple 
        F                       W                                                            
human universal and occurs even when there are no demonstrable object                  
                 A                                                                          
the invention of childhood in the seventeenth century in terms of the distribution of play on 
the side of childhood and work on the side of adulthood. The historian J. H. Plumb talks of 
life in the middle ages: 
There was no separate world of childhood. Children share the same games with 
adults, the same toys, the same fairy stories. They lived their lives together, never 
apart. The coarse village festivals depicted by Breughel, showing men and women 
besotted with drink, groping for each other with unbridled lust, have children eating 
and drinking with the adults. Even, in the soberer picture of wedding feats and 
dances the children are enjoying themselves alongside their elders, doing the same 
things. (Plumb quoted in Kline, 1993: 46) 
Of course, the originator of this perspective was Ariès in his Centuries of Childhood (1962). 
Ariès talks about the abundance of images and statuettes found in the middle ages and 
                                                                                 . He argues 
that they                                                                                   
relics from a pilgrimage... miniature replicas of familiar o                         Moreover, 
he argues that: 254 
 
I am not suggesting that in the past children did not play with dolls or replicas of 
adult belongings. But they were not the only ones to use these replicas; what in 
modern times was to become their monopoly, they had to share in ancient time, at 
least with the dead. (Ariès, 1962: 67) 
Aries also talks of how miniatures of people and things in daily life were used in magic, but 
also played with by adults as well as children in the Middle Ages. 
By 1600 , approximately, toys had become an infantile speciality, with a few 
differences of detail with regard to present-day usage... There was probably some 
connection between the infantile specialization in toys and the importance of 
infancy in the ideas revealed by iconography and dress since the end of the Middle 
Ages. Childhood was becoming the repository of customs abandoned by the adults.  
(Ariès, 1962: 68) 
A series of objects once shared by all (including the dead) take on new meaning through 
their congregation around young children. Ariès qualifies this statement, though, by saying 
that the specialisation of toys and pastimes did not extend beyond infancy (i.e. 3-4 years 
old) at this particular time. But as the centuries rolled on this age period extended upwards 
and downwards. A                                                                             
pastimes is far from uncontested. Many historians now argues that children across the ages 
played with toys (Orme, 2003) 
Nevertheless what is uncontested is that since the end of the nineteenth century we 
have witnessed an intensification of investment in the relation between children, play and 
toys. As Gary Cross has argued: 255 
 
Before the second half of the nineteenth century, toys were rare and often served 
the needs of adults more than the play of children. The modern toy is a distinct 
product of a new kind of toy business and a new childrearing ideal. (Cross, 1997: 12) 
What is central to this is not simply the rarity or abundance of toys, but that toys in the 
1700s, for example, would have, by and large, been hand-made by the player or a family 
member or someone close to hand. When in 1760 Laurence Sterne describes Tristram 
“        U     T                                                                           
from household window weights (Brown, 1996). Some toys (such as metal figures, dolls and 
rattles) were mass produced in the medieval period (Orme, 2003), but over the course of 
the next two hundred and fifty years toys have become manufactured in number and 
variety in conditions which are industrial, market oriented, technological, and global. The 
toy industry reflexively constructs, invests in and changes the nature and conditions of play. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries we see an expansion of toymakers, a 
reaching out to a mass market and the use of advertising to appeal to parents (as the main 
purchasers of toys, for their offspring). The growth in the market for toys and the massive 
innovation and development has been a cause of pleasure, but also concern. We should 
remember that despite this huge intensification and proliferation of investment, children 
and parents still make toys from scratch and that toys both hand-made and bought are 
                                                     W                       B              
we can turn a hairdryer into a ray gun; and we can mix teddies with Action men in game of 





Media Culture and the De-Differentiation of Childhood and Adulthood? 
Alan Prout has claim                                                             
modernity erected and kept in place for a substantial period of time, is beginning to blur, 
                                                         P                 “               
based on longstanding arguments that throughout the latter part of the twentieth century 
with the advances in visual cultural technologies and with their growth and 
commercialisation the distinctions and differentiations between childhood and adulthood 
are either blurring or disappearing.  The most resonant form of this argument comes from 
the sociologist and communications scholar, Neil Postman (1994).  Postman makes a 
historical argument that draws on the work of Aries, with regard to the notion that 
childhood is a social invention emerging in the seventeenth century, but he frames it in 
relation to major changes in communications technology. For Postman, the Middle Ages is a 
time of openness. There are no distinctions between adults and children; work is conducted 
by both adults and children; sex and violence are visible to both and the hardships of life are 
not concealed from children. But with the invention of printing with moveable type 
(signified by the publication and distribution of the Lutheran Bible) there develops an adult 
culture different from that of children. Print allows certain forms of abstraction that is not 
possible within oral culture. Print allows certain forms of reflection (i.e. the ability to read, 
but also to re-read). It allows certain forms of complexity (Ong, 1982). Moreover, whereas 
oral cultures are public (i.e. stories, such as the Iliad from ancient Greece, are told to 
audiences sitting before a storyteller), books and pamphlets and printed documents are 
read on an individual basis. Print constitutes a culture that is not readily accessible to 
everyone. Books can be used to keep secrets, to keep things from children, to encode 
knowledges that are not accessible to the illiterate. But print also requires certain forms of 257 
 
apprenticeship or certain forms of training and learning. Certain forms of institutionalisation 
emerge to facilitate this training (i.e. schools) and certain forms of power relation are 
established on the basis of this training (i.e. between teacher and pupil, holder of 
                             P                                                             
and culture. And in this sense, childhood is that which is excluded from the world of 
adulthood. Thus the development of print technology brings about new forms of 
consciousness (abstraction, reflection, individuation), new forms of knowledge, new forms 
of exclusion, new forms of training and new forms of culture. 
In the twentieth century with film but especially with television and other visual 
media everything, Postman argues, is accessible; there are no adult secrets, no way of 
separating children from that adult world. Postman states that: 
Television... is an open-admission technology to which there are no physical, 
economic, cognitive, or imaginative constraints. The six-year-old and the sixty-year-
old are equally qualified to experience what television has to offer. Television, in this 
sense, is the consummate egalitarian medium of communication, surpassing oral 
language itself... The most obvious and general effect of this situation is to eliminate 
the exclusivity of worldly knowledge and, therefore, to eliminate one of the principal 
differences between childhood and adulthood... Children are a group of people who 
do not know certain things that adults know. In the Middle Ages there were no 
children because there existed no means for adults to know exclusive information. In 
the Age of Gutenberg, such a means developed. In the Age of Television, it is 
dissolved. (Postman, 1994: 84-5) 
P                                                            I                       
knowledge and access to knowledge that is readily accessible to everyone. Although framed 258 
 
in different terms this is also the argument Joshua Meyrowitz makes regarding the 
                                                                                                  
differentiate between age-related people (Meyrowitz, 1984 and 1987). Of course, these 
arguments about television culture seem to be potentially exacerbated in the context of 
internet and mobile communications. There seems to be little if any regulation of content 
and despite a large amount of textual navigation everything is visible. 
One of the problems with this account is that it is technologically deterministic. 
There is an assumption that print, television, and oral culture have set meanings or 
functions. But what we know of communication technologies is that they are open to 
different interpretations and to different forms of use (see Grint and Woolgar, 1997; 
Silverstone and Hirsch, 1994). B           P                                            
print to differentiate between adults and children, the difference between those with 
literacy competence and those without is akin to a division between children and adults. 
When in fact what we know is that levels of cognitive intelligence (and perhaps even more 
so media literacy) does not exactly correlate with age. A bright 10 year old is just as likely to 
be literate as a dull 50 year old. If print were to differentiate between adults and children, as 
if there were a clear division between the two on the basis of literate/non-literate, then 
such a differentiation could only be on the basis of a prior cognitive division between 
children and adults. What we know is that things are much more complex. What we know is 
                                                                                             
accessing media are both formal (and institutionalised, for example, in school) and informal 
(i.e. learnt through popular culture, friendship networks and so on). We know that television 
far from being readily accessible to everyone is actually something that requires forms of 259 
 
literacy to understand it. Children of different ages with different media competencies read 
programmes in different ways (Buckingham, 1993). 
The cultural critic John Hartley put forward a variation on this theme initially in a 
paper on the institutional construction of audiences in the television (Hartley, 1987). Hartley 
puts forward a thesis that similarly leads to a dissolution of the boundary of generational 
distinction, not in terms of the adultification of children, but in terms of the infantilisation of 
adults. The term that Hartley uses is                     H                P                
                                       P                                               n 
relation to a range of media (not only visual), including novels (as with the popular reception 
of the Harry Potter books), theme parks (as with Disney World and Parc du Futuroscope), 
and computer games (as with Lara Croft and Grand Theft Auto). There are three elements to 
his argument: that the audience is an imagined community, that a commercial logic drive a 
demand for audience maximisation, and that childishness constitutes universal imaginary. 
Firstly, for Hartley, the television audience is a fiction or an imagined community. There is 
no real audience waiting to be discovered. It is something that is wholly constituted within 
the discourses of the television institutions. The television audience qua audience is only 
ever a representation. Secondly, for Hartley, a commercial logic is geared toward audience 
maximisation and profit maximisation  and the figure of the child is seen to provide media 
and consumer industry with a means of addressing audiences that may be divided 
                                                    Thirdly, then, Hartley argues that, in 
addressing something that is supposedly universal (i.e. childhood), we can all potentially buy 
into such an imaginary figuring. Moreover, the childlike audience is one that is addressed 
through the lowest common denominator (i.e. to a base level of intelligence). Thus in the 
television industry storylines are told and re-told in a single episode of a soap opera or sit-260 
 
com; characters are developed to allow maximum identification; any complexity is ironed 
out. And thus, the industry, once onto a good thing, reproduces that which seems to work 
and a productive cycle multiplies this paedocratisation.  
A       P        H                                                          
interpreted at a local level (Billig, 1992). I               H                              I  
seems to come from an era when television was the most significant media industry and at 
                                                                       T                
certainly are still important alongside internet and social media, but from the 1990s onward 
the commercial logics shifted away from profit maximisation by way of massification toward 
niche but global markets. And yet even in the context of these changes, there is still an 
                                                                                            
and consumer cultural landscape. Hartley in looking to forms of infantilisation offers an 
explanatory model for understanding what is at stake in contemporary adult childishness. 
How do we explain the impact of adults playing computer games, going paintballing, 
dressing up in fancy dress, and so on? Although the commercialisation of adult 
entertainment may in some cases lead to its paedocratisation, to the hailing of the lowest 
common denominators that we were all and still want to be children or at least childish, it is 
unclear whether there is a single market logic which is able to explain a massification of 
audience or market in the manner of pitching to a notion of the lowest common 
denominator, a common base intelligence and emotional responsiveness. It is worth noting 
here that some critics discuss paedocratisation in the context of adult narcissism and hence 
                                  G                                                          
in late modernity (e.g. Giddens, 1992; Lasch, 1985). Pat Holland is concerned about and 
critical of such paedocratisation inasmuch as it leads, she argues, to adult irresponsibility 261 
 
(Holland, 1996). If adults are behaving narcissistically and childishly, then who is going to 
care for the children themselves?  
In both Postman and Hartley there is an understated but central theme regarding 
the centrality of play as the basis upon which children and adults have been and are 
differentiated and distributed. Postman states, for example, in his concluding chapter that 
                                                                                        
                                                                                             
 P                    H                                                            evince a 
freedom and spontaneity and that are unsupervised by adults. In contrast he gives an 
                                              U“A                                    
thoroughly invested by adults and thoroughly controlled by adults. He states        F   
                                  A                                                          
(Postman, 1994: 131). He seems oblivious to the obvious contradiction in his argument 
                                                                  t produced and 
orchestrated affair (see Rose, 1984). For Hartley , on the contrary, play is the basis of a 
                                                                                     
imaginative, fantasy, irresponsible aspects of adult behaviour... a fictional version of 
                                                                                       
            H                     
Both Postman and Hartley in their discussion of modern visual culture treat 
representation in a manner that simplifies questions about mode of address, marketing, 
forms of identification, patterns of use and communities of interpretation. For example, 
they fail to understand that a single text, computer game or other form of entertainment 
may appeal to both adults and children alike, not because it addresses a common childish 262 
 
identity, but on the contrary because it constitutes a form of, what Marsha Kinder has 
                                       K              F                                  
such as Home Alone                                                                         
of Bugs Bunny) with those of the vigilante movie (e.g. such as Dirty Harry or Die Hard) with 
                                                                                         
more mature action genre and their parents to enjoy a non-                                  
               K                  W       Home Alone actually achieves this effect is 
another matter, but Kinder makes clear a longstanding argument within literary and media 
analysis that texts are never transparent and they constitute ambiguities at the level of text, 
interpretation and use. Media texts, consumer texts, and plays texts open up rather than 
close down and dictate meaning and use.  
But there is a pro                                                                    
it were a matter of meaning and symbolic differentiation or de-differentiation. Both 
Postman and Hartley agree inasmuch as they present a picture of the blurring of the 
boundaries between childhood and adulthood in terms of the symbolic, or representational, 
nature of this generational distribution. Thus, Postman states that his argument has been 
                                                                                              
m                                        P                    A                          
from different sources (the media, taste and style, and social facts regarding drug use, 
                                                                               ct on the 
symbolic level. But to focus solely on the symbolic precisely fails to account for the more 
hybrid mixes of the human, the technological and the natural (see Prout, 2005). Over and 
above a division of representations into childhood and adulthood, the distributions of 
people and things offers a subtlety and complexity which needs to be explored, not least 263 
 
because if there has been a convergence of play and consumer culture, then it has been 
                                                          nd the object relations within 
which play is constructed. 
 
T   M                C          Culture 
“       K                                                                         
                                                                           t has been 
increasingly colonised since the 1950s. He states that: 
C                                                                                   
privileges fiction as a cultural form and the fantasy mode of consciousness and 
expression. And nowhere is this tendency to amplify the dominion of fiction more 
evident than in the new approach to communication resulting from the link forged 
                                                   K                 
He continues: 
T                                  ly activities and conversations: when we observe 
                   G I  J                              W     W         F          
bouts, or staging mock battles based on Ninja Turtle heroics, or even when they tell 
                                        heir Care Bears or that they want to grow up 
                      B                                                           
play fantasies is abundantly evident. (Kline, 1993: 321) 
K                                                                       maginations and at 
                                                                    
One notable case that condensed many of the concerns was in the early to mid 
1980s and surrounding the production of what were then                  -length 264 
 
             (PLCs)  T     PLC                                                
independent television production companies, but with a close relationship with the toy 
companies and presenting stories containing characters based on characters sold by those 
companies. Two widely debated PLCs at the time were He-Man and the Masters of the 
Universe and Thundercats. The former featured toys produced by Mattel and the latter by 
Hasbro. These were, and still are,                                         
Due to television deregulation in the early 1980s in the US and corresponding 
deregulations in the UK and elsewhere a greater relationship between toy companies and 
production companies could be facilitated. In the US Filmation   an animation company that 
had made Fat Albert (written by Bill Cosby) and had a reasonably sound reputation   made 
He-Man. As Cross states: 
The PLC reversed the traditional relationship between licensed characters and toys. 
They were not simply entertainment featuring characters that gained popularity and 
                                             T                               
                                                                               C      
1997: 1999) 
I              PLC                                           U“  Action for Chil       
Television      P     C                   UK  B       A          C          T               
people like myself, Maire Messenger Davies, Philip Simpson and others) campaigned at this 
time to enforce tougher regulation. It is interesting to note that child psychologists and 
other child experts were lined up on either side of the battle. Filmation hired specialists to 
defend the company, but also to check the content before it was syndicated. And the 
campaigners drew from the ranks of academia to bolster its credibility. That battle was won 
by the campaigners, but the war has certainly been lost. It was certainly lost even before it 265 
 
began. For example, if we consider a very different kind of animated film such Raymond 
Briggs  The Snowman, then this short film was a huge critical success and was often lauded 
as a contrast to animations like He-Man. But in fact The Snowman could only be made 
because of the promise of future merchandising deals (i.e. because of the revenues that it 
could be seen to earn). Animation is hugely expensive to make and so money needs to be 
found to finance it; toys are an obvious place to look for money, but equally other forms of 
merchandising deals (clothing, school kit, and so on). This relation is not new. It goes back to 
Muffin the Mule                                                  UK in the late 1940s. 
  One of the standard responses to this marketisation and commercialisation of 
                                                    J        A   H                               
ubiquitous power of media and its concomitant consumerism that has spread across 
                                                                       “                    
                                                                                  stinctly 
                                                                                     H     
2011: 348). For Hill, children are vulnerable and unreflexive with regard to such global 
corporate power. It is worth contrasting this view to that of David Buckingham in a report 
                                                      D              C         “           
Families, under the Labour government in the UK. He states that:  
‘                                                           gradually develop a 
range of skills and knowledge to do with the commercial world that help prepare 
them for adult life. They are neither the helpless victims imagined by some 
                                                                          
marketing people. Their engagement with the commercial world is part of their 266 
 
everyday social experience and is very much mediated by other social relationships 
with family and friends. (Buckingham, 2009: 8) 
Both these approaches, mentioned by Buckingham above, tend to construe the child as a 
discrete being which is either tainted by commerce or resistant to its effects. Whereas 
B                                                                                           
meaning-making practices, what concerns me in this chapter is the question of how, for 
                                                                                             
agency. The services and things sold to children make a difference not only in terms of their 
meaning as texts (i.e. as if consume                                            F              
but in the way that the objects have meaning, affects and affordances of use. Imagine a 
world divided by children with tiny books, the size of matchboxes with very small print, and 
those with huge encyclopaedia-sized books with huge typeface. Even if the same content is 
published in both large and small size, the meanings of the artefacts will be different, the 
uses different and the impact different. Will children with small books tend to sit to read; 
will they have problems with their eyesight and hence require glasses? Will those with large 
books tend to huddle on the floor to read; or will they develop very large muscular forearms 
from carrying such volumes across the room? 
The marketisation of c                                                                  
the age and lifestyle differentiations of children; and secondly, through pluralising the forms 
                      I                        Daniel Thomas Cook   argument about the 
retail clothing industry is instructive. He argues that this industry brought about changes in 
the early twentieth century in the commercialisation of the child and childhood and that this 
fed into a broader transformation in the cultural construction of the child and childhood. 
F                                                                      U“                   267 
 
(Cook, 2003), looks first to the creation in the 1910s of play spaces built next to the toy 
departments. Children could be left in these spaces, playing but also perhaps having a 
haircut, while mothers were able to shop elsewhere in the store. These rooms were 
                                                                              C           
      A                                             s clothing departments; clothes were 
sold according to size, not age. But over the next twenty years retailers began to market 
their products directly to children. Retailers began to classify their clothing according to age, 
but also gender. In the 1920s retailers, Cook argues, began to treat the child both as a 
customer, but also as an independent person (Cook, 2003: 155). Retailers began also to 
study the agency and conduct of children in consumption. Young teenage girls, for example, 
were seen to not want to be addressed as children or infant and so would be catered for in a 
          T    -and-T                            C                 
Thus, the separation of age-graded sections took into consideration differences 
between age groups as much as the similarities within them. These sections, taken 
together, offer something of a gendered, spatial biography of commercialized 
childhood, designating an appropriate path to follow requisite for specific age 
ranges. It is a pattern which becomes a model for the design of juvenile clothing 
departments in the 1930s, and other child commercial spaces thereafter. (Cook, 
2003: 156). 
Age-graded differentiations were mapped out according to different stages along a 
                   C                                   the progression through different 
products and services and through different commercial spaces. The desire to be older and 
to be seen to be older facilitated the movement from one stage to another. Consumer 
desire thus built in both progression and obsolescence. Although these spaces and products 268 
 
were, and are, made by adults, they are iterative spaces which are recognised and taken to 
                   C                 
The processes and forms of organisation which Cook discusses are familiar across 
oth                                        I                                              
from its earliest days in the 1920s had separate programmes for children, which were in 
turn divided into programmes for the very young and those for older children (Oswell, 
       W                                                                                
further differentiated according to age (Oswell, 2002). These were spaces specifically 
oriented to children and marked their identity as distinct and separate from that of adults. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the differentiation of childhood by age took into account much 
younger children of two to four years old (e.g. Teletubbies, Ragdoll Productions) and one to 
four years old (e.g. In the Night Garden, Ragdoll productions). Programming for age-
                                                                                              
market, on the ability to distribute across that market, and on synergies across media and 
across products (i.e. through merchandising agreements). In the case of both Teletubbies 
and In the Night Garden, these programmes were sold internationally, audiences other than 
                                                                             
merchandising; it was only because of these factors that a programme such as this could be 
made ostensibly for such a small age-group. In this sense then, the differentiation of 
                                                                                      
developmental factors. In this case, market segmentation relies on globalisation. That said, 
the process of segmentation is productive with regard to forms of identification and 
constructions of spaces for children. Cook argues that: 269 
 
[C]hildhood itself is commodified. It acquires exchangeable values in that the very 
transitions between life stages create perpetual and market-necessary forms of 
scarcity. Children do not encounter the marketplace as if somehow separate and 
distinct, but come to realize self, others and perhaps the very idea of childhood itself 
through commodity form, their identity and personal agency emplaced vis-a-vis 
merchandising categories. (Cook, 2003: 165) 
Moreover, for Cook there is a fusion between biography and consumption in such a way 
                                                                             C           
166; see also Cook, 2004). C                                                           
facilitated through it. It is through marketisation that children have been endowed with 
greater personhood, Cook          a partial (that is, non-exhaustive) and progressive 
process of extending to children the status of more or less full persons, a status most 
concretely realized when children gain recognition and adjudication as legitimate, 
individualized, self-contained cons       (Cook, 2004: 3) 
I                                                                           
pluralisation of agency. Market driven play innovation facilitates kinds of interaction among 
children and between children and things. In such spaces of interaction different resources 
and competencies might be drawn on. The negotiation of protiocols and the sites of 
pleasure for an eight year old playing Moshi Monsters online are very different from 
imagining doll play face-to-face in a bedroom. Such innovation and pluralisation of agency 
produces a tension with the investment in consumer personhood which Cook discusses. 
T                                                                                             
consumption were contained within the individual child. Moreover, to talk of market 
                                                                                    270 
 
children       , (c.f. Kline, 1993: 327). If we look at the range of toys on offer to children 
now, we might ask to what extent these toys and the forms of play they support are not 
constructive of forms of agency: namely, children as the compilers of jigsaws, the drivers of 
cars, the builders of houses and castles, the makers of fantasy worlds and so on. These toy 
spaces are the spaces upon which agency is constructed; they are the spaces of invention 
and a multiplication of investment. These spaces allow the big toy corporations to harvest 
                                                                                       
meanings, pleasures, technologies and materialities of these marketised spaces. 
In relation to the early years of infancy there are new codifications of intelligence, new 
spaces of facilitation for the developing child. For example, in the 1990s the Lamaze  C   
B           accompanying booklet for parents or guardians offers a glimpse of how the 
                                          seen to be coded. Certain things attract              
vision and touch a                                  This is a toy for the very young child to 
be played with in their cot. The visual and tactile experience is coded according to stages of 
                                                                                            
           T                               ld developmental psychologists Dorothy and 
Jerome Singer are stated to have assisted in the design of this and other toys and are 
quoted as saying: 
Newborns, infants and toddlers play as they grow and grow as they play 
with the Lamaze
® Infant Development System
®. Lamaze
® toys are specially 
                                              T                        
gently guide baby from milestone to milestone and help you select the 
Lamaze
® toy that is most appropriate - and enjoyable - for your child at 
each stage of development. 271 
 
From another range of toys, Tiny Love Soft Developmental Toys, we can see a similar 
discourse. For example, the literature o                                  “    ony-in-
Motion 3-D Developmental Mobi                      D                          
development experts including psychologists and musicologists . It talks about the infant in 
terms of its development, not only of cognitive capacities, but of musical intelligence, spatial 
intelligence, linguistic intelligence, logico-mathematical, intelligence, bodily-kinesic 
intelligence and emotional intelligence. W                                                  
placing of child into an intelligence incubator, a hothouse) and defined in relation to a small 
number of overly ambitious parents is now addressed as a common practice for all parents. 
These toys are not simply sold as educational toys, but as generators of better forms of 
personhood facilitated through novel forms of interaction. What this indicates is a 
collaboration across scientific expertise, commerce and technology in the codification of 
novel forms of interaction. It is important to be wary of the claims of market discourse, but 
it is equally important to recognise how such toys, just as much as the codification of the 
colour palette or alphabet letters correlated with pictures or word cards, have constituted 
innovations in social technologies for children. 
In the context of artificial intelligence, artificial life and robotics life, toys sit on the 
interface of product development, huge capital investment, leading research, and 
reconceptualisations of the relations between the human, the technological and the natural. 
In the big academic and commercial scientific research laboratories in Japan and the US (e.g. 
   ‘      B              MIT; Sony Computer Science Laboratories in Tokyo and Paris) new 
toys are invented to advertise the technologies, to generate new consumer demand and 
new capital investment, but also to facilitate new forms of interaction. Some of the online 
increasingly mobile toys come out of a context of research on the slippage between 272 
 
 protein-based life                                    silicon-based life                     
computers and computer networked technologies). There is talk of the extension of 
biographies across new substances and the articulation of new knowledges of life (Kember, 
2002). Some of this discussion is science fiction, but some is science and often the 
development of toys works on this interface between scientific and science fiction 
imagination. There are seen to be mutual benefits to playing up the confusion between the 
      Wetware  (e.g. attempts to create artificial biological life through building, unicellular 
organism in test tubes),  hardware  (e.g. constructions of robots and other embodied life-
forms), and  software  (e.g. creations of computer programmes that instantiate emergent or 
evolutionary processes) constitute key areas of development. An early UK example of the 
fusion between first and last was the computer networked software game Creatures (1996) 
designed by the scientist Steve Grand (see Kember, 2003). In robotics, the Sony Computer 
Science Laboratories created Aibo a robotic dog which is sold as a toy, but is also 
emblematic of leading research. The MIT laboratories have produced the emotional robots 
COG and Kismet (Brooks, 2002;  Turkle, 2011) and these have been developed alongside 
more commercial spin-             M        Miracle Moves Baby and Furby (designed by 
Caleb Chung). For Sherry Turkle, who observed and researched the interactions with Rodney 
Brooks  COG (1993) and Kismet (with Cynthia Breazeal), it is precisely in the development of 
these kinds of emotional and social robots that we come to define who and what we are as 
       “                  T    , the controversy about computers does not turn on their 
capacity for intelligence but on their capacity for life. We are willing to grant that the 
machine has a 'psychology', but not th                    (Turkle, 1996: 84). But, although 
                                                                                             
in the interactions with such robots (in talking, cuddling, caring, and so on) that the robot 273 
 
itself is endowed with humanness and the form and nature of talk, love and care 
                        T                                                       H        
       N     T                                             -driven entities modelled on 
biological assumptions is a significant event that has the potential to decisively change 
                                                       M                                   
clear that these animals can be made more or less lively and more or less threatening by the 
lines of code that animate them   not just in their capacity for surveillance (which is 
substantial) but also in their capacity to pass on and inculcate behaviours that may be 
                                                           T                -11). 
 
Conclusion 
  T                                                                               
both adults and children, and the convergence across toy industry, new and old media, and 
                                                                                      lay have 
been reworked in quite dramatic fashions. Play as a form of free expression, as a relation 
with objects, and as the performance of both friendship and self has been transformed over 
the course of the last century and the rate of change has massively accelerated toward the 
end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Cook has argued that:  
The market-culture of childhood represents a monumental accomplishment of 
twentieth-century capitalism. The rise and expansion of a child-world of goods, 
spaces, and media over the last century signifies a development above and beyond 
the opening of merely one more market similar to others. The child market stands 
apart from others because childhood is a generative cultural site unlike any other. 
Childhood generates bodies as well as meanings which grow, interact, and transform 274 
 
to the point of creating new childhoods, new meanings, and quite often new 
markets, and in the process effectively ensuring the movement and transformation 
of exchange value beyond any one cohort or generation. (Cook, 2003: 2) 
It is not only with respect to the symbolic frontiers of childhood or the meanings associated 
                                                                                     



















Chapter Eleven   Political Economies of Labour 
Viviana Zelizer eloquently described a shift in the value of the child from a subject 
                                                                                  
                                           )                  )                                 
in consider in more detail later in this chapter, provided an explanation of how children 
from the 1870s to the 1930s in the USA came to be taken out of paid employment, moved 
into classrooms and playgrounds, and the correlative of this was an investment in children 
by adults as emotional centres of family and social life. In 2002 Zelizer provided a 
reconsideration of her original argument and suggested that if we                    
experiences of economic relations and not simply at adults perspectives on children, then 
                                                                                     
consumption, distribution and production (Zelizer, 2002: 377). )                             
her earlier work is significant inasmuch as it picks up on a broader range of studies, interest 
                                                                                             
see as emerging in the mid-1980s (Ab                 I                                       
labour in the context of industrialisation and we look at the framing of arguments against 
                                                  W                                       
                  abour in the context of broad shifts in socio-economic organisation and 
                                                        O                                 
                                                        
 
From Pre-Industrial to Industrial Labour 
In agrarian and early mercantile societies the fact of children working was, and is, 
commonplace. Children and young people helped out in the family economy as they 276 
 
became able and as best they could. There was no clear division and point of transition from 
non-work to work as a transition from childhood to adulthood. As children became more 
physically able boys helped out in the fields and tended to the animals, whilst girls were 
often put to work in the kitchen or in the home sowing or weaving (Orme, 2003: 307; 
H                    H         C     H                                                     
loom large in textbooks, much of the work done by children in the past was casual and 
              H                    M                                ntryside were, as 
                               T                                                            
to freely leave the land. Many children from very young age were sent away to work 
(sometimes only to a neighbour on a daily basis, but also for longer periods) and many 
                                                                  T                         
referred to any person between the ages of seven and seventy. The various terms for 
servant though carried strong age connotations whatever the actual age of the servant (e.g. 
                                     O                  “                                     
of work regarding the upkeep of the estate and the day-to-day care of the household 
members. Fewer children   ordinarily from about fourteen years old, primarily of higher 
status families   went into apprenticeships, learning a trade. In both cases the relationship 
between servant or apprentice and master and his family was an intimate affair and could 
very well be equally either abusive or greatly beneficial inasmuch as servants, for example, 
                                                        H               H              
156-60).  Those who worked in a household and learned a trade as an apprentice would be 
governed by their masters in a way that included aspects of their moral and social life (for 
example, regarding their drinking in taverns, sleeping with prostitutes, gambling, getting 
married without permission, having sex with other members of the household, and so on). 277 
 
But the master of a household also had an obligation to care for their servants or 
apprentices and to provide patronage (which would include helping to find a job once 
service or apprenticeship had completed). Most children worked for the societal elites, the 
large aristocratic households, the gentry, the clergy and those who approached the gentry 
in rank who owned large farms (Orme, 2003: 310). The towns presented themselves as an 
attraction inasmuch as they offered different kinds of work opportunity, but also a danger 
with regard to disease and crime (Orme, 2003). There were many young people who drifted 
to the towns and laws were formulated to keep people on their manor of birth and to 
                                              O                 
It would be easy to imagine children of all ages working, whether in their family, with 
a local neighbour, in a farm, put into service or learning a trade. But historian Hugh 
C                                                                                    ere 
                  C                     H                                             
apprenticeship were largely conservative inasmuch as they only allowed the transmission of 
experience from one generation in one locality with respect to one kind of occupation. 
Heywood states that this may have suited agrarian societies, but was less suited to urban 
and commercial societies (Heywood, 2001: 160). And he makes this observation in the 
context of a comparison with modern forms of schooling which, we might add, allow for the 
accumulation of knowledge and skills, for their abstraction and distribution outside of 
particular localities, and for their refinement, development and innovation with respect to 
different kinds of deployment and employment. 
From the seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries across north-western Europe 
the transition from feudal agrarian to industrial urban economies is often referred to as a 
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Germany and England families became involved in spinning, weaving and knitting. Trade in 
these industries increased and children were a source of labour (Heywood, 2001: 129). But 
rather than seeing this negatively, many commentators at the time saw this as a positive 
solution to the problem of idleness in children (Cunningham, 2005: 88). Over the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrialisation located work less in the family home 
and more in the factory. In the early nineteenth century there was widespread use of 
children in textiles, dress, mining, agriculture, domestic service, docks and navigation, 
metals, machinery and tools (Hendrick, 1990). Industrialisation introduced regularity and 
repetition to the work schedule on a day to day basis (i.e. no longer determined by the 
                                                                                      -
work (i.e. inasmuch as at one age one was at home and then at a later age at work, but also 
inasmuch as the factory constituted a particular locale of industrial labour). But also 
                                                                                           
own), the factory constructed a relation between child worker and supervisor which was 
distanced and impersonal (Cunningham, 2005: 89). The growth of the textile industries 
continued to draw on children within these new conditions of work. In some mills children 
under thirteen years of age constituted nearly half the workforce (Heywood, 2001: 131). In 
the textile industry both girls                                                                 
work. By and large the work conducted by children was ancillary and many worked in 
assistance to adults (Heywood, 2001: 131). Historians have argued that during the period of 
industrialisation in Europe and the USA, children constituted a significant source of labour. 
This also meant though that children constituted a source of competition for work within 
families (i.e. fathers, mothers and children all competing for the same work (Heywood, 
2001: 130)). 279 
 
Many commentators have talked about the exploitation and the brutal conditions in 
which the children worked and particular industries, such as textiles, mining and chimney 
sweeping, have figured largely in popular contemporary imagination as sites of concern. 
Many of these commentators assume that the natural innocence of the child would have 
disclosed the harshness of these conditions to all that were willing to look. But the reality 
was that children were conceived very differently.  Moreover, it is precisely as a 
consequence of those campaigns in the nineteenth century over the working conditions of 
children that our understanding of the child and childhood has changed. As Harry Hendrick 
argues: 
In campaigning to restrain this form of child labour, reformers were in effect 
arguing about the direction of industrialization, the meaning of progress, and 
the kind of childhood necessary for a civilized and Christian community. 
(Hendrick, 1990: 40) 
Over the course of the nineteenth century there were a series of pieces of legislation in 
E                                                                                  T     
Factory, and other, Acts aimed to reduce the number of hours children worked, to place 
lower age limits regarding particular industries, to delimit the types of work performed by 
                                                                         F                     
Factory Act prohibited children under 9 years from working, the 1840 Act prohibited 
children from chimney-sweeping and the 1842 Mines Act prohibited children under 10 years 
and women from working underground in the mines. There were similar acts of legislation 
across Europe and the USA at this time (Heywood, 2005: 141-2). The factory acts were not 
necessarily productive forms of state intervention (Heywood, 2005: 121-2). Campaigns 
against child labour drew on the support and slogans of anti-slavery campaigners; banners 280 
 
at demonstrations, for example,             N                   H                    But the 
campaigns and acts of legislation were not intended to abolish child labour; campaigns were 
not based on the banishment of all child labour, but only on certain forms of it (Heywood, 
2005: 135). Diane Gittins has argued that we also need to consider that the campaigns 
against child labour were against public forms of labour and not those based in the home. 
She states that: 
It was primarily public labour (or labour that was seen as such) that concerned 
                                                                                
household was left uncriticised, uninvestigated, because that realm was defined 
as sacrosanct by the middle classes themselves. Such views largely let the middle 
                                                                      
exploitation of young girls as servants. (Gittins, 1998: 64) 
Some employers looked to some of the factory acts as intending to provide them with a 
better quality of labour (Heywood, 2005: 141). There is also evidence that the decline of 
                          starts to occur before legislation (Heywood, 2005: 140). In the 1900 
US Census, 1 in 6 children between 10 to 15 years old were identified as working. Zelizer 
                                                                                             
children who worked for parents on farms and in textiles before and after school (Zelizer, 
1994: 56). By the 1930s the number of children working had dropped dramatically. Zelizer 
considers a whole set of possible structural reasons for the decline of childre            
work including: (i) growing demand for skilled labour, hence children in schools; (ii) rising 
incomes, so no need for child labour; (iii) rise in standard of living, so families could afford to 
keep children at school; (iv) institutionalisation of family wage, thus father earned enough 
for whole family; (v) new cheap labour due to increase in immigration, hence children not 281 
 
competitive and thus social problem of their presence addressed in terms of putting them in 
schools; and (vi) new technologies at work replaced the jobs that children did (Zelizer, 1994: 
62-3). 
A                                                                                      B   
rather than see a direct correlation between the two, as if the campaigns against one might 
be seen as linked to campaigns for the other, sociologists and historians point to the 
broader social, cultural and political mobilisation of an emerging ideology of childhood. 
Hendricks, for example, argues that: 
The campaign to reclaim the factory child for civilization was one of the first 
steps in what might be described as the construction of a universal childhood. 
T                                                                            
           H                 -2) 
And Zelizer argues that child labour reformers held a sentimental view of the child and it 
was the mobilisation of this image of childhood that is significant; it was not an issue of 
                                work (Zelizer, 1994: 57). She argues that the struggle between 
reformers                       conflicting and often ambiguous cultural definitions of 
what constituted acceptable work for children. New boundaries emerged, differentiating 
legitimate from illegitimate forms of economic participation by children  (Zelizer, 1994: 58). 
She states that it was the boundary between legitimate work and illegitimate work centred 
on whether the work was a form of exploitation (Zelizer, 1994: 58). In relation to England, 
Hendrick argues that: 
In opposition to laissez-faire capitalism, there could be found the Romantic 
image of childhood which opposed the unremitting debasement of children 
through long hours, unhealthy conditions, corporal punishment, and sexual 282 
 
harassment. But there was a conflicting perception of children, which also 
opposed their economic exploitation. This emanated from the combined (and 
often contradictory) influences of Evangelical opinion about human nature, the 
                                                                                 
political behaviour of the working class. It saw the brutalisation (including 
alleged precocious sexual awareness) of children as contributing to the 
dehumanization of a social class and, therefore, was to be avoided. (Hendrick, 
1990: 41) 
But there was certainly not a clear division between child labour reformers, interested in the 
welfare of the young, and capitalist bosses, only interested in profit. Zelizer quotes 
Reverend Dunne in the Chicago News                                                     
curse instead of a blessing to those compelled to earn their bread by the sweat of their 
                 )                -7). If children worked, then they would not be tempted 
by the sins of idleness, of crime and poverty. In contrast those wanting to bring in reforms 
were, according    )                                                                           
(Zelizer, 1994: 72). The campaign for the useless child, as Zelizer typifies it, was also 
concerned with the valuation of children in terms of their affective labour, domesticated 
and familial. 
 
Fordism, Post-Fordism and Post-Industrial Labour  
I                                                                                       
                                                                         B                    
inter                                                                                 
school and that wonder how the shortfall of their contribution to economic value was made 283 
 
up after they left the labour market. Some of that discussion has turned to the type of social 
and economic formation that was emerging in the twentieth century and to the centrality of 
schooling to that formation. Nick Lee, in his theoretical discussion of children in the context 
of dependence/independence and completeness/incompleteness,                             
                                                                                             
                                                                                      
relations between states and their population within which children are understood to have 
                                        L           -6). In making this connection between 
                                                    L                                 
correlation between sociological accounts of state formation (particularly forms of 
statehood in the global North in the twentieth century) and dominant theories of childhood 
socialisation and psychological development. Thus the structural functionalism of Talcott 
Parsons is able to be seen alongside the work of Jean Piaget, but also theories of socio-
economic organisation and statehood. Lee discusses the latter in terms of theories of 
Fordism, namely the form of socio-economic organisation and regulation that takes its name 
from the organisation of work in the construction of Ford motor cars in the early twentieth 
century and its relation to capitalist development. Fordism is understood in terms of the 
development of a system of mass production, such that the products built were 
standardised                                                                T                    
of efficiency (i.e. division of labour and specialisation), the assembly line and economies of 
scale. Economic efficiencies and higher relative productivity meant that workers could be 
rewarded with high relative wages. Higher spending power afforded through mass 
production pushed mass consumerism. The workers with higher wages were able to afford 
the mass produced products (and not only motor cars, but electrical goods, food items, and 284 
 
so on). Mass media and mass advertising developed alongside in order to showcase the new 
products available. Commentators talk about the virtuous circle of mass production and 
mass consumption in terms of the stabilisation of economic and social relations through a 
form of mass politics and democracy (i.e. political parties representing the masses of people 
constitute a system within which relations between capital and labour are stabilised through 
both management and union representation) (Hall and Jacques, 1989). Workers once in 
work could stay in a job for life, live in a gendered divided family for life and vote for the 
same political party for life. Fordism was seen to provide stability, stable hierarchical large-
scale organisation and stable industrial or bureaucratic masculinity. Lee sees long-term 
marriage as Fordist and Parsons is seen to offer a sociological account of its stability in terms 
                                                                                            
order, and a gendered division of labour, with women as mothers and housewives. The 
developmental Fordist state was seen to constitute a stable system for the male labouring 
subject and the socialisation of children (Lee, 2001: 15). Of course, such a system required 
specialised forms of labour. There needed to be not only a division of managers and 
workers, but also the training of labour in order that they could work as skilled workers 
making cars, electrical goods and so on.  Mass education, then, becomes a prerequisite of 
the Fordist state. And, as mentioned earlier, it allows for the accumulation of knowledge 
and technical expertise as one of the engines of growth and technological progress. 
Lee points to sociological thought which looks at how the system of Fordism has 
undergone a decline in the West from the 1970s onward. Post-Fordism is typified not by 
mass production and mass consumption, but by flexible specialisation, niche products, 
service economy, and forms of cultural economy. Where Fordism constituted a form of 
industrialisation, post-Fordism is seen as dependent on the new technologies of 285 
 
computerisation. From the developments of technology in the 1970s and 1980s firms are 
able to build not simply a range of standardised products, but a huge diversity of different 
products. In car manufacturing, for example, computer technology allowed cars to be built 
by robots in such a way that a different car, with a slightly different specification could be 
made with only a slight readjustment to the computer programme. Instead of massification, 
flexibility and segmentation typify post-Fordist socio-economic organisation. For Lee, post-
Fordism is significant in terms of how it allows us to understand changes in family forms and 
the break-up of the traditional patriarchal family. For Lee this is understood in terms of a 
major transformation in intimacy and systems of parenting for children. He argues that 
                                                                                       
                                                        -identity now remain open to change. It 
                                                                                                   
                     L               F   L                                    -Fordism, is no 
                                                                                       
                                                                            C            
now dictated by uncertainty and ambiguity (Lee, 2001: 19). 
Jens Qvortrup has significantly has argued that children are locked into the systemic 
nature of economic production. He                                                     
basically always had a correspondence to the prevailing forms of production: they have a 
system immanent          Q                H                                        
                                  Q                Q                                           
                                                                                    elates 
this with a shift in the dominant mode of economic production. His argument is based on 
changes in Europe and the USA, although this is never stated explicitly. He argues that 286 
 
 economic development in general has entailed a movement from manual activities to 
abstract or symbolic activities corresponding to a movement from producing use values to 
                                                                   Q                A  
such, he argues, it is obvious that under economic conditions which favour abstract 
reasoning and symbolic labour, children would be obliged to do similar things, namely 
                             H                                 I                              
the classroom labour ceased; rather it was that its nature changed from being essentially 
                                  H                    M                                 
subjects, Hendrick argues, education does not just get done to children, as if they were 
passive recipients, rather (through their mental and sometimes physical effort) children 
                                              H                    M         Q        
                                                                                       
would not survive. Children, though, are not properly compensated for such labour. In pre-
                      Q                                                                pater 
familias, whereas in modern industrial and post-industrial societies this responsibility is now 
in the hands of the state. Children have no control nor any claim over any revenue earned 
from that decision. The state decides the obligatory tasks of children (i.e. what constitutes 
                                                                                     
economy. In addition, Qvortrup argues, the demands of a modern economy are such that 
the training of a labour force takes time. He refers to this in terms of there being a 
                                 Q                                                     
become economically useless once they are no longer employed in the factory and find 
themselves at school. Rather the new economic rationale and organisation of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century has demanded that children become constructed as 287 
 
a different kind of resource and shaped as a different kind of capacity. Of course, it was the 
family which bore the brunt of the loss of income from children no longer directly working. 
B             Q                                                         o recover that loss 
through the temporal delay in the system and the facilitation of national insurance and 
pensions through the state (Defert, 1991), inasmuch, that is, that schooling and social 
insurance as mediated and managed by the state are the twin poles of the Fordist 
state/society settlement and both work toward the growth, circulation and maintenance of 
human capital as temporally ordered. 
The work of David Oldman provides an important backdrop to these discussions. His 
                                                                                          
two distinct classes, namely as social categories of people defined through their economic 
antagonism to each other and inasmuch as adults benefit as a class from the exploitation of 
children as a class (Oldman, 1994: 154). Children growing up, Oldman argues, produces 
human capital for children (not only through the school, but on the street and at home), but 
also the process of growing up provides adults, through their labour for children (or 
               O                                            T                                
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries constitutes a process, not of welfare, but of 
exploitation (Oldman, 1994: 155). Oldman refers to the class relations between children and 
                                                                                           
                                                                                           
through market relations and relations between capital and labour) and a patriarchal mode 
of production (i.e. as constituted through gendered relations of power and exploitation in 
the domestic economy). But each mode of production is articulated with the other and 
works toward the social reproduction of each other (Oldman, 1994: 165). Although some of 288 
 
                            Q                                                                 
   O                                    a priori structurally controlled by adults and it is 
only by virtue of that initial control that adults are seen to be able to exploit children, 
namely to extract the surplus value of their labour and to accumulate that capital at the 
expense of child workers (Oldman, 1994: 163). 
There is a big question though as to whether what Qvortrup and Oldman in their 
                                                                                              
to a different discussion about children and childhood as a site of adult productivity and 
investment and the growth of human capital, but no                             A        
Q                                                                                            
siblings or other relatives, and so on) or helping in a family business or doing paper rounds 
and so on as a minor factor in                                                              
significance of that labour (Morrow, 1994). Karen Wells refers to this form of labour in 
                               W             C                                                 
status and                                                                                  
globally across North and South. Children are involved in helping elderly parents and smaller 
children; they tend the animals; and they clean the house. This kind of work is often low 
paid or not paid at all. It is domestic work that is often seen to exist outside the capitalist 
economy (Wells, 2009: 101). 
Before concluding this section, we should consider a slightly different understanding 
of modern forms of labour and consider the role of children therein. Social and political 
theory, originally emerging from Italy in the context of workerist movements in the 1970s, 
talked about the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s (due to the oil crisis and the international 
economic crisis) and its reorganisation as post-Fordism in terms not simply of the 289 
 
transformation of markets (from mass to segmented) or the impact of computer technology 
or the role of new communications technology in facilitating globalisation, but of the power 
of labour in bringing about, but also within, these new conditions inasmuch as these new 
conditions afforded new forms of affective, communicational and collective labour. Antonio 
Negri and Michael Hardt, for example in their works Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004), 
argue that the world of work now is not that of the manual worker working in the factory, 
but the immaterial social worker whose labour takes place as much at home as in the office, 
on the internet as much as face-to-face, and with colleagues from across the world as much 
as fellow workers in the same office building. Whereas for Marx, they argue, labour and the 
extraction of surplus value from labour was understood in terms of a measurable labour 
understood in relation to measurable labour time, the cutting edge social, economic and 
cultural developments mean that labour cannot be understood in such measurable terms. 
Instead, they argue, the extraction of surplus value needs to be understood in the context of 
the collective life of productive subjects. In conditions of post-Fordism, it is the whole life of 
workers   their bodies and their biographies   that is seen as the basis upon which 
exploitation occurs. But, although this sounds very totalising and pessimistic, Hardt and 
Negri argue that it is precisely because of these conditions that labour is able to resist and to 
creatively and productively bring about change. Information technology allows workers to 
collectively mobilise new lines of connection across life and capital and to facilitate new 
forms of political alignment and articulation. The precarious working patterns and working 
                                                                                    
                                                                          G        P    , 2008: 
3). This new workforce is understood primarily in terms of its communicative and emotional 290 
 
                 H         N                                                              
immanent global sociality.  
Although not without difficulties and problems, the work of Hardt and Negri and 
                                                                             C          
communicational and affective labour   which many (following Zelizer) have understood in 
                                      uselessness   might be seen as a site of productivity 
not inasmuch as childhood constitutes a site of human capital investment, but inasmuch as 
                                                                                           
might be seen to constitute different aspects of a single form of biopolitical productivity. 
T                                               )                                            
                                                                                          
value (Zelizer, 1994: 212). But we would need to add to the equation the more general 
affective labour performed by children in the familial economy, inasmuch as family 
happiness constitutes a central signifier of the modern economy, and also the labour of 
children in the presentation of their bodies for the extraction of exchange value (e.g. 
through the circulation of their photographic, film and other forms of image). If the 
                                                                                   the office, 
the shop floor or the factory, then children through their activities and through their very 
bodies might be seen to deliver such economic value. Immaterial production, for Hardt and 
Negri is defined in terms of its cooperative and social nature. It concerns the production of 
relationships and of things in common. Moreover, they argue, these social things are not 
consumed and used up, rather they increase with use. This is not to say that capitalism does 
not expropriate that which is common. Of course it does; it tries to put that which is 
common into the hands of private owners. 291 
 
T                                                                                      
labour in the twentieth and twenty-                 H         N                   post-
F                                                                                   
productivity, their abstracted labour and their collectivity but not in a manner that reduces 
these to a question of social class. For Hardt and Negri, the production of a global common 
does not derive from a new economic class. Hardt and Negri instead use the term 
                                                                                             
about class in terms of identity (i.e. in terms of what is to be included or excluded from a 
                                                                                    H         N     
talk about the multitude in terms of a collection of singularities which, they argue, cannot 
be reduced to a single identity (i.e. in our case to childhood as a class of persons defined 
through a unitary relation to either the social, the cultural or the economic). There are 
questions though as to whether it makes sense to refer to all emotional and cognitive 
activity as work and also, even if it were analytically feasible to do so, whether we can lump 
together all the different activities which could come under this heading as constitutive of 
the same kind of political subjectivity. Admittedly Hardt and Negri argue that these do not 
define a class identity but rather constitute the resources, as it were, through which people 
come together in all their differences. This then raises another set of issues regarding the 
extension of the categories of emotional and informational labour: either we are all 
emotional and informational workers by virtue of all activities being defined as such; or only 
some people by virtue of the kinds of activities they do (and whether these activities are 
paid) can be included in this category of emotional and informational labour. If the former, 
then the category seems analytically facile; if the latter, then the big question is how we 
understand divisions of people (as classes of people?) in the context of the distribution of 292 
 
those forms of labour and in                                             “                     
                                                           -industrial to industrial to post-
industrial. It would be a mistake to read this history as a model for understanding a 
geographical distribution of types of labour and work organisation, not least because it 
enframes a longstanding colonial ideology of development and progress. 
 
C          L          G      E       
C                                         unevenly distributed across class, gender and 
global geography. Much of the work conducted by children across the globe is agricultural 
and mostly done in the context of local family households. In Africa, for example, children 
tend to livestock and bring in the crops during harvest time. Some farming is commercial in 
coastal West Africa and the East African plateau (Canagarajah and Nielson, 2001). Similarly 
in Latin America most child labour is agricultural. Mexico has the highest rates globally for 
agricultural child labour and such labour remains largely within the family (Bey, 2003). 
Families provide a space for the training of labour and parents and older family members 
supervise that socialisation. The UNICEF report on T   S            W       C        (1997) 
considers children                                                                           
                                                                                                 
some more detrimental to child development than others. It states that 246 million children 
are engaged in child labour; 171 million of these children work in hazardous conditions (for 
example, working in mines or with chemicals); 300,000 children        as armed 
combatants; and 1.2 million children are trafficked every year. Child labour by region is as 
follows: in Asia and the Pacific there are 127.3 million children below 15 years of age (19% 
                            working; in Sub-Saharan Africa there are 48 million (29%) 293 
 
working; in Latin America and Caribbean, 17.4 million (16%) working; and in the Middle East 
and North Africa (15%) working  I                                      2.5 million children 
                                           2.4 million. The report is predicated on a 
                                ticulated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights for 
the Child (UNCRC). Article 32(1) of the Conventions states that: 
States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
                                                                                
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. (1989) 
William Myers has argued that this wording in the Convention needs to be seen in the 
                                                                                       
protection, and the globalisation of European models of childhood and understandings of 
work therein. He contrasts this wording in the UN Convention with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Minimum Age Convention (no. 138) of 1973, which sought to raise the 
minimum age of persons able to enter employment in keeping with an understanding of 
                                                                         T   ILO         
up in 1919 as an outcome of the Treaty of Versailles (after the First World War) and one of 
its main tasks was to work toward the abolition of child labour. Myers argues that the ILO 
                     E                                                                   
                               M                                                           
                                                                                      
development. Myers argues that successive ILO conventions on child labour were based on 
                                     E                                                
industrial work in urban areas, and recourse to the state as a means to alleviate problems of 294 
 
                   O                                                                      
labour legislation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Europe and the force of 
the law rather than other                                                                      
Hendricks and Zelizer argue are more significant). Nevertheless, Myers argues that the focus 
                                                                                      
countries, where child employment is overwhelmingly agricultural, where social welfare 
laws have relatively little impact on the everyday life of the poor, where labor inspection 
services tend to be precarious and corrupt, and where national governments have extreme 
difficulty extending full primary education coverage to the rural and urban periphery areas 
                                   M              -6). Moreover, Myers argues that 
Convention 138 was written partly in the context of protecting adult forms of labour from 
                                                                                     
contribution to the familial economy in developing countries. Very few non-Western 
countries signed up to the Convention until the end of the twentieth century when financial 
                                                            
The UNCRC Article 32, then, Myers agues is framed in the context of the whole 
                                                                                        
minimum age fo                                                                    
labour with the demand that children should be able to have a say in the governing of their 
       M                 B                          UNC‘C                                     
work per se                                                                              
and exploitative work. And it is in this context that the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour 
C                         T   C                                                            
forms of slavery, trafficking, bondage, compulsory labour, use of children in armed conflict, 295 
 
child prostitution, use of children for pornography, use of children in the illicit drugs trade or 
                                                    in which it is carried out, is likely to 
                                                C                           T               
Convention 182 in 1999 helped to properly cement a distinction across different forms of 
                                 riterion of harm. Thus, for example in the UNICEF report on 
T   S            W       C                             ork                work by children 
                                                                               labour      
work harmful to children                                                       rostitution  is 
defined as work clearly illegal and with no justification according to principles of social 
justice (see also Fyfe, 1993). 
T                                                                                     
a wide range of bonded activity done to and by children and notwithstanding this broad 
           C                                                                       labour is 
defined. Bonded labour includes, for example, children in Sierra Leone captured by rebel 
and government forces, made to carry arms or to provide sexual services for older troops. 
The definition also includes the trafficking of children from eastern Europe to western 
Europe for the sex trade industry, to work in brothels. It might also include the use of 
children working in poisonous hot conditions in the sulphur mines in Bolivia or children 
forced off the land to work in the coltan mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These 
very different, although often equally appalling forms of work, cannot be posed as if they 
constitute the antithesis of development and modern forms of society. On the contrary 
what these forms of labour indicate is the intimate and interconnected nature of modern 
social life and appalling forms of child labour. The fight over minerals in Africa (whether 
diamonds, oil, or metals such as coltan for mobile telephones), the development of the 296 
 
global sex industry (tourism, prostitution, film, and internet pay-to-abuse), but also the 
increasing and unstoppable demand for consumer goods (from refrigerators, cars, plastics, 
and so on) fuel forms of child labour, which is cheap, non-unionised and expendable in the 
global South. Although some of this process implies an increasing urbanisation of child 
labour, evidence also suggests that processes of development and modernisation lead to 
                                                                           K                 
There is a concern that focus on worst forms of child labour is set against best forms 
                                                                                             
as modern and enlightened, the former as an affront to childhood and the latter as a proper 
                                       I                                                        
                                                                                           
matches the development of the nation-state. Children in school constitute a form of capital 
                                              B                                    
understood in the context of the broader set of economic relations (multiscalar and at once 
local, regional and global), such that children                                               
of activity but only by the articulation of that activity within that broader set of economic 
           W                                                                              
contrast between work and school or work and leisure, such that work, schooled education 
and leisure are understood with regard to comparative value and human capital investment.  
Research by Stuart Aitken, Sylvia Lopez Estrada, Joel Jennings and Lina Maria Aguirre 
on children working as checkout packers in Tijuana supermarkets (Aitken et al, 2006) helps 
to set in context the complex economic, social and cultural relations across local and global 
spaces. The economic growth of Mexico has led to a movement of people from the 
countryside to the city and to the northern towns bordering the USA, including Tijuana. In 297 
 
the past many Mexican children would have learned how to labour (a phrase which the 
                    W                                                                   but 
increasingly this now takes place in the context of welfare institutions and schools. Poor 
children still contribute significantly to their family economic well-            M       
families are increasingly less likely to monitor the ways their children learn to labor because 
children increasingly divide the day among different spaces and away from other family 
          A                      -1). Aitken and his co-researchers look specifically at a 
government programme intended to support the supermarket packers called the 
Paidimenta Program. The programme was designed to help train children between the ages 
of 9 and 14 years in a culture of work, to facilitate academic  study, and to assist in the 
management of their money. Aitken et al consider the juggling of working at the 
supermarket, schoolwork, work in the family, and leisure time and they consider the 
movement of the children through the town from home to work to school and back again. 
Aitken et al discuss this in the context of the broader economic and social changes of the 
                                         T                T                           its 
physical and social landscape   is intimately entwined with global processes and children are 
caught up in, voluntarily participate in,                                     M             
economic changes over the last two decades have transformed grocery consumption in 
Tijuana, then so too have the lives of child packers at the supermarkets expanded spatially 
                             Aitken et al, 2006: 383). Children, by virtue of working, are able 
to leave the home and family and discover new parts of the city, to travel through the town 
on the minibus, and to meet new people. And their time becomes intensified through the 
mixing of different kinds of work at school, home and supermarket. In doing so, these 
children make themselves and are made in space, in a dynamic process which Aitken et al 298 
 
                           H     L                                                   I       
sense then, there is not a simple trade-off between school and work, as if one were better 
than, or substitutable with, the other, rather it is across different forms of labour that the 
children negotiate their identities as forms of geographical performance. 
 
Conclusion 
I                                                                                      
different modes of production (agrarian and mercantile, industrial and post-industrial). In 
doing so, the vestiges of earlier economic and social relations are not easily forgotten, but 
are increasingly  entangled in, on one level, an obvious uneven and unequal distribution of 
labour and accumulated capital and, on the other, a complex not easily unknotted. It would 
                                        bour either in terms of a moral response on the 
basis of an ideal and idealised child or on an equally simplistic model of historical 
development. For example, the transition from the image of the industrial working class as 
figured through forms of masculinity (the dirty overalls, the hard boots, the leathery and 
tarnished skin, the hard stoical and disciplined aggression, the early death) to the clean, 
cognitive, fresh-faced work of post-industrial global capital demonstrates a history of 
                as a gendered and ethnocentric global stereotype. What we know is that 
                                                                                               
scaling (across local, national and global) of demand and ideology. The recent campaigns 
about children working in India in the clothing industry does not stop the constant demand 
                                                                                           
in the Democratic Republic of Congo dictate the choice of mobile phones. 
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Chapter Twelve   Rights and Political Participation  
I               I                                                             
participation. Of course, although we might endow ceteris parabus any persons or even 
things with legal rights, not everyone or thing is deemed to have the capacity for political 
participation. We consider initially some of the philosophical and cultural history to the 
question of children as rights bearers and as political animals. We then consider how the 
capacity for modern rights and political participation is distributed unevenly across the 
                                                                                          
enshrined for example in the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
Finall                                                                                           
of national sovereignty, modern forms of governmentality and forms of political 
                            A  H      A                         “      W     W       ly 
with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become 
                                                    A                   T            
regarding children though is doubly confounded in that ordinarily the constitution of their 
very being (with regard to their infancy and lack of maturity) places them a priori outside of 
the both the political and global humanity. 
 
The Capacities of Children: Genealogies of the Family and the Political  
Didier Reynaert and his colleag                                                 
discourse since the adoption of the UNCRC has been preoccupied with highlighting the 
                                         ‘                           Y                    
                                etency with regard to their rights and their political 
participation has a much longer history. A key facet of that history has been the relation of 300 
 
children, with regard to their infancy or lack of maturity, to both reason and speech. The 
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle makes a distinction in the Politics between voice 
(     ) and speech (or language) (logos) inasmuch as voice is the noise of animals and 
speech is the articulation of reason by men within an organised political unit, namely the 
city-state (polis). Unlike bees, or other animals such as guinea pigs even, which are able to 
express signals as to whether they are in pain and perhaps even pleasure, men have speech 
(and not voice alone) and are able to articulate rights and wrongs, the good and the bad, 
and the safe and the harmful. The management of the household (oikos), which for 
Aristotle, is concerned with reproduction is qualitatively different from the organisation and 
management of the state (polis). Voice is that which resides in the household, but it is 
speech that is heard on the stage of masculine politics. In such a framing, politics is 
articulated in the public realm and concerns public affairs; in contrast the household 
concerns women and children and matters of reproduction. In such a framing, infants are 
those pre-adults who are literally without speech and who literally come before adulthood 
and language; but infancy also defines the state of those outside of politics, political 
organisation and political expression. To be a citizen then implied being a man, having 
freedom and governing oneself accordingly; it did not include women, children or slaves. 
Moreover, the government of the state implied an equality and similarity among free men. 
Much has changed since the fourth century BCE, but equally there are many continuities 
regarding how we conceptualise the political as logocentric (or overly rational) and how we 
                                                                                     -
                       al, non-logocentric forms of expression and organisation.  
John Eekelaar in a paper from 1986 provides an account of the emergence of 
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relation to, initially, patria potestas and then parental rights. In the past children were seen 
very much as the property of the father and, latterly, both parents. Even in cases, for 
                                                                                          
very much in terms of their threatening other people (i.e. inasmuch as the failure of a father 
to look after his child may then lead to the harming of others). Moreover, in cases where 
the father was wanting to claim possession of his child and the court refused on the basis 
                                                                        E                    
                                                                                                
well-being was seriously threatened (Eekelaar, 1986: 168). And yet Eekelaar states 
                                                                                              
                                                                                        
                                               (Eekelaar, 1986: 168). The interests of the 
child thus emerge in relation to perceived community and societal interests. In this sense, 
the protection of children was in the first instance the protection of society. It is only once 
the correlation of these                                 E                                
                              H                                                            
interests, developmental interests and autonomy interests. The first he understands in 
            al physical, emotional and intellectual care within the social capabilities of his 
                                          E                                              
     C            Y     P       A                                                    life if 
                                   avoidably prevented or neglected or his health is being 
avoidably impaired or neglected or he is being ill-treated                                 
control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes an                   E         
1986: 171). As this legislation is directed to minimal protection rather than positive care, 302 
 
Eekelaar considers this in terms of basic interests. In contrast, developmental interests refer 
to the positive facilitation of a chil                                                         
that they are not disadvantaged disproportionately. Eekelaar discuss these in the context of 
    M               F      P           A                                                    
should be given to the welfare of children interests, and in terms of the House of Lords 
ruling regarding a divorce case, Richards v Richards                                     
                                                                                          
in                     T   H        L                                                   
                                       I                                                      
                                        C        A                                    
                                                   E                     E                 
this in terms of the broader political climate at the time around the rights of fathers with 
respect to divorce proceedings. The interests of children in divorce were thus seen to 
provide mothers in divorce cases with an advantage over the fathers and as The Times on 7
th 
January 1983 remonstrated   “                                                            
considerations?... The requirements of justice to the family as a whole may not always 
                                                                           E               
176). Finally, Eekelaar discusses autonomy interests in the context of the legal case of a 
mother, Victoria Gillick, taking to court her local health authority (Gillick v Wisbech and 
Norfolk Area Health Authority, 1985). Gillick had argued that proscribing contraception to a 
person under sixteen years old was akin to encouraging sex with a minor and that such 
medical treatment would be treatment without consent as vested in the parent. The 
significant outcome of the Law Lords was that which came from the wording of Lord 
Scarman, who stated that:  As a matter of Law the parental right to determine whether or 303 
 
not their minor child below the age of sixteen will have medical treatment terminates if and 
when the child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what 
            . Eekelaar                                                                        
cannot be over-        Eekelaar, 1986: 181). In the context of the UK, the Children Act of 
                                                                        I           
paramountcy principle (i.e. that the welfare of the child is paramount) central in legal and 
state dealings with children (for example in divorce cases) and it also introduced limits on 
state intervention into the family with respect to notions of significant harm to the child. In 
addition to welfare rights, the Act made provision for                                       
their having a say about, for example, which parent they live with or their refusing medical 
or psychiatric examination (Roche, 2002). The extent to which these interests dominate 
                                      he extent to which they are underpinned by broader 
dynamics of social change have provided the very rich terrain of sociological discussion in 
this area. 
U      B                  D                                   )                      
dynamism of polit                                                                     
151) and, as such, is part of the mix that is changing the nature of contemporary society. In 
the paper he is particularly concerned with how this relates to the process of 
detraditionalisation in modern societies, namely how traditional forms of authority (e.g. 
regarding church, factory, and family) no longer have the hold they once did. He asks what 
this might mean for the family and how this can be understood in terms of a process of 
de               I              B                                                       
understood with reference to patriarchal and paternal authority, namely in the context of a 
notion of the patria potestas. As we saw in chapter six, many authors from the 1970s 304 
 
                                                                                       
shaped by a contestation of patria potestas. Thus, for example, whether we look to Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Donzelot or to Christopher Lasch and others, it is clear that the 
           (and I use this term, as does Beck, very broadly here) of children in the home are 
seen to be a consequence of the realignment of authority across family and state and the 
distribution of new forms of authority and expertise. Beck though wants to add some doubt 
                                                                                           
participation. He does so by doubting that inner freedoms translate simply into political 
freedoms, that the idea of freedom simply becomes an actuality without the provision of 
state resources, and that freedom as enshrined in legal statute does not always become 
practiced as social action. But Beck is also keen to point to a distinction between a 
                    -                                         -                              
these carry a spirit and actualisation of democratisation which cannot simply be tethered to 
an understanding of the fixed, natural and ontologically rooted rights and freedoms of 
particular groups of                                                                             
        I                                      B                                            
recourse to such fixed forms of social identity. The current context, then, is defined, on the 
                                                                                                 
are tied to the statutory laws of the nation-state, but on the other, by social forms of 
                                                                are open and, as it were, 
detraditional (Beck, 1997: 160-1). 
B                                                                         children are 
                                       : 161). But he points to Swedish social democratic 
family policy as exceptional in that it has provided children with a series of entitlements, not 305 
 
                                                            It is this, Beck declares, which is 
                                                -determined life are even enforced against the 
                           : 162). In such circumstances, where the state intervenes in order 
to facilitate the right of the child to a life of their own, the distinction between private and 
public, between oikos and polis, is surpassed; this zone of indistinction is discussed by Beck 
                                                : 162). What Beck describes here in the 
context of Sweden is to be seen more broadly spread across different national contexts. In 
                             such biographisation opens up new spaces which often reveal 
                                                                                     
                      A                           B                  one framing of a more 
general debate about                                                               have 
seen in chapter six in wide ranging research from the social theory of Anthony Giddens to 
the empirically focussed work of Carol Smart on children in situations of divorce to Sonia 
Livings                                           
The construction of young people in terms of their right to their life implies, Beck 
argues, that moral authority becomes individualised, not such that individualisation is an 
external imposing process, but rather such that it is something that young people do to 
themselves. Moral authority is not something controlled by the church or the state, but by 
individuals themselves. We also see the process of individualisation, Beck argues, not 
imposed upon young people, but as something which they do to themselves: 
  B                                                                                         
A                                                                     g and self-
                     : 163). Moreover, he adds, young people are not socialised, but rather 
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(1997: 163). For Beck this implies not the end of the social, but rather peer groups, media, 
schooling, family and so on are seen as resources, not enforced functionally-defined facets 
                   B                          -                            W          nt to 
be more cautious though in our interpretation of these processes. Certainly, what Donzelot 
and Lasch would add to this is that the process of deprivatisation and the role of the state 
therein are more significant inasmuch as they have provided the initial supports and 
infrastructures for these processes of biographisation. The intervention of social workers, 
medics, and many others into the home in the late nineteenth century and twentieth 
century has provided an infrastructure which both contests the patria potestas and gives 
the child both voice and life. Importantly, the cultural forms of biography have been 
provided in the context of the state; the prisons, welfare services, and other institutions 
have construed the child in the context of their life history within a case study (Foucault, 
1977; Tagg, 1988). And in this sense, the provision of voice, individuality and biography have 
been closely correlated with the growth of the modern state and its means of discipline, 
surveillance and government. 
The focus on biographisation as a more ambivalent infrastructured process helps to 
                                                                                           
            T                               A                                                    
refers to those, ordinarily adults, who act in accordance with overall welfare for the child. 
Unlike older conceptions of the child as a property of the father, the protectionist thesis is 
governed by an understanding of those acting in the best interests of the child, such that the 
act of protection does not imply that the child is the legal property of the adult nor that the 
child does not have any individuality or agency. Protectionism is not set against the 307 
 
autonomy or freedom of the child, it simply states that the child does not always know or 
act in its own best interests and that a higher authority should, and is able to, act on behalf 
of the child. This welfarist conceptualisation of the child also is linked to the rise of the child 
as a developmental subject (i.e. by virtue of their lack of reason, experience and awareness 
the child is unable to act fully on their own behalf). In this thesis authority is distributed 
unevenly and children, by virtue of their lack of maturity, are able to be denied authority 
with regard to their own lives. In that respect, although protectionism may be seen 
positively in terms of, for example, parents providing children with a safe environment in 
which to grow and learn (i.e. a space free from intruders and dangers), such protectionism 
                                                                                               
to author their own actions. 
In the 1970s                                                                         
facilitation, but of incarceration and control. This criticism of protectionism can be 
understood in terms of a liberationist discourse. This discourse often sat alongside anti-
psychiatry criticism of the family as a site of schizophrenic production and feminist critiques 
of the patriarchal family. Thus, Shulamith Firestone in The Dialectic of Sex, originally 
published in 1970, drew on the work of Aries, not simply to argue for the emergence of a 
new conception of childhood, but to argue that the institutionalisation of childhood 
constituted a form of segregation. She argued that those who talked about childhood as an 
                                                                                        
                                                          Firestone makes an analogy 
between women and children:  In every society to date there has been some form of the 
biological family and thus there has always been oppression of women and children to 
varying deg      (1971: 73). F                                                              308 
 
                                                                                          
complex ways that we will be unable to speak of the liberation of women without also 
discussing the liberation of children and                           Moreover, she argues that: 
 I                                                                               
because children of every class are lower class, just as women have always been. 
The rise of the m                                                                  
noose around the already economically dependent group by extending and 
reinforcing what had been only a brief dependence, by the usual means: the 
development of a special ideology, of a special indigenous life style, language, 
                        A                                                    
                                                                           
Women and children are now in the same lousy boat. Their oppressions began 
to reinforce one another. (1971: 89) 
The liberation of children, then, was seen alongside other social and political struggles (see 
Oakley, 1994). The rights of children are seen in terms of the overthrowing of an oppressive 
and exploitative regime. 
Richard Farson and John Holt similarly draw on Aries to understand modern 
childhood as a social institution. The institution of             is seen as a walled-garden, 
but one which constitutes the segregation and also imprisonment of children. The practices 
which are seen to make up the institution of childhood are thus critiqued on the basis that 
they constitute forms of control and dominance. The timetable and scheduling of school 
classroom, activities are seen as controlling and so too are practices of parental care and 
love within the family. Central to the liberationist discourse was an understanding of the 
child as an autonomous and rational agent able to freely make decisions about their own 309 
 
lives. As such, divisions between adults and children on the basis of developmental 
indicators were pushed aside and the rights of children were in large part framed in terms of 
permitting children to do what they had been denied from doing (i.e. adding them to those 
spaces from which they had been subtracted). Thus, H                                   
                                                                                                  
He argues that these rights would include: right to equal treatment under the law; right to 
vote; right to legal responsibility; right to work; right to privacy; right to financial 
independence; right to manage o     education; right to freedom of movements and 
habitation; right to equal receipt of state services; right to form and enter into relationships; 
right to do what an adult can do (Holt, 1975: 15-16). These declarations were associated 
with various other programmatic statements, declarations, such as The Little Red 
Schoolbook (1971), and experimental social forms, many of which found their origins in 
early twe                                                    A “ N                      
experiment Summerhill in which children were not told to attend lessons and could follow 
their own learning path. The late 1960s and early 1970s was also a time in which young 
people were engaged in school strikes and councils, counter-cultural protests, public cases 
such as the Oz trial which purported to contest ideas about young people and sexuality, and 
other innovative forms of political engagement. Liberationist discourses relied on an earlier 
romanticism (found for example in Rousseau, but also the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century romantic poets) and as such the simple statement that a liberationist thesis is based 
on the conceptualisation of children as subjects of rational choices needs to be attenuated 
with the foregrounding of children as romantic irrational and natural subjects. More broadly 
the discourse of liberation was linked, through writers such as Marcuse and others, with a 
certain reading of Freud and psychoanalysis regarding sexuality, the unconscious and the 310 
 
repression of the father and society (i.e. the individual as both conscious and unconscious, 
as a being whose                                                               
polymorphous sexuality is seen to be the essential character of their individual being).  
Although children are constructed in a liberationist discourse as having competency with 
regard to political and life decisions, they are also, inasmuch as there is a genealogical 
connection with romanticism, often seen as innocent. It would be a mistake, then, to 
assume that a liberationist discourse constitutes a single philosophical statement regarding 
                   O                                                                          
whi                                                                                        
with regard to their authority in authorising their actions and lives. In that sense, what is 
significant is less the proclamations of autonomy, than the detailed attempt to recodify 
                                                   Hence drug taking and sexual activity might 
                                                                                  T    
process of recodification is not a political platform of children, but largely of adults; its 
                                                              lives. Moreover, this process of 
recodification was intended to conceptualise children as having agency and biographies 
outside of the family and domestic household (but in such a way that is not in a 
straightforward manner governed by the state). The opposition between liberation and 
protection is a false opposition inasmuch as both constitute forms of refiguration of 
                                           (and powers of authorship) with respect to those 
biographies. Individualisation is not set against a discourse of welfare, but rather both 
constitute two aspects of modern forms of biopolitical governmentality. 
If we are to understand the processes of biographisation in the context of the 
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these processes are mediated, but also how those forms of mediation have been significant 
factors in the emergence of children as authors of their own lives and experiences. It is 
                 I                                                                        
political rights are caught up in a series of questions about the distribution of authority and 
the capacity for authorshi                                                               
those persons can do, but in terms of how those acts are authored and authorised. In this 
                                                                                            
rights and                                                                                    
From the mid- to late-                                                             
experiences can not only be discussed by adults inquiring as to the nature of this type of 
personhood (something that has happened certainly since the ancients), but rather can 
become the site in which children themselves can reflect on themselves and give voice to 
themselves. In 1744 A Little Pretty Pocket-Book was published by John Newbery (Darton, 
1982). From 1752 to 1800 eleven periodicals were published for the young of England 
 D               A      E              U“                                                    
Although the magazines, novels and fairy tales were often guided by a moral demand for 
improvement, they offered young people perspectives that were largely absent in the past. 
Young people were subjects of narrative, rather than the objects of prose. Young people 
engaged in the pages of these works not simply with adults, but with other young people. 
The young were given character and voice. Dialogues were held between the young. 
Whatever the authority of the adult author, a centripetal force had emerged in the context 
of that authority. A dialogic space for children pulled against a historic adult monologism 
(Thacker and Webb, 2002). The emergence and development of a domain of literary 
experience for children was predicated on an ability to move from a stage of illiteracy to 312 
 
literacy, from infancy to childhood. Far from being, as Neil Postman (1994) has argued, a 
means of differentiating adulthood from childhood, literacy and literary culture for children 
  and hence the emergence of a cultural medium that makes visible children as a collective 
experiential subject - is made possible only because children have access to a world of 
                                                                                                
                                           T                                                    
communication, a medium through which the collective experiences of children can be 
made intelligible and, importantly, presents children as having not only voice, but 
determining agency with respect to events and other people (i.e. to put it crudely, children 
in                                                                                      
T              B                                                                             
control of their biographies and their correlation with the democratic, it is clear that the 
                                                                                             
occurs historically much earlier, certainly by the late nineteenth century. Of course, the 
                                                         he course of the twentieth 
                                           and latterly the internet importantly contribute to 
the cultural forms through which children are made visible as agents with the power to live 
through and determine people and events and extend the range of media through which 
children are seen not only to have a voice, but to be subjects both with a singular set of 
experiences and with speech. 
I                                                                              
individual. To construct children as a collectively defined experiential subject and to 
construct them with speech is to construct them in conditions of dialogue, claim and 
counter-claim, and authority and counter-authority. Namely, to say that children have 313 
 
speech is not to root them with fixed identities, interests and capacities, rather it is to open 
their being to others, but also to allow them to undo the claims that others have had of 
them in formation of dialogue; it is precisely to consider children in terms of speech and 
counter-        T                                                                        of 
children within a democratic political community imply the inscription of children with voice 
and agency (i.e. as the recognition or endowment of an ontological competency). On the 
contrary, the significance of presenting children with speech is that they are constructed 
                                                      J       ‘                          
                    N                          imes called, is not on the basis of existing and 
pre-defined interests and identity. To construe children as subjects of speech is not to 
constitute them with a prior identity (or community or sense of belonging), rather their 
speech raises their identity as a matter of disagreement, a matter which is not simply 
         T                                                                                  
citizenship, but to look at the resources deployed with respect to rights and the democratic 
and to position children as a problem therein. Rights are always a form of defence, as 
Ranciere also argues; they are insisted on and performed only inasmuch as they are not 
purely formal, but draw on the substantive differences now assumed within the domain of 
the political. In this sense, children (with respect to their infancy or maturity) cannot be 
seen in terms of either the imposition of an adult-centric or a child-centric model of rights 
and the democratic (Jans, 2004). To talk about children as rights-bearers then implies the 
                                                                                               
Foucauldian sense of a field of power, knowledge and subjectivity). In the context of 
children, this also implies a questioning of the status of speech as the vehicle, medium and 314 
 
logos                                                                                   
language. 
The question of political competency inasmuch as it has been defined in terms of 
organised speech raises the fundamental problem of those denied membership of a political 
community on the basis of their incapacity. Patricia Alderson has notably raised this issue 
regarding the rights of infants and babies, particularly in the context of their capacity to 
consent to medical treatment (Alderson, 1993 and 2000). Alderson, for example, although 
                                                                                              
                                                                                           
Through this simple format she raises the significant question of how to consider those 
                                                        “                                  
child may be too young or too sick to share verbally in making health-care decisions, yet 
                                                                       A               
123). She gives an example of a child of six who after the failure of her first two liver 
transplants became distressed and resistant. Her parents interpreted this and refused a 
                          T                    A                                             
assumed that words are the only genuine way to communicate, body language is mistrusted 
as vague and misleading. Yet words too can be misleading or confusing. Bodies can be the 
source of profound knowledge, when children learn through their illness and disability, and 
                                A                     T              A                       
area, requires us to consider a radical rethinking of what constitutes, for example, the 
                                                                  A                I            
        “      K                                                                        
children under six years of age, both abled and disabled, in educational, medical and health 315 
 
care contexts, considers the fundamental ambiguities at the heart of human communication 
(Komulainen, 2007). Alderson implicitly assumes the transparency of communication 
between adult and child and assumes that better understanding vis-a-vis non-verbal 
communication or childish expression is able to come about through political will, ethical 
sensibility and greater knowledge. However, Komulainen questions the very basis of such 
transparency of communication between adults and children in such a manner that the 
                                                                                         -
verbal expression works on the basis of their rational and reasoned communication akin to 
verb                                  K                                                  
                                              K                                             
should be seen as a point of departure and investigation instead of an assumed endpoint for 
the individual child with reason, interests and political will.   
The sociology of childhood certainly supports, but also raises significant problems 
                                                                                             nd 
competencies. Michael Freeman has argued that we should shift our emphasis from 
                                                                                        I      
former is tied up in questions about the capacities and competencies of children, then the 
                                                                                              
             ‘                                                                           
                                          T                 ugh whether a shift towards 
                                                                                              
                                                                                          
protection; or to pose this in classical terms there is a question as to the extent which this 
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within the context of reproduction, rather than the political; what is at stake is precisely the 
rethinking of both. 
 
T   U                   C          ‘          H            NGO  
On the 20
th November 1989 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted its 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Framed as a series of 54 articles, the 
Convention constituted a legal document now signed by all represented nations of the 
United Nations and ratified by all except the USA. The Convention comes out of the history 
                                                                               League of 
Nations, Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1924 and the United Nations Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child in 1959. Significant also is the foundation in 1946 of the United 
N       I             C          E         F     UNICEF).  The rights of the UNCRC include 
rights to provision, protection and participation. The Convention states that children should 
be entitled to resources needed in order to live, to safeguards with respect to abuse, 
neglect, exploitation and discrimination, and to contribute to the decisions which affect 
their lives and upbringing. Such rights, then, might include access to education and 
schooling, to proper family life, to healthcare, to protection under the law, and to freedom 
of association and assembly. As already noted Alderson has argued that the UNCRC should 
be applicable to all children regardless of perceptions of immaturity or incapacity. Alderson 
argues that such rights are limited (with regard to reasonable expectations and their 
enforcement), aspirational (with regard to resources available for their realisation), 
conditional (upon contingent factors such as national legal structures and capacities of 
children), and shared (namely, the rights of children are collective with regard to all children 
and hence not individual) (Alderson, 2000: 23).  317 
 
Many commentators have argued that the UNCRC continues in a long tradition of 
colonial and imperial discourse regarding European definitions and understanding of 
childhood; these specific and originally localised definitions and understandings shaped in 
particular social and historical contexts of power and exploitation are now deployed globally 
(i.e. definitions of childhood are always relative to culture, history and social formation). 
Others have argued, on the contrary, that the definitions of childhood being deployed are 
ones that accord with the natural body of the child in the context of social structure and 
understood through the accumulation of knowledge in the natural and social sciences (i.e. 
all children everywhere are ceteris paribus sufficiently similar to warrant a universal 
approach). The UNCRC certainly continues with a developmental notion of children and a 
notion of development which is supported through family, schooling and protective welfare 
state. As we have seen earlier in the book, the history of developmentalism has been, and 
still is to a large extent, the object of much criticism within the sociology of childhood. It 
would be easy to read the UNCRC as ethnocentric, essentialist and colonial. But Jude 
Fernando asks whether relativist arguments, which point to the entrenched historic 
interests encoded in the UNCRC, could be detrimental to the welfare of children as 
                                                                                      
(Fernando, 2001: 19). He asks whether relativist critiques implicitly support neoliberal 
globalisation in their attack on global standards and measures through which to move aid 
and resources to those children in conditions of economic and social hardship. He argues 
                                                                                  atus quo and, 
moreover, make it difficult to effectively deal with the forces that are working to undermine 
                                       “                                                   
                                     F                   In a different vein, Erica Burman 318 
 
                                                                                         
terms of a discursive set of oppositions between western/non-western, local/global and 
individual/state and that these oppositions need to be understood in the context of 
histories of colonialism. She argues, moreover, that: 
If we commit ourselves to a purely local notion of childhood then we are subject 
to three kinds of dilemmas. First, we either adopt a moral relativist position or 
we are positioned as imposing a colonial-tainted code. Second, it appears that 
we are positioned as having no choice either to collude with paternalism or with 
fundamentalism. Third, we are in danger of mistaking authentic those traditional 
practices which are brought to life through acquiring an anti-imperialistic 
meaning. (Burman, 1996: 62) 
Burman pushes us in the direction of not thinking of global and local and oppositions, but as 
more complexly related to each other. 
The UNCRC emerges from, consolidates and further markets and helps construct a 
proliferation of agencies which operate across the international, national and local. Lawyers 
and legal agencies have been a significant part of this proliferation (Halliday and Osinsky, 
2006). And yet although the globalisation of legal languages, intergovernmental agencies 
and nongovernmental agencies certainly constitutes a new dynamic in the understanding 
                                                                  I                           
that there was widespread agreement on the wording of the Convention and, as Burman 
                                                                                              
within the articles of the Convention, notably with regard to pressure from the USA for 
Article 13 on freedom of expression, Article 14 on freedom of thought, 15 on freedom of 319 
 
association and 16 on rights to privacy (Burman, 1996). Nevertheless, its wording is 
sufficiently flexible with regard to its interpretation and implementation.  
The articles of the Convention only have effect in the context of social practice and 
infrastructure. National state and governmental agencies clearly shape the take-up, 
interpretation and action with respect to the articles. Different national governments have 
taken on the UNCRC in different ways (Franklin, 2002). The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) is central in this respect, regarding the reporting on State parties in regular 
reports, which are then picked up in the national press and other media (in a               
                      “                             C          C               
Ombudsman (e.g. Sweden, Norway and the UK) to act as both witness and advocate for 
                   B                                             T             s and 
mechanisms are not uniform inasmuch as many countries do not have commissioners. But 
also, there are difficulties regarding the assessment of the implementation of the UNCRC 
inasmuch as data is gathered often with only hazily defined standard measures (cf. UNICEF 
I         ‘        C              B                                               
                                                                                              
                     B                  E                                                  
rights within a technocratic discourse, which some argue simply closes down debate and the 
actual politics and contingencies underlying those rights (Reynaert et al, 2009: 528). But we 
should also recognise the agency of children in the mobilisation and interpretation of rights. 
W       M                                                                                  
    UNC‘C                    E                                                      
remarkable resonance with children and grassroots organizations in many developing 
countries where working children are increasingly undertaking advocacy, mobilization, 320 
 
                                                                                    M       
2001: 50). In that sense, the interpretation and use of the UNCRC is manifold. But this is not 
                                                                    G                        
                 J         J                                                               
the                                                                                           
           J         J                 
Nick Lee provides an interesting analysis of the UNCRC in terms of its fundamental 
ambiguity with regard to the construction of childhood (Lee, 2001). Lee focuses on Article 
12 of the UNCRC which states that children who are able to express their views should have 
                                                                                              
that those views are to                                                   M         A       
12 states that children should be heard in legal and governmental decision-making 
                                                                                        
procedural rules o                 A           UNC‘C         L               A                 
children to be viewed outside of a normatively defined developmental discourse and in 
                                            B   L                                          
ch                                                                                          
cannot simply be taken at face value. Its mediation is more problematic. Lee states that 
       A                 ambivalent about children, about their capabilities to have voices of 
                                                                                   L   
                                                                                          
            L              T                  UNC‘C     A    le 12 in particular contains a 
series of contradictions between an adult framing of children as not yet adult (i.e. in a stage 
of development, becoming adult) but also an understanding of children as morally equal to 321 
 
adults, between an idea of childhood as a universal and the applicability of the articles to 
                                                                                UNC‘C   
promissory status as an international agreement and its actualisation in particular national 
jurisdictions. For Lee, these contradictions do not deter from the power of the UNCRC, 
rather the fundamental ambiguities about childhood at the heart of the UNCRC constitute 
                                                                                         
never solely with either adult or child, nor global or national institution (Lee, 2001: 95). 
Notwithstanding the openness of the UNCRC as a legal text and the ambiguities 
regarding its implicit and explicit claims, it is important to understand the Convention in 
terms of its complex scaling. Namely, the UNCRC cannot simply be understood in terms of 
universal/particular or global/national scaling, such that a relation of scale between two 
homogenous self-enclosed spaces is assumed i.e. the universal or global in one space and 
the particular or national in another. In fact the scaling is more complex. Organisations and 
agencies construct connections and spaces. Particular places have significance, such as the 
United Nations Headquarters overlooking the East River in Manhattan, New York City or the 
offices of Amnesty International in Shoreditch, London in the UK or the refugee camps in 
Darfur in the Sudan. And particular forms of connection have different relations of 
significance across those locations, whether it be funding for campaigns, aid, or the influx of 
medics equipped with medicines into a war torn region. Across the variated chains of 
                                                                                    
participants and their status and agency vis-a-vis rights and political participation cannot be 
divorced from these specific chains of agency. I                                         
refer, for example, to the United Nations Headquarters as global or the agreements of its 322 
 
members to a Convention as universal and to refer to the malnutrition of a child in Darfur or 
a teenager on the streets of London as particular.  
NGOs have been particular forms of organisation which have mushroomed over the 
latter part of the twentieth century. They have facilitated connections across international 
forums and national agencies and local practices. Certainly, the ability of NGOs to operate 
effectively is dependent on national governmental organisation (Fernando, 2001). NGOs 
often operate within nationally defined parameters, channelling support in the context of 
national legislation and national infrastructures. Much of the mobilisation around the 
UNCRC has been nongovernmental, orchestrating grassroots organisations, using the 
                                          ectly legal manner, but as a form of mobilisation and 
action at the level of civil society. In some sense the rise of global NGOs is closely correlated 
to the rise of a global discourse of child saving. Nongovernmental organisations have been 
central to th                                             A  F                         
              NGO                                                                            
                                F                    H                                   
fallen and NGOs have turned to private funding and to areas which are able to garner public 
sympathy and support. He mentions the example of NGOs turning from education and 
healthcare to microcredit.  
These complex spaces of rights, territory and authority are mediated through 
different forms of cultural mediation (forms of speech, notification, legal discourse, 
technology, various artefacts and so on). An important aspect of the globalisation of 
                                                         -governmental discourse, but also 
                                    K    N                                            
intermestic (crudely meaning both international and domestic) nature of human rights 323 
 
which figures such rights in the context of a mixing of both international and national law 
and culture. Importantly, for her, the cultural politics of human rights implies serious 
consideration of the media in its construction of a symbolic space for the struggle over the 
meaning of rights and for the assembling of a mediated public sphere. The agency and 
impact of NGOs, but also of the UN and its committees and peripheral organisations, 
actively create strategy on the basis of such a media space. For Nash, this is a reflexively 
constructed space in which actors are neither simply dopes nor controllers (Nash, 2009). 
The regular country reports of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, for example, are 
not only technocratic and concerned with measurement and implementation, but also focal 
points for mediated public contestation and struggle. 
 
Sovereignty and Humanity 
T                                                                           
discourses and ideas about children in the context of a balancing of powers across family 
and the state in terms of competency, protection and welfare and, on the other hand, ideas 
about human rights and humanity that consolidate in the European enlightenment in the 
late eighteenth century and which have constituted a fundamental basis upon which 
national jurisdictions are formed. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century these 
                                                                                       
                                 J          B                   A                  
(Bhabha, 2009). Bhabha points to the huge number of people who are recognised as 
                               U      N       H    C                ‘         UNHC‘         
of 5.8 million people stateless and also that it is believed that the actual figure to be much 
higher, nearer 15 million (Bhabha, 2009: 411); but Bhabha is herself interested in the 324 
 
significant number of these stateless people who are children. She refers to these stateless 
             A                        H      A                                      of the 
stateless in the shaping of the twentieth century. Bhabha indicates that the category 
                                                                                      
refugees and hence have no national government to look over them, but it also includes 
children who are technically citizens by virtue of birth but who lack legal registered identity. 
T                                                                                            
they are, or they risk being, separated from their parents or customary guardians; and they 
do not in fact (regardless of whether they do in law) have a country to call their own 
                                                                 B                   A        
children are seen by Bhabha to be migrant or refugee children who have neither nation nor 
family to offer guaranteed protection, education and welfare. These children are 
                                                                                         
by someone who is able to care for them and hence risk neglect, abuse, or exploitation, and 
they face accumulated risks of economic, social and psychological disadvantage and danger 
(Bhabha, 2009: 414). 
Hannah Arendt, just after the Second World War, in the context of the Shoah, the 
huge migratory movement of peoples across Europe, the founding of the State of Israel, and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, makes a profound and resounding argument 
about the relationship between human rights and statelessness (1962). She writes that: 
 M                                           -reaching in consequence has been 
statelessness, the newest mass phenomenon in contemporary history, and the existence of 
an ever-growing new people comprised of stateless persons, the most symptomatic group in 
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first World War inevitably added a new category to those who lived outside the pale of the 
law, while none of the categories, no matter how the original constellation changed, could 
                       A                   T                                               
their country of origin nor be fitted in the country of their current habitation, were an 
                                                                                             
by police forces that grew as a consequence of this new category of person. Internment 
camps, refugee camps, and concentration camps were set up to house and offer a solution 
                              F   A                                                         
pose the problem as it had not been before and to demand the solutions imposed. The 
Rights of Man in Europe since the French Revolution were shaped within the European 
nation-state and defined according to formal and substantive rights of citizenship. They 
were defined according to notions of natural man and natural law. Thus the history of 
European philosophy from Rousseau and Hobbes onward helps to frame this Man. Arendt 
                         ‘         M                                           
                                                                                        W     
War dispelled that myth (Arendt              A                         ‘         M    
supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable   even in countries whose constitutions 
were based upon them   whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any 
        A                   I                                                              
new connotation: they became a standard slogan of the protectors of the underprivileged, a 
kind of additional law, a right of exception necessary for those who had nothing better to 
fall back                                                                                    
rights of national citizens (Arendt, 1962: 293). Arendt argues that whereas the Rights of Man 326 
 
rest upon a notion of human nature and natural law, human rights imply a sense of political 
community (Arendt, 1962: 298). The notion of humanity has replaced that of nature or 
                                                                                             
                                                              “               I           
means certain whether this is possible. For, contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian 
attempts to obtain new declarations of human rights from international organizations, it 
should be understood that this idea transcends the present sphere of international law 
which still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign 
                                                                                     A       
1962: 298). Thus, those innocent persons, naked in their existence, were not immediately 
recognised as humans, as part of humanity. Rather those, in their bare humanness, without 
the protection of the nation-state were only seen as savages, unclothed beasts. For Arendt, 
moreover, this bare existence is framed in the context of a classical Greek division between 
household and state, between the private sphere of the domestic and the public world of 
          “            T                                                                  
civilized society, is as consistently based on the law of equality as the private sphere is based 
on the law of universal difference and differentiation. Equality, in contrast to all that is 
involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organization insofar as 
it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members 
                                                                                         
(Arendt, 1962: 301). Those forced to live outside political community can only fall back on 
their humanness as if like animals in nature. 
T                         G       A                  A                        
Foucault and Schmitt) as a major framing device in his discussion of modern forms of 327 
 
sovereignty and bio-political power (1998). For Agamben the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen of 1789 similarly cements a relationship between rights and citizenship in 
                                                      I                                as 
                                                                                             
             A                    A                                                          
that there is, as Arendt also argues, an intimate relationship between totalitarianism and 
                           A                                                              
                                                  A                    B                    
read as precisely the problem. Agamben refers to the appalling genocide in Rwanda and to 
the imaging of victims in development campaigns. He says:  
T                           ‘                                           
                                                                              
may well be the most telling contemporary cipher of the bare life that 
humanitarian organizations, in perfect symmetry with state power, need. A 
humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to reproduce the isolation 
of sacred life at the basis of sovereignty and the camp   which is to say, the pure 
space of exception   is the biopolitical paradigm that it cannot master. 
(Agamben, 1998: 133-4) 
For Agamben, it is this correlation which perhaps more urgently than Arendt, pushes him to 
figure the refugee as that limit case that surpasses the construction of rights in the context 
of nation and natality (or birth). The figure of the refugee precisely calls such a paradigm 
into question. 
B                                                                 A                   
understands the contemporary framing of politics in such a way that allows for international 328 
 
agreements and organisation above and beyond the level of the nation. For example, she 
gives an example of Tabitha Kaniki Mitunga, a five year old girl from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. This little girl, her father killed, was living with family while her mother 
sought asylum in Canada.  On her way to meet her mother, Tabitha was separated from her 
uncle in Brussels. She had no passport or legal documents. She was interned in a remand 
centre and then deported back to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Bhabha uses this 
example not only to illustrate the tragedy of refugees, but to show how the European Court 
of Human Rights found the Belgian state respons         T                                 
hence in breach of her human rights as stated in Article 3 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Bhabha, 2009: 433). 
International law, but also nongovernmental organisations which both support and criticise 
the deployment of such law, constitutes a part of the picture which was missing at the time 
   A                   The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Bhabha argues that there is still 
a big deficit between international law and the actualisation of these intentions at a national 
level. It would be possible to argue that the neglect and exploitation of refugee children is 
multiplied as a consequence of that deficit. But such an account places too much faith in the 
law. Ranciere has been critical of those models of social justice which aim to close the gap 
                                 H                                                     
                                                                A       he is critical of 
Arendt (and also Agamben). He states that: 
It is only if you presuppose that the rights belong to definite or permanent 
subjects that you must state, as Arendt did, that the only real rights are the 
rights given to citizens of a nation by their belonging to that nation, and 
guaranteed by the protection of their state. If you do this, of course, you must 329 
 
deny the reality of the struggles led outside of the frame of the national 
                                                                                
deprived of national rights is the implementation of the abstractedness of those 
rights. The conclusion is in fact a vicious circle. It merely reasserts the division 
between those who are worthy or not worthy of doing politics that was 
presupposed at the very beginning. (Ranciere, 2004: 306) 
F                                                                                          
national, but also the familial. For Arendt the figure of the refugee is typified as having an 
                                                             A                   T        
existence of the refugee is marked as a site of infancy. This trope is similarly repeated in 
A                                                                                       al 
power. For both these writers there is a sense that the entry into political community 
involves not only an entry from private household to public domain of politics, but also a 
transition from infancy to maturity, and in Aristotelian terms from voice to organised 
speech. For Bhabha, her figure of the Arendt children is such that these children are doubly 
infantilised, constituted as external to both political community and family. And in this 
                                                             tection of children as framed 
within a model of the family, whether provided by parents or state officials acting in loco 
parentis. The issue, then, is not only the formulation of rights in the context of the post-
national, but also the imagination of those rights external to the model of the family. 
 
Conclusion 
T                                                                                 
                                                                     T                       330 
 
rights is measured in terms of their competency and capacity to speak and to reason, which 
has been shaped by their learning and development within a schooled context (inasmuch 
the school is seen to instil cognitive and symbolic communicational capacity) and is 
increasingly shaped in the context of globally networked information and communication 
technology. Moreover, in the course of the twentieth century this form of understanding 
gets complexified in the context of the international and a notion of global humanity. The 
figure                                                                               K        -
W                    N     F                F                                         
conditions of the post-national. There is still a question though as to the infrastructuring of 
                             -national level and the interdependences and relations across 
international and national, but also an issue as to whether the bestowing of rights to 
refugee children constitutes a form of welfare akin to familial care. At one level, this is 
clearly not a problem. Children need to be helped. The two genealogies of family/state and 
humanity/nation are now in practice increasingly intermixed. And yet if the refugee child 
forces a questioning of the nation-citizen-nat                   A                        
question both that and the familial model of care. To repeat, this is not a call to abnegate 
                                                                                                
human rights in the context of the political     ‘                                T         
huge and difficult question, but a start is to recognise what Ranciere says about democracy, 
              D                                       I                                    
qua                                  ‘                     ‘                                
on prior definitions and qualifications as to who might or is able to speak. This is not to 
                                                                           ts in the context 
of the historical and contingent accumulation of resources and infrastructures concerning 331 
 
what counts as political expression, in what areas, with regard to what topics, with regard to 















































Chapter Thirteen - Conclusions 
In this final chapter I want to summarise my conclusions but also confirm a slightly 
different orientation for the sociological study of                    I            I         
reduce much of the subtlety of the field into a set of blockages in, or myths of, current 
                                                                                               
sort of default resource. I then want to identify some of the undercurrents of contemporary 
discussion in the field and particularly with respect to describing and mapping the leading 
                                         T                                                     
about childhood studies and the contribution of sociology to such an interdisciplinary field 
and finally to suggest a point of urgent discussion. 
 
Five Myths of Childhood Studies 
There are currently five longstanding myths which circulate in discussion of children 
and childhood. These are the myths of the individual child, of identity and difference, of 
homogenous and static space, of unitary scale, and of the ontology of agency. I will discuss 
each briefly in turn. 
a)  The Myth of the Individual Child 
The idea that subjects are able to exist, whether children or adults, independently of 
others is one that is regularly and repeatedly rejected within sociological thought. Children, 
from infants to teenagers, are social animals. Over and above any question of dependency 
children are, as we all are, connected with others (people and things, relations simple and 
complex, different forms of materiality, different textures and affects). We should no more 
believe that children are possessive individuals, than adults. Similarly, children cannot be 
defined as striving for such personhood as a property (Lee, 2001). 334 
 
What we have seen over the course of the chapters of this book is that many 
sociologists of children would explicitly agree with such a position. Many of the sociologists 
considered in this book would argue that children are thoroughly social beings. Many would 
also argue that any capacities which are held by children are not held individually, but only 
by virtue of their relationship with others. For example, the capacities of children are 
dependent on their locally situated interrelations with other children or with adults. Any 
capacities are thus seen to be a facet of the situation.  
Other sociologists would argue that the solitary individual child is either an 
ideological and imaginary fiction or an effect of forms of power and knowledge. In the first 
instance, the individual is a form of security, a mode of identification, which harks back to a 
primary maternal security. In the second, the individual child is the outcome of discursive 
mobilisation and institutional weight, which draws on subjects, inscribes their bodies and 
bestows a soul. In such accounts, the individual is the effect of systemic power. 
The myth of the individual child is a myth which does indeed circulate and yet few 
explicitly believe in it. It is most often heard in fragments, although it finds its clearest 
expression in its relation to the myth of the social agent (which I discuss below) as the 
repository of capacity building. 
b)  The Myth of Identity and Difference 
There is still a sense that the sociology of childhood works with an understanding of 
children in terms of their separation from adults, their exclusion from a world of adults and 
their progression from the one world to the other. In such an interpretation, children are 
understood in terms of their having an underlying identity and that identity is defined only 
inasmuch as it is defined against the identity of adults. Children and childhood are defined in 
terms of their fundamental difference from adults and adulthood. This difference is 335 
 
understood as a consequence of a structural universal (namely that for all history and 
geography children are and have been understood as different from adults and that 
irrespective of particular social and cultural formations that fundamental structural 
universal remains), also as a deep-rooted, sometimes hard-wired, facet of the self-identity 
of children (namely that inscribed in the bodies and minds of children are self-evident 
identifiers which hold                                                                          
generative binary which is only instantiated and actualised in particular empirical settings 
(namely that, although generational difference is socially specific, it nevertheless is repeated 
as a constant structure such that the child is not adult and the adult is not child).  
Let us consider the example of Ngisti, who, having fled east Africa when she was 
sixteen years old, arrived in the UK, at which point she was detained as attempting illegally 
to enter the country. She was assessed by professionals working for the social services 
                                                                         H    O      
asylum unit in Croydon, South of London, and she was deemed not to be a child and was 
                                                C               H                          
other children, was taken up by Mark Scott of Bhatt Murphy solicitors, taken to court, and 
was eventually won with regard to the primacy of the social service initial assessments. The 
case of the children, who were variously fleeing war, civil unrest,  torture, rape and sexual 
assault, was widely reported in the press and other bodies, such as the UN Refugee Agency, 
the Royal College of Paediatricians     H   M         I               P                     
concerns with the action of the Home Office and Border Agency. For us, the case provides 
evidence not that the expert judgement of the social service team was essentially correct on 
the basis that the children were really children (inasmuch as their bodies or minds disclosed 
a fundamental identity or inasmuch as their decision instantiated a fundamental structural 336 
 
universal regarding the differentiation of childhood from adulthood), but rather that a 
particular set of people working within particular organisational constraints and professional 
rules of practice through their assessment and judgement differentiated these forty children 
and designated them as children. Moreover, the assemblage regarding the judgement of the 
social service team was supported and further mobilised with regard to other assemblages 
regarding paediatric knowledge, human rights legislation and definitions of humanity in the 
context of United Nations definitions of children in the context of migration and detention. 
There is no sense then that we can simply have recourse to a prior definition of the child or 
childhood (whether as a structural universal or an in-built identity) in the differentiation of 
adults from children. These divisions are the outcomes of particular performances through 
particular assemblages and the broader orchestration of assemblages. Outside of this nexus 
of arrangements (and the contestation of judgement and assessment by the Home Office 
and undoubtedly sections of the right-wing media) Ngisti was not necessarily a child or adult 
and her conduct, habits, pleasures and anxieties was not necessarily stamped with that 
division. Similarly her construction as child or adult or particular age of child with respect to 
schooling would not be determined by the same forms of judgement, assessment and 
technologies of observation as by the social services team. There is not a universal 
structuring principle (of generationing) which organises and distributes all discourses, 
                                                                               T                 
are immanent, not external, to the assemblage.  That said, there are of course overlaps and 
overdeterminations and that is precisely why a groups of paediatricians might object to the 
original Home Office judgement. But because there is no clear cut division, the authorisation 
of expertise across different assemblages constitutes a form of labour. Any authority that 
paediatricians in the UK might have with respect to a judgement made by the UK Home 337 
 
Office regarding the detention of child asylum seekers is not an a priori authority; it has to 
be worked on, it is has to be set up and there has to be a huge amount of translation work 
to make it happen; even then it is not an incontestable judgement. Any equivalence across 
assemblages in this sense requires translation work. We cannot assume a generalised series 
of equivalences in the manoeuvring of children and adults nor can we assume a principle 
which divides between the two and locks the meaning of each as a binary relation between 
them.   
c)  The Myth of Divided, Separated and Homogenous Space 
For some reason, as we have seen with Aries, but also many others, sociologists of 
childhood  find it easier sometimes to think about children within child-only settings, as if 
peer interactions in playgrounds or school classrooms or elsewhere were not also 
interactions with other people overlooking or nearby or in the immediate or distant past, 
helping to build, shape and facilitate particular kinds of interactions and as if also those 
interactions were not also caught up in and necessarily mixed with materials, resources and 
technologies made and re-made through accumulated processes and histories and 
geographies. Similarly, some sociologists are happy to talk of childhood (or conversely of 
adulthood) as designating a space which is both contained and within which adults (or 
children) are removed and excluded. When, for example, sociologists talk about the 
boundaries between adulthood and childhood as blurring or disappearing, they are talking 
as if these two categories constituted relatively fixed and homogenous spaces, spaces 
defined and dominated by those categories. Even if we take the simple example of pre-
school children                                            W                                  
childhood. But what do we mean? Do we mean that this is a space within which adults have 
been excluded? Of course, not! This is a space which is built by adults (i.e. those who design 338 
 
the playground and build the sandpit alongside the swings and climbing frames and so on), 
but it is also built by children (i.e. through their building of sandcastles and roads and other 
things in the pit itself). The small children, who play in this sandpit, act as attractors and are 
accompanied by adults (whether parents, guardians, grandparents, siblings or others). Do 
we mean, then, that it is a childhood space because it is intended for children? Yes, but the 
                                                                                  C          
agency is not defined in terms of children or adult spaces, but rather through highly 
entangled social relations. 
The myth of homogenous divided space relies on a subject position from which one 
is able to see from a position of vantage, to see the differences between people, and to see 
their neat spatial distribution. Moreover, this vantage position is such that it is itself 
untainted by the labour of distributing. What is seen is the clarity of childhood and 
adulthood and little else. It is from such a position that one can talk of childhood as a 
becoming inasmuch as one is at a point infinitely receding toward a transcendent point, a 
point which is both inside and outside the frame. But equally, and contrary to this, such a 
vantage point allows one to claim the clear position of supporting children, to speak from 
their standpoint. Such an understanding presumes the fixity of spatial relations prior to their 
instantiation, such that one is able to take up the position of the child, to speak from their 
position, only because that position is known (or at least assumed to be known). The 
distribution of homogenous space not only forgets the labour of division and the labour of 
constructing a vantage point (Law and Benschop, 1997), but also the boundary-work 
involved in such demarcation and policing (Star and Griesemer, 1989). In this sense, the 
labour of division is not only epistemological, but also ontological labour. It makes little 339 
 
difference whether that boundary-                                                       
             
d)  The Myth of Scale 
C                                                                                    -
to-                            “                                        agency in terms of 
social relations within conditions of co-presence. Thus, they like to investigate social 
interactions in terms of particular interactions within a classroom or in a playground or at 
      C                                               n is understood generally in terms of 
their interactions with others nearby in relations of propinquity. However, even when 
considering, for example, communication at a distance over the internet or by telephone or 
through some other abstract system, these relations are understood with reference to and 
by analogy with relations of propinquity. Agency, then, is understood in terms either of the 
myth of the proprietorial individual or of the resources generated through social relations in 
conditions of co-pre       A                                                            A   
even when we look to actor-network theory or other post-social theories of agency, agency 
                                           I                                                  olving 
actors which are bigger, such as the state, the family, the education system, or which are 
aggregates of micro-sociological entities, such as populations. Actor-network theory in some 
sense offers a corrective to this bi-scalar world of micro and macro, small and big. But it also 
tends to reduce the big to the small and hence agents, actors, and actants are understood in 
terms of their highly localised relations of propinquity. Scale in actor-network theory is built 
up from small to big. 
In contrast, what we have seen in the context of the different arrangements 
considered over the course of this book is that scale is both small and big and more 340 
 
between. Local interactions between two children in a school playground are intersected, 
for example, with playground designs, teacherly interventions, government policy regarding 
school formations and the importance of play, the history of developmental psychology, and 
the regulations of class and motherhood. These constitute different elements with different 
histories and spatial forms and which come together in conditions of complexity. There is no 
position of vantage nor prior hierarchy from which to lock the perspective of macro and 
micro and to normalise its relations. The agency which circulates around children, in this 
sense, is defined through its multi-scalarity and its multi-dimensionality. Assemblages are 
rhizomatic and agency needs to be understood in this context. In the context of such multi-
dimensionality and multi-scalarity what becomes significant is not the mixing across 
different scales, but rather the devices and modes of translation which facilitate connection 
across and in between. Much recent discussion on this question talks of topology as a way 
of beginning to understand such complex post-Euclidean and post-Cartesian complex 
spatiality. 
e)  The Myth of the Social Agent 
Lastly, we come then to the myth of the social agent. It has been said that it is less an 
ontology and more a point of departure (Prout, 2005). This is certainly correct in some 
respects, but also wildly wrong in others. Agency, with regard to individual capacity 
possessed and contained only to be expressed through the intentions (whether conscious of 
unconscious) of that individual intentional subject, presumes insufficient ground to make 
the case for an ontology of agency with regard to children but equally no analytical ground 
for a point of departure. In this book we considered the arrangements of agency, such that 
agency neither starts nor finishes with any individual agent. Rather agency is understood 
more akin to agency as discussed within narrative analysis inasmuch as characters might be 341 
 
said to have agency but only inasmuch as that agency is orchestrated within narrative 
structure and forms of narration and in the context of other characters with agency. We talk 
about the actions of a character, about their motivations, but not in the sense that we 
                                     B                                                          
of children, as it were) is also one in which there is no single author but multiple authors. 
Each contributor is able to change the story and to tell the story from their perspective. 
Thus any character is encoded within multiple narrations. But even more so, these 
contributors are themselves narrated within the fictions they write. This is not to say though 
that anything can happen or that it is all fiction and hence has no substance. On the 
contrary, it simply means that the stakes are more complex. It does not imply an erasure of 
differences, unevenness, inequalities and the different forces of different agencies.  
I                                                                                       
not having agency, capacity and power. Although the presentation of children as active 
rather than passive had a place in the history of ideas about children and socialisation in the 
social sciences, it is based on a rather slanted history that ignores as much as it benefits. But 
more importantly such a binary, active or passive, constitutes a facile reduction. For 
example, a story in The Observer UK-based newspaper reports on children in Rwanda in 
2012, malnourished and dying. The problem of the extent of malnourishment among 
children became an acute problem once the statistical measurements of height and weight 
were compared to those of European children. The Rwandan Health Minister and a 
                           T                                                              
                                                    The Observer, 19
th February 2012). 
But if the statistical comparisons revealed the problem to government, it is the global food 
markets which create the problem. Rwanda is a country with sufficient food stocks, the 342 
 
story reports, but the cost of maize has increased to such an extent that local people are 
unable to afford to buy it in sufficient quantity to feed their families. Even if we take into 
account the framing of the story in a UK national newspaper, in a story written by the 
                                                                                           
looked at, to be the object of empathy, and ultimately to be saved, the disclosure of counter 
                                                                     king do in the face of 
such hardship cannot be interpreted within a reduced and limited stage of agency (i.e. as a 
question of whether the child is active or passive). Such assertions deliver little analytical 
       C                                      nt, but in the context of the assemblage of 
elements and with respect to a particular politics of engagement; the question of what is to 
be done cannot be reduced to the politics of either/or, active or passive.  
 
Descriptive Assemblages, Social Observation and Bio-Power  
It is clear from the substance of this book that I am not so much considering 
                                                                                          
thinking through the agencements or assemblages or arrangements within which children in 
some form or other find themselves. In this sense agency is always relational and never a 
property; it is always in-between and interstitial; and the capacity to do and to make a 
difference is necessarily dispersed across an arrangement. M                           
constitutes a problem-space, which is composed of questions, investigations and methods 
of analysis, but which also invites further questions, investigations and analyses. It is not 
constituted as a solution. It does not indicate a model which can then be deployed as a form 
of explanation of different kinds of social conduct. The different spaces of experience, 
experimentation and power that I consider   concerning the family, schooling, crime, 343 
 
health, play and consumer culture,                                           constitute 
                                                                                               
makes little sense to consider these spaces in terms of agency residing within individual 
children in the context of pre-existent social structures. 
T                                                                                 
of the growth of biopower, the growth of methods of observation and the growth of 
descriptive devices. As we noted in chapter two in our discussion of Ariès, the iconographies 
which develop around forms of family portraiture are significant not because they 
document the invention of childhood, but because they constitute significant forms of 
description of children in a manner that codifies them in particular kinds of ways with 
respect to dress, family status, location in the household and relation to the bucolic. Over 
the period that Ariès documents, we also see the increasing documentation of children with 
regard to their bodily conduct and their physiology and increasingly their interior self, 
defined through physiological, medical, psychological and psychiatric discourses. These 
discourses make children intelligible through ways of describing children and through 
methods of observing them. The observations of children, for example by Darwin, provide 
the basis for expert and scientific deliberation regarding the lives of children. The lives of 
children are thus defined in terms of their conduct with others and their internal state of 
growth and development. As we have also noted, this occurs over the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at a time which Foucault discusses in terms of the 
emergence and development of modes of governmentality concerned with the life of 
individuals and populations, namely biopower. It is at this time that we see the changing 
form of the family and the government of families in terms of their behaviours and 
psychologies, in terms of their norms and their pathologies. The growth of expertise 344 
 
concerning the lives of children becomes increasingly specialised, through the development 
of paediatric medicine in the twentieth century, the specialisms in psychology and 
education, and the growth of criminology based on theories of delinquency and crime. We 
witness across the twentieth century the deployment of forms of government not based 
solely within the institutions of the school, the clinic, the prison or the family, but more 
broadly across the population.  
It is also across the long period from the eighteenth to twentieth century that we see 
the growth in cultures directly oriented and addressed to children. Magazine and book 
publishing, radio, television and film, but also consumer cultures more broadly identify 
                                        y differentiated market. Of course, in the late 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the internet and social media add a new dimension to 
this dynamic. What these cultural forms provide is a series of platforms upon which 
                                 escribed, observed, displayed and circulated. Through 
                                                                                           
A                                                                                 T         
lives   whether real or fictional   which are written about and documented. They are 
recorded and narrativised. They are codified through modes of seriousness, but also 
melodrama, tragedy, comedy and romance. The affective codification further aligns the lives 
of children alongside the lives of others, including heroes and villains, horses, rabbits, and 
various other creatures. 
C                                                                                  
with the growth in descriptive assemblages and devices and the correlation of these with 
                           C                                                              
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sense, then, this book has been concerned not wi                                           
                                                                                            
                              T                                                       
review the literature nor are they surveys of the literature and the field. They are 
excavations of problem-                                                                 
from within those spaces, but also from across those spaces. Leaving the question of agency 
relatively open and allowing myself the opportunity to read the literature in a way not 
beholden to the strict intentions of their authors, I was able to disentangle some striking 
                               I                                                        
              n see across the different problem-spaces covered in this book some 
significant (if not necessarily sociologically novel) trends: 
 
a)  Children over the course of the modern period were initially thought best dealt 
with within specially designed institutions (schools, families, clinics and so on), 
but increasingly those institutions were displaced, but not by any means 
discarded, such that children now roamed the cities, the streets, the shopping 
centres and the worlds of cyberspace. In doing so, these children were escorted, 
watched, tagged and cared for, but also some roamed more freely and yet all 
were entangled with adults. Moreover, it was precisely this entanglement that 
provided a site of care, but also concern. Children outside of the classroom still 
needed to learn; children outside the clinic still needed to be healthy; children 
outside the sandpit still needed to play; children outside of the detention centre 
still needed to be surveilled; and children outside the family still needed to be 
parented. Moreover, the other side of this move can be seen in terms of the 346 
 
franchising of services outside the institutions and the mediation of forms of care 
through various intermediaries, whether particular dedicated persons or forms 
of technical device. Most obviously now online discussion services such as 
mumsnet provide means of raising questions about schooling, childcare, problem 
children, maternity, and so on in a manner that constitutes parenting as intensely 
mediated by others sharing similar experiences. 
 
b)  There has been a growth of the range of expertise and in the number of experts 
gathered around children. But this has meant an increasing agonism and 
antagonism concerning the resident authority over a particular child or problem. 
Thus, the question of who is authorised to speak for children with psychiatric 
problems no longer simply rests with psychiatrists specially trained in diagnosis 
and care. Instead, various patient groups, for example, might also lay claim to 
such authority, not on the basis of psychiatric knowledge, but with respect to 
intimate knowledge and experience of the community of sufferers. Increasingly 
then the problem-                                                            
inasmuch as there are conflicts of authority and status of knowledge. But also 
the growth of expertise has meant that synergies have formed across competing 
expertise and knowledge. Thus, for example, teachers and educationalists that 
might have been defined in contrast to those employed to market toys to 
children might now be drawn on by toy companies in the design of toys which 
may appeal to children and parents with regard to their pedagogic value. Toys 
may also be designed to facilitate learning within schools. Educational toys are 
not only those found in the home to hot-                                       347 
 
in the classroom as motivational objects and sites of pleasure and pedagogy. 
They might be intelligent, networked and constitute the platform for a 
commercialised educational strategy. 
 
c)  There has been a growth in the range and number of observational and 
descriptive devices such that children are known through a vast array of methods 
and means. They become intelligible through a vast array of different 
technologies of observation, aggregation and detail. Children are known rarely as 
whole persons and more often as aggregates (e.g. through forms of surveying) or 
as part-objects. Thus, for example infant teeth are identified as a particular set of 
part-objects, which are observed and measured through various dental 
technologies and which are aligned with commercial organisations selling 
specifically designed toothbrushes and toothpastes. Moreover, they are 
increasingly observed, described and known, not by experts on children, 
sometimes not even by experts, but by humans and increasingly machines 
trained and designed to gather data and to feed this data on. Their behaviour 
and attitudes are logged, their transactions are noted, and their agency is, 
accordingly, increasingly surveilled. Methods of research observation have 
sought to become more closely aligned to the forms of observation and 
description of children themselves. In this sense, the growth of large data sets 
                                                                            
manipulated are matched by the distribution of data retrieval and generation 
across a diversity of sources, which may be seen to be closer to the ground 
rather than located in the big laboratories or closed-in centres of calculation of 348 
 
old. Of course, the old centralised centres of calculation are still important, but 
                                                                   -        
     -       data generators, interpreters and analysers. Children, then, are not 
simply the objects of scientific knowledge, they are increasingly the co-producers 
of that knowledge, but in ways which are often driven by very different 
motivations and contexts of use and which, in doing so, radically re-articulate 
and re-orient the domains of certainty and authority. 
 
d)  Selfhood is increasingly a site of investment for children   through, for example, 
dress, adornment, writing, accumulation of music, and friendship networks. But, 
biographies are increasingly lived inside-out. They are no longer contained within 
individuals. They are thoroughly written and written for publics. They are 
thoroughly exteriorised. Emotions, friendships, loves, musical tastes, heartaches, 
anxieties and all are opened up to some and sometimes all. It is also accepted 
that these biographies will be able to be re-written, to be commented on and 
sometimes to be trashed and ridiculed and hated. Biographies are exteriorised, 
not because there is an individual interiorised body outside of which lives are 
now visible. But rather, biographies are exterior because they are now lived in-
between, in media res. These lives are interstitial and it is because they are so 
that they can be taken up, mediated, assembled and infrastructured. In this 
sense, also, the lives of children are relational. This is the stuff of childhood. 
 
C                                                                                             
the institutions of modernity which initially gave it such life, in the context of conflicting 349 
 
authority such that its capacity emerges in the gaps between competing claims and counter 
claims, in the context of a huge machinery of observational and descriptive devices which 
are increasingly aligne                                                                           
increasingly exteriorised biographies such that no longer do children simply define the 
                                                                              C          
agency in the twenty-first century is thus significantly different from that at the beginning of 
the last century. This is not to say that their agency is only defined by this leading edge, but 
rather that this leading edge constitutes potentially momentous change.  
 
Post-Childhood Studies? 
One of the big questions within academia concerns the question of whether children 
are best studied within the remit of an inter- or trans-disciplinary field of childhood studies. 
The recent focus on children was given a huge push by the framing of what has been called 
                                  T            -shifting framing of the field made centre-
                                                                                           
up across a range of disciplines. This paradigm-shifting intervention, although framed very 
much within the sociology of childhood, also took stock of other disciplines. Primarily these 
included social history and anthropology. Latterly this has also included media and cultural 
studies, some parts of social psychology, literary studies, development studies, cultural 
geography and art history. Many of these disciplines had established parallel intellectual 
agendas unbeknownst to the sociology of childhood. The success of this interdisciplinary 
field was largely dependent on a broad consensus regarding three key theoretical tenets, 
namely regarding                                                               an 
emphasis on social constructionist methodologies.  350 
 
Of course, it is clear that childhood studies, defined as the field of academic 
disciplines focussed on children, has a much longer history and the range of disciplines 
much wider. Across the range of different forms and methods of description and 
observation from across the academic disciplines, children have been made visible and 
intelligible to human, social, biological and medical sciences. From height and weight charts 
to Gessell domes, from ethnographic participant observation to social surveys, and from 
narrative analysis to aesthetics, children are disclosed as particular kinds of human being. 
Moreover, across those forms of observation, description and expertise there are many 
discussions. Paediatricians talk to anthropologists who talk to psychologists who talk to 
sociologists who in turn talk to literary theorists. There is no shortage of common 
conversation. But that said, these different disciplines encode often very different forms of 
causal explanation and often very different modes of professional writing. The weighting 
within different disciplines of different ideas of causality and of different methods of 
observing and documenting a relation of cause and effect or the transformation of a body 
over time means that undoubtedly there are severe epistemological limitations to any 
common project of childhood studies, over and above broad philosophical debate or 
problem-based research in which disciplinary anchors are uprooted for the purpose of the 
project at hand. That said, there are opportunities for dialogue which should not be missed. 
The commonality of this programme is assisted by, but needs more than, goodwill and 
conversation. 
 
What Lines are to be Drawn? 
  In many ways a broader horizon helps in this dialogue or rather in staging the 
diversity of antagonisms. Nikolas Rose notes, in his 2005 Clifford Barclay lecture on 351 
 
biomedicine and society, that according to repeated reports from the World Health 
O                                                                  -health and suffering across 
the globe is coded Z59.5 in the International Classification of Diseases. The condition Z59.5 
is extre             ‘               H                                                       
diseases across the globe, 12.2 million children under five died in developing countries from 
conditions that could have been surmounted for a few US cents per child (see WHO, 2002). 
The global inequality between rich and poor is huge and growing. The life expectancy in 
many countries in the global South is such that many of those countries are populated 
mainly by young people and children. Nearly half the population of Sierra Leone is under 14 
years of age. The mix of poverty and large numbers of young people has always been 
perceived as an explosive synthesis. For example, Giovanna Procacci, in her genealogy of the 
government of poverty, presents the fears of state of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries as follows: 
Pauperism is thus poverty intensified to the level of social danger: the spectre of the 
mob; a collective, essentially urban phenomenon. It is a composite (and thereby all 
the more dangerous) population which                                                
its tenements, its industrial agglomerations. It is a magma in which are fused all the 
dangers which beset the social order, shifting along unpredictable, untraceable 
channels of transmission and aggregation. It is insubordinate, hidden from the 
scrutinizing gaze of any governing instance. (Procacci, 1991: 158) 
The pauper was defined through its mobility and promiscuity, improvidence and frugality, 
and by its ignorance and insubordination.  
As I write this conclusion, London and other UK cities and towns have seen riots and 
looting. T    A    “                                                                   352 
 
enthusiasms of youth. The Occupy Movement in the US and across the globe is often talked 
about as an expression of the young. Sometimes these arrangements are discussed 
positively as hopes for a better future; often they are uneasily dismissed as at root forlorn 
and wretched. T                             I       A            Y     B                
(1997), have their lumpenness written on their bodies through the adult observers. They 
have a productivity, a productivity which has not escaped the productivity of others. But 
Abdullah and his colleagues account for lumpen youth in Sierra Leone. Abdullah says that 
               I                                                                          
live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or 
                      A                     T                          minals, gangs of 
young people who begin to form from the mid-1940s in Sierra Leone. They are associated 
with the rarray boy culture. The composition of this lumpen youth, Abdullah argues, 
changes in the 1970s when they become mixed with middle class young people. As such the 
                                                                                          
                                           A                     P                          
now mixed with university and school students and an aggressive anti-establishment 
popular culture provided a particular type of cultural expression. Throughout much of the 
late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the economic situation plus an increasing neo-liberal 
withdrawal of state services provided some of the context for the formation of the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. In a different context, Senegal in the late 1980s 
                                           M       D                                  
                                                s to rule are diminished; the liberated space 
                                                                                         
                                                                                         353 
 
production of synthetic idioms whose elements are borrowed from distant and 
                       D               -8). What is striking is that across the different 
contexts the voices, so often called upon to speak for the dispossessed youth, from 
clergymen to Marxists to philanthropic charities, but also whole swathes of experts from the 
natural and social sciences, continue to get heard, over and over again, in now globally 
                     B                                               G                   
close to the ground is another matter.   
The poor of the world are not only primarily in the global South, but also increasingly 
housed or homeless in the increasingly growing global cities. These cities are typified by 
neo-liberal governmental programmes and a large informal economy, both legal and illegal. 
These economies are also bulked up by huge numbers of children. Mike Davis asks the 
           T                                                                       M       
                                  H             
Portentous post-Marxist speculations like those of Negri and Hardt, about a new 
                                                                            
ungrounded in any real political sociology. Even within a single city, slum populations 
can support a bewildering variety of responses to structural neglect and deprivation, 
ranging from charismatic churches and prophetic cults to ethnic militias, street 
gangs, neoliberal NGOs, and revolutionary social movements. But there is no 
monolithic subject or unilateral trend in the global slum, there are nonetheless 
myriad acts of resistance. Indeed, the future of human solidarity depends upon the 
militant refusal of the new urban poor to accept their terminal marginality within 
global capitalism. (Davis, 2006: 202) 354 
 
The resistance to poverty, the urgent demand that this presents, is one that is certainly 
articulated by Marxism and the Left, but for Davis, it is not they who have the ears and 
hearts of those resident in the planet of slums. That voice, he argues, has been given 
                 M               H    G                   H            
What is clear is that the contemporary megaslum poses unique problems 
of imperial order and social control that conventional geopolitics has barely begun to 
register. If the point of the war against terrorism is to pursue the enemy into his 
sociological and cultural labyrinth, then the poor peripheries of developing cities will 
be the permanent battlefields of the twenty-first century. Some templates are 
obvious. Night after night, hornetlike helicopter gunships stalk enigmatic enemies in 
the narrow streets of the slum districts, pouring hellfire into shanties or fleeing cars. 
Every morning the slums reply with suicide bombers and eloquent explosions. If the 
empire can deploy Orwellian technologies of repression, its outcasts have the gods 
of chaos on their side. (Davis, 2004b: 14-5) 
It seems that children may be not only outcast, but increasingly have chaos on their side. 
But if anything, this book has attempted to indicate some of the rich research which lays 
bare the technological, infrastructural support for these voices and actions from those 
outcast. For sociologists it is important,                                            
understanding of their biographies, certainly to be guided by humanity, but we cannot 
return to a bifurcated ontology which poses technology against agency (Agamben, 2009).  
  O                                                                                   
context of sociological reflection, not moral argument. A concern with the agency of 
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unitary phenomenon. It is the task of a sociology of children to document that capacity 
when observed, but also to recognise incapacity, abuse, power relationality, torture, and 
              B                                                             D          
implies a notion of hanging from and being reliant upon, such that the one relied upon is 
weighed down by virtue of that dependency. Over and above the necessary connectedness 
of materiality, some social relations are defined through the weighing down, but not 
necessarily a burden, of some in the context of others. In the world we live in now   pretty 
much everywhere across the globe, irrespective of wealth or poverty, peacefulness or states 
of warfare   those who care for children (whether parents, grandparents, social workers, 
doctors, nurses, teachers, aunts, uncles, and children themselves) understand that 
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